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The provision of rural public goods in China, which heavily relied on 
fiscal revenue of local governments, affected peasants’ everyday lives. 
Although the central government had increased the investment on the rural 
area construction, the situation of rural public goods provision still remained 
unsatisfactory in villages dominated by agriculture. Not all public goods were 
under-provided however. This paper explores the factors leading to the high 
level of variation in the provision of public goods. This paper argues that the 
different outcomes of different types of public goods depended on the strong 
support of government and clear policies. Public infrastructure projects were 
classified into three categories in this paper based on whether local 
government has clear policy on fund allocation. 
The first category of public project was organised and funded mainly by 
the government with clearly defined policies. The success rate of these 
projects is high as they are often the key projects on the agenda of local 
governments. To show how specifically defined policies are crucial to the 
fundraising and fund allocation, this paper examines two major projects at 
county and village levels. The second category of public projects is funded 
mainly by the government, with unclear policies pertaining to fund application 
and fund allocation. The success is pending that depends mainly on guanxi or 
local governments’ own preferences. The interview with local government 
officials, village officials and farmers, and evaluating the account books of 
villages has revealed the workings of guanxi in the fundraising process of this 
category of public projects. The third category of rural public goods is 
provided mainly through village itself with little or no government’s financial 
support. The success rates of these projects are low. This dissertation delves 
into several case studies to investigate the major factors hindering the success 
of the provision of this category. 
This dissertation concludes that public goods provision in agricultural 
villages not only depends on local government, but more importantly, on 





clearly defined policies that county or town governments have. Public goods 
under government’s responsibility with clear policies are often successfully 
provided. For public goods that fall under the category of government’s 
responsibility without clear policies, they will fail to be provided unless either 
guanxi exists, or the project promotes local government’s achievements. For 
public goods that are provided by villages without government’s responsibility, 
it mostly fails to be provided unless the project is small enough to be within 
the affordability of farmers and to avoid free-rider problem, or entrepreneurs 
donates heavily. 
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Chapter	  1	  	  
Introduction	  
 
1.1 The	   Problem	   of	   Rural	   China’s	   Public	   Goods	  
Provision	  
After more than 30 years of reform and opening up, China’s economy has 
witnessed dramatic development. However, the development is uneven and 
huge disparities have existed between cities and villages, and between coastal 
areas and inner areas. Rural public goods provision remains a problem despite 
reforms in agricultural production and management. Lower spending on 
public goods perpetuated slower growth in poorer provinces.1 In many villages, 
the poor condition of rural infrastructure such as roads, drinking water and 
irrigation facilities has hindered economic and social development of rural 
China, and has greatly affected the living condition of farmers.  
The overall provision of rural public goods has been low. It was reported 
that until 2008, around 10,000 towns and 40,000 administrative villages in 
China had no paved road, nearly 280 million peasants did not secure drinking 
water2 and there were insufficient irrigation facilities for farming. According 
to statistics provided by the Ministry of Water Resources in 2010, 959 million 
mu (nearly half) of the total 1,830 million mu of farmland had no irrigation 
facilities.3  
Total investment in rural public goods provision is grossly inadequate. 
Villages have enjoyed only a relatively small share of total budgetary 
                                                
1 Jean-Jacques Dethier, “Governance, Decentralization, and Reform: An Introduction” In 
Governance, Decentralization and Reform in Chile, India and Russia. ed. Jean-Jacques 
Dethier (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 24. 
2 Qu, Yanchun, “Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji yu Gonggong Caizheng de Jianli” (The 
Establishment of Rural Public Goods Provision and Public Expenditure), Shandong Shehui 
Kexue, no. 5 (2008): 72. 
3 Yao, Ruifeng, “Zhonghan Wuwen—Zhuangfang Guojia Fangzong Mishuzhang, Shuilibu 
Fubuzhang Liuning” (Five Questions—Interview with Liuning, Secretary General of the State 
Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters, and Vice Minister of Minister of Water 
Resources), Xinhua News Agency, 26 March 2010. Available at: 
 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/26/content_13253894_3.htm> (accessed 18 
May 2010). 





investment from upper-level government.4 From 1991 to 2004, the reported 
proportion of public expenditures by the state on rural public goods provision 
to the total was a consecutive 10.26%, 10.05%, 9.49%, 9.20%, 8.43%, 8.82%, 
8.30%, 10.69%, 8.23%, 7.75%, 7.71%, 7.17%, 7.12% and 8.28%. The 
proportion was not only low but also decreasing.5 A large part of public 
investment on rural public goods in many places came from village level 
organisations and villagers rather than from the state.6  
There is also the question of indiscriminate investment in public goods. 
Some governments invested in vanity projects for a specific event or a brief 
period to demonstrate their achievements to upper-level government. The 
result was the oversupply of some public goods and the undersupply of some 
needy public goods.7  
The lack of rural public goods provision in many of China’s villages was 
due to historical as well as current institutional factors. After the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China, the state had focused on heavy industry 
development and allocated resources from the countryside to contribute to 
urban construction and industrialisation.8 To some extent, the development of 
industry in the early stage of industrialisation in China was at the expense of 
agriculture.9  
                                                
4 Zhang, Xiaobo, “Fiscal Decentralization and Political Centralization in China: Implications 
for Growth and Inequality”, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 34, no. 4. (December 
2006): 713-726. 
5 Qu, Yanchuna. “Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji Zhidu de Kunjing yu Chuangxin”, no. 
2 (February 2007): 96. 
6 Zhang, Linxiu, Li Qiang, Luo Renfu, Liu Chengfang and Sigao, Luo, “Zhongguo Nongcun 
Gonggong Wupin Touzi Qinagkuang Ji Quyu Fenbu” (The Situation and Distribution of 
Public Investment on Rural Public Goods in China), Zhongguo Nongcun Jingji, no. 11 (2005): 
18-25; Zhang, Linxiu, Renfu Luo, Chengfang Liu and Rozelle, Scott, “Investing in Rural 
China—Tracking China’s Commitment to Modernization”, The Chinese Economy. vol. 39, no. 
4 (July-August 2006): 57-84. 
7 Qu, Yanchun, “Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji yu Gonggong Caizheng de Jianli” (The 
Establishment of Rural Public Goods Provision and Public Expenditure), Shandong Shehui 
Kexue, no. 5 (2008): 72-76. 
8 Feng Xingyuan, Christer Ljungwall Renqing Li, Zhongguo de Cunji Zuzhi Yu Cunzhuang 
Zhili (Village Organisations and Village Governance in China), (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui 
Kexue Chubanshe, 2009), p. 290. 
9 Yu, Shui. Xiangcun Zhili Yu Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji (Rural Governance and 
Public Goods Provision, Shehui Wenxian Chubanshe, (Social Sciences Academic Press) 
(2008), p. 1. 





Unlike other countries, China’s provision of rural public goods is based 
on a dual system, one for the cities and another for the countryside. The 
provision of rural public goods and services in China is usually a unilateral 
imposition by government rather than the result of government-society 
negotiation and consultation. Farmers have to pay for public goods like it or 
not.10 Public facilities such as water, electricity, communications, schools, and 
hospitals in cities are provided by the governments, while rural public goods 
have to be contributed by the farmers in villages, with the government only 
providing subsidies.11 The heavy responsibility has lowered farmers’ income 
and purchasing power.12  
Before the tax-for-fee reform (TFR), rural public goods were provided by 
non-institutional means—funds from farmers.13  To relieve the burden of 
farmers, the central government has implemented the TFR and the abolition of 
agricultural tax (AAT). However, studies show that the TFR has adversely 
affected the ability or willingness of villagers to invest in public goods.14 Post-
reform villages experienced decreases in both village expenditure for public 
services and public funding input from the county level, with villages in the 
upper-middle income brackets hardest hit.15  
After the AAT, the fiscal revenue of town governments has been greatly 
reduced, especially for those less developed areas that depend largely on 
agriculture for revenue. Town governments with limited financial support 
                                                
10 Bernstein, Thomas P. and Lu Xiaobo, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary 
Rural China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 89. 
11 He Xuefeng and Luo Xingzuo, “Nongcun Gonggongpin Gongji” (2008): 28. 
12 Cheng, Youzhong and Weidong Chen, “Guojia yu Nongmin: Gonggong Chanpin Gongji 
Juese yu Gongneng Dingwei” (State and Farmer: Public Product’s Supply Role and Function 
Locating), Huazhong Shifan Daxue Xuebao. Renwen Shehui (Journal of Huazhong Normal 
University. Humanities and Social Sciences), 45, no. 2 (March 2006): 2-7.  
13 Ye, Xingqing, “Lun Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji Tizhi de Gaige” (Discuss of Rural 
Public Goods Provision System Reform) no. 6 (1997): 57-62; Qin, Guomin. “Shehui 
Zhuanxingqi Woguo Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji Tizhi de Goujian” (Building the 
Rural Public Goods Provision System during the Social Transition Period), Zhongguo 
Xingzheng Guanli (Chinese Public Administration) no. 8 (August 2005): 69-72. He Xuefeng 
and Xingzuo Luo, “Nongcun Gonggongpin Gongji” (2008): 28-34. 
14 Luo, Renfu, Liuxiu Zhang, Jikun Huang and Scott Rozelle, “Elections, Fiscal Reform and 
Public Goods Provision in Rural China”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 35, no. 3 (2007): 
606. 
15 Sato, Hiroshi, “Public Goods Provision and Rural Governance in China”, China: An 
International Journal, 6, no. 2 (September 2008): 296. 





cannot meet the strong demand for public goods and services from villages in 
China. Village committees with limited funds have to provide public goods, a 
responsibility, which is more than what they could handle. 
Organising rural public goods provision by villagers is another problem. 
After the AAT, rural public goods provision depends a lot on village 
community organisations. The establishment of “one case, one meeting” (yishi 
yiyi) at village assemblies or village representative assemblies to discuss 
public goods provision issues, such as fund-raising and building or 
maintaining certain type of infrastructure, is ineffective in practice. First, 
attendance at meeting is poor since many villagers work outside the village.16 
Second, raising the required funds through “one case, one meeting” is 
impossible because funds collection is officially limited at RMB15 per person. 
It is far below what is needed in a project. Third, as the contribution is 
voluntary, it is difficult to persuade villagers to contribute funds. Without 
funds, projects cannot not take off.17   
Some scholars argue that the public goods provision in villages in China 
is now at a standstill. While town governments have insufficient money to 
provide public goods,18 it is also difficult to get villagers to contribute funds 
for public goods provision. The inability to improve infrastructure after the 
implementation of TFR and AAT has negatively impacted on agricultural 
production and the livelihood of farmers, raising the likelihood of social unrest 
and undermining the development of the country. 
                                                
16 Sheng, Duanfeng, “Quxiao Nongyeshui Hou de Nongcun Gonggong Wupin Gongji Jizhi—
Yi Zijin Chouji Wei Zhuyao Fenxi Duixiang” (The Provision Mechanism of Rural Public 
Goods after the Abolition of Agricultural Tax—the Study of Fundraising). Difang Caizheng 
Yanjiu, no. 8 (2008): 37-42. 
17 He, Xuefeng, “Nongcun Gonggongpin Gongji”, 10, no. 5 (2008): 28-34. 
18  Liu, Jianping, He, Jianjun and Wengao Liu, “Nongyeshui Quxiao Hou Nongcun 
Gonggongpin Gongji Nengli Xiajiang de Xianxiang Ji Duice Fenxi—Jiyu Hubeisheng Bufen 
Diqu de Diaocha” (Phenomenon of Decreasing Ability of Providing Rural Public Goods after 
the Abolition of Agricultural Tax—Case Studies in Hubei Province), Chinese Public 
Administration, no. 5 (2006): 17-21; Long, Bifeng. “Shuifei Gaige Hou Nongcun Diqu 
Gonggong Chanpin Chouzi Kunjing Yu Duice Tanxi” (The Difficulties of Financing and 
Solution of the Rural Public Goods Provision after the Agricultural Tax and Fee Reform), 
Qiushi (Truth Seeking), no. 12 (2005): 103-105; John James Kennedy, “From the Tax-for-Fee 
Reform to the Abolition of Agricultural Taxes: The Impact on Town Governments in North-
West China”, China Quarterly, no. 189 (March 2007): 43-59. 





Scholars who are more positive argue that there are multiple channels for 
raising funds such as the transfer of payments from central and provincial 
governments and funds raised by village corporations and villagers. Even with 
limited financial support from town governments, village officials and 
villagers could act collectively to provide public goods.19   
The issue of rural public goods provision has been studied from various 
angles. But existing literature proves that there is still room for further study. 
Scholars who have examined rural public goods provision from the 
perspective of institutional change have examined, at the macro level, the 
effect of a shift from the mere dependence on government to the joint 
participation of government, private organisations, and individuals as a result 
of the Household Responsibility System (HRS).20 Further study of the impact 
of institutional change on rural public goods provision at the micro level— 
local or community level—after the TFR and the subsequent AAT is required. 
This study finds huge differences between different types of public 
projects in agricultural villages in China in spite of the fact that a lack of fund 
after the TFR and AAT was the common phenomenon.21 This dissertation 
argues that apart from the shortage of funds, many underlying factors 
commonly found in agricultural villages in central and western China, such as 
the poor allocation of funds and the workings of informal institutions in the 
funds application process, require more detailed study.  
                                                
19  Wang, Yulong (2004), “Xiangcun Gonggong Chanpin Tigong Moshi Jieshi—Jianlun 
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of Rural Public Goods Provision Mode—Discussion of Farmers’ Participation and 
Contribution of Funds to It), Nandu Xuetan [Renwen Shehui Xuebao] (Academic Forum of 
Nan Du [Journal of the Humanities and Social Science]), no. 1 (January 2004): 109-112. Jia, 
Yan, “Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji Zhuti Duoyuanhua Yanjiu” (The Study of Plural 
Provision Subjects of Rural Public Goods in China), Xiangzhen Jingji (Rural Economy), no. 1 
(2007): 14-17. Tsai, Lili,b "Solidary groups, informal accountability, and local public goods 
provision in rural China", American Political Science Review, 101, no. 2 (2007):355-72. Yu, 
Shui (2008), Xiangcun Zhili Yu Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji (Rural Governance and 
Public Goods Provision. Shehui Wenxian Chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic Press).  
20 Zhang Jun and He, Hanxi, “Zhongguo Nongcun de Gonggong Chanpin Gongji”, 5 (1996), 
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Gongji”, 1 (1998), 36-44; Lin, Wanlong, Zhongguo Nongcun Shequ Gonggong Chanpin 
Gongji Zhidu Yanjiu, 2003. 
21 Lin Wanlong and Liu Xianjuan, 2006; Yep Ray, 2004; John James Kennedy, 2007; Luo 
Renfu, 2007; Sato, 2008. 





Some studies have identified the complicated process involved, including 
fundraising, funds allocation, decision-making and production, without 
systematic analysis. 22  Li Linda Chelan and Hu Zhiping focused on the 
function and role of towns23 with little analysis at county (district) level and 
villagers’ activity in the provision process. Li Linda Chelan has pointed out in 
the conclusion of her dissertation that increasing public investment is not 
enough and that establishing institutions for the allocation of public money, 
supervision of money spending, and others need to be emphasised. However, 
she did not analyse these issues in detail. More in-depth analysis of funds 
allocation and the different types of public projects are thus necessary.  
 
1.2 Significance	  of	  this	  Study	  	  
In this dissertation, both formal and informal institutions are combined to 
investigate the factors resulting in the huge differences on the provision of 
different public goods in agricultural villages in inland China. This 
dissertation regards the provision of rural public goods as a process that 
requires a systematic and micro level analysis. An investigation of the process 
of fundraising for public goods has unveiled the different roles played by 
government, village committee and farmer, as well as the relationship between 
county, town, and village committees. The implementation of certain policies, 
such as yishi yiyi at the local level, reflects a flexibility that may be 
inconsistent with the initial purpose of the policy.  
The classified examination of different public projects in this dissertation 
would show why some public projects are more successful than others, 
providing the basis for improving rural public goods provision by revising 
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policies on the less successful public projects. An examination of the 
construction of a certain public project in a village group or village will better 
explain the problems existing in the current situation of rural public goods 
provision. Especially, the flaws of project application policy and fund 
allocation policy have caused negative effects on certain public projects 
construction.  
Informal institutions such as guanxi and norms in the fundraising process 
will be examined along with the dynamic mechanisms of both formal and 
informal institutions in rural public goods provision. Guanxi is fundamental to 
understanding Chinese society. It has been studied in connection with doing 
businesses in China such as works by Hu Biliang24. This dissertation provides 
a new perspective of funds application of rural public goods provision in 
China. The vague policies and regulations regarding rural public goods 
provision by local level governments have nurtured the growth of guanxi. The 
negative effects of maintaining and building guanxi would shed light on the 
low trust of farmers on local government officials and village officials.  
The investigation into the mind-set of farmers would explain why farmers 
are reluctant to contribute funds to some types of public projects and whether 
they could cooperate and construct public projects on their own in view of the 
financial situation of villages. It may also lay the foundation for improving 
fund allocation for rural public goods in villages without having to establish 
guanxi with government officials.  
 
1.3	  Central	  Argument	  
This dissertation explains why the provision of some public projects is 
more successful than that of others by examining rural public goods provision 
as a dynamic process at the micro level. The central argument is that the 
success of rural public goods provision in agricultural villages depends on 
clearly defined policies formulated by the local government. Based on the 
clarity of government policies, rural public goods in this dissertation have 
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been classified into three categories: first, those overseen mainly by 
government with government’s specific formal institutions and clear policies; 
second, those funded mainly by government, with unclear policies; and third, 
those mainly launched by villages.  
The first category of rural public goods is most easy to be successful as 
these projects are often taken as a gauge of government performance. While 
local governments are liable to be punished if these projects are unsuccessful, 
they also stand to benefit from the investment they attracted, thus promoting 
local development in the long run. The construction of inter-village road is a 
case in point. Local government is highly motivated to provide enough funds 
for the construction of public projects. Backed by the government’s strong 
support of funds and clear policies, farmers would be greatly motivated to 
contribute funds, as they are certain that their contribution of funds will be met 
by the same or more from the government. 
The success of the second category of provision cannot be guaranteed, as 
the unclear policies will give way to the informal institutions. When a public 
project is not on the agenda of the government and lacks the clear policies for 
fund application and allocation, guanxi is essential to obtain fund. This forms 
the basis of the second argument of this dissertation. When local governments’ 
policies of funds allocation are unclear, guanxi plays an important role in the 
success of rural public goods provision. Villages having good guanxi with 
local government officials would manage to get the fund and public goods are 
more likely to be successful than those without guanxi. Furthermore, the 
unclear policies or guidelines for public project construction hindered the 
progress of the provision due to repetitive construction and construction of 
vanity projects. 
The third category often includes small-scale public goods that often 
require village’s collective income and farmers’ large contribution of funds. 
The failure of these projects could be due to low collective income, free rider 
problem, and farmers’ mind-set of dependence on government and other 
factors. On the other hand, the success of some special cases could be 
contributed to the heavy donations from entrepreneurs, the small size of the 





project and the capability of the project leader. The third argument is that on 
their own, village’s provision of public goods is difficult in agricultural 
villages as village collective has little collective funds, and farmers are largely 
reluctant to contribute funds. 
1.4	  Overview	  of	  Chapters	  
Chapter 2 reviews literature and theories regarding public goods provision 
such as public goods, institutional analyses, incentive and guanxi. Theoretical 
framework based on institutional theory would be presented and research 
method would be discussed. 
Chapter 3 reviews the history of rural public goods provision, the period 
under the People’s Commune (PC) system from 1958 to 1983, and the period 
after the implementation of HRS up till the TFR. The development of PC is 
reviewed, along with that of town, administrative village and village group, 
which took over the previous roles of PC, production brigade, and production 
team respectively, in the second period. The incentives of PC, town 
government, and farmers to provide rural public goods in these two periods 
are analysed. The chapter will also highlight problems in rural public goods 
provision after the implementation of the HRS.  
Chapter 4 critically evaluates the effects of TFR and AAT on the 
provision of rural public goods in China, leading some agricultural towns to 
debts. The incentives of town government, village committee, and farmer 
during the post-reform period are examined. The main problem with rural 
public goods provision after the TFR and AAT is funding. Fiscal transfer from 
upper level government is insufficient while the implementation of yishi yiyi 
did not help either. The poor state-of-affair of rural public goods is presented. 
Chapter 5 examines the first category of public projects. Funds come 
mainly from the government, while villages contribute only a small fraction. 
Two types of public projects including inter-village road construction and 
ponds desilting at T Town, Hunan province are investigated. The examination 
of fund allocation from government and fundraising within village has shown 
that public projects with clear application procedures and scientifically 





designed fund allocation system are more likely to be successfully constructed. 
The town government of T Town has little financial ability to provide rural 
public goods, which are mainly undertaken by county or district governments.  
The second category of public projects is analysed in Chapter 6. 
Compared to the successful projects studied in Chapter 5, many drinking 
water projects and many New Socialist Countryside Construction (NSCC) 
projects have not achieved desired outcomes. A comparative study of two 
similar projects on drinking water in the same village of S Village, T Town 
has revealed the operation of guanxi due to the flawed policies. The negative 
effects of guanxi would be presented.  
An examination of NSCC projects in H District, Hunan province would 
discuss how project application procedures, fund allocation and evaluation 
systems affect fundraising and how NSCC works. The flaws in these systems 
would lead to duplicated constructions and the construction of vanity projects. 
The NSCC project might not achieve the initial purpose of improving the 
infrastructure of villages and narrowing the gap between cities and villages 
due to the flaws mainly in the application eligibility and content design of the 
NSCC. It also reveals different roles of county, town governments, village 
committee and farmers in the provision process, especially in fundraising.  
Chapter 7 investigates the provision of rural public goods mainly by 
villages through specific case studies. Different levels of rural public goods 
provision by villages would be explored. First, the policy of yishi yiyi that 
aims to facilitate village’s self-organisation of rural public goods provision 
will be assessed. Problems with yishi yiyi such as the lack of supervision and 
the unscientific fund limit to be contributed by an individual make the actual 
implementation inconsistent with the policy. Some small-scale rural public 
goods need efforts on the part of the village. The collective income of the 
village and entrepreneurs’ contribution to rural public goods provision will be 
evaluated. This chapter will also demonstrate why it is difficult for farmers to 
contribute funds and cooperate based on the case of T Town, Hunan province. 
Chapter 8 concludes the whole discussion by summarising the findings, 
evaluating their significance and limitations, and singling out areas for future 





extensive study. The improvement of rural public goods provision requires the 
regulation of formal institutions, and a revision of policies and relationship 
between local government and farmers. 
 





Chapter 2  
Review, Theoretical Framework and Research 
Methods 
2.1	  Literature	  Review	  
The standard of living of villagers to a large extent depends on basic 
public goods and services provision. A variety of literature has attached great 
importance to the study of rural public goods provision. There is general 
consensus that the situation of rural public goods has worsened in agricultural 
villages after the tax-for-fee reform (TRF) and abolition of agricultural tax 
(AAT) in agricultural villages. Existing literature has revealed the poor 
financial situation of town governments and the lack of rural public goods 
provision in many villages.  
 
Defining	  Public	  Goods	  
The provision of public goods is an essential indicator of governmental 
performance and the government is regarded as performing well if it provides 
a modicum of basic public goods and services, in addition to effectively 
carrying out other duties such as decision-making, budget planning and 
information collection.25 Kimenyi states that the provision of public goods is 
the legitimate functions of the government.26 
The distinction between public and private goods was first made by Adam 
Smith who concludes that if the market fails to provide public goods, it is the 
job of the government to do so.27 Scholars studying public goods often cite 
Samuelson’s definition of classifying goods into two categories—private 
consumption goods which could be distributed among different individuals 
and collective consumption goods which are enjoyed by everyone without 
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in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 5. 
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African Economies, 15, no. 1 supplement (2006): 62-69. 
27 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes (New York: 
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taking them away from any other individual’s consumption of those goods.28 
Buchanan argues that there was a missing link between purely public goods 
and purely private goods as proposed by Samuelson. He raises the concept of 
club goods or collective ownership-membership arrangements to fill the gap 
between purely public goods and purely private goods.29  
Olson uses common, collective and public goods interchangeably. He 
defines public, common or collective goods as “any good such that, if any 
person Xi in a group X1,…, Xi,…, Xn consumes it, it could not feasibly be 
withheld from the others in that group”.30 It means that public goods have the 
characteristic of non-rivalry and non-excludability and it is unavoidable that 
people should share in the consumption of the good without purchasing or 
paying for any of the public good. In addition to non-rivalry and non-
excludability, public goods have another characteristic of non-divisibility. 
However, Bardhan claims that local public goods are more like “club goods”, 
site-specific and semi-public goods that have this exclusive element that 
deprives other people of their consumption.31 He suggests that local public 
goods in the context of poor countries must include semi-public goods called 
the commons.32  
When classifying public goods in the Chinese context, scholars differ on 
their definition. Some Chinese scholars classified rural public goods in China 
as pure public and semi-public goods.33 Pure public goods are provided freely 
by government in areas including rural environmental protection, river and 
water treatment and information system construction. Semi-public goods 
                                                
28 Paul A Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 36, no. 4 (November 1954): 387. 
29 James M Buchanan, “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, Economica, vol. 32, no. 125, 
(February 1965): 1. 
30 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 14. 
31 Pranab Bardhan, “Local Governance and Delivery of Public Goods”. In Governance, 
Decentralization and Reform in Chile, India and Russia, (ed.) Jean-Jacques Dethier (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 181. 
32 Bardhan, “Local Governance and Delivery of Public Goods” (2000), 185. 
33 Li, Qiang, Jinyong Guo and Gennv Cai, “Woguo Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin de Ziyuan 
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include rural compulsory education, electric power facilities, public health, 
roads construction, clean water supplies and others.  
Other scholars classified public goods based on their research aims. For 
example, in order to examine the roles of central and local governments and 
rural communities, rural public goods are classified into three categories: 
capital-intensive goods such as rural water supply, electric power facilities, 
roads, communications, medical care and others supplied mainly by the 
central government; labour-intensive goods including mutual aid and 
cooperation by rural communities and villages; and technology-intensive 
public goods such as technologies of plant disease prevention, agricultural 
technical training and others by county and town governments.34  
However, Feng Xingyuan et. al. argue that the classification of public 
goods based on provider organisations could barely reflect the actual situation 
of China’s rural public goods provision. In China, government, 
nongovernment institutions and individuals all participate in public goods, 
collective goods and private goods provision. Hence, public goods such as 
roads might be constructed by private individuals or contributions of private 
enterprises.35 Feng Xingyuan et. al. use nonmarket provided goods to describe 
public goods. Others such as Tsai study particular types of rural public 
goods—roads, running water infrastructure and school facilities36— while Luo 
et. al. chose roads, bridges, irrigation, drainage and school, 37  and Sato 
examines irrigation, education and health care.38 
In this study, public goods are those that have the characteristics of non-
rivalry, non-excludability and non-divisibility, as well as semi-public goods 
that are site-specific (as defined by Buchanan) and with an element of 
exclusivity. Based on the argument of Feng Xingyuan et. al., rural public 
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goods in this dissertation will include essentials such as roads construction, 
water facilities and small-scale irrigation facilities provided jointly by 
governments and social organisations or the private sector. It also includes 
semi-public goods39 such as the maintenance of clean drinking water facilities 
initiated mainly by villagers’ cooperation.  
 
Perspective	  of	  Institutional	  Analysis	  
Scholars who examine rural public goods provision in China from the 
perspective of institutional change propose that rural public goods provision 
would be undergoing institutional change after the implementation of 
Household Responsibility System (HRS). Zhang Jun and He Hanxi argue that 
the abolition of the old collective plantation system and People’s Commune 
(PC) as well as the establishment of HRS resulted in the demand for a rural 
public goods provision system since the institutional arrangements are 
mutually dependable. 40  Private organisations and individuals can also 
undertake to provide some small-scale public goods as in the case of Shaoxing, 
Zhejiang province where some of the public goods had been converted to 
private goods or club goods.41 Lin Wanlong concurs with Zhang and He and 
points out that the demand for public goods has been diversified and the 
dependence on the government for supplying them has been changed after the 
implementation of HRS. Three new modes of rural public goods provision, 
namely, individuals’ provision and conversion from public goods to club 
goods and from public goods to private goods, have developed in at least some 
villages.42 
The conclusion that the provision is undergoing change is based on 
Zhejiang province where villages have a well-developed industry and are 
faring better than villages in other provinces. Hence, this institutional change 
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41 Zhang, Jun and Jiang, Wei, “Gaige Hou Zhongguo Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin de 
Gongji” (1998): 36-44. 
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analysis is limited to villages that are pretty well off. Whether the 
developments of village enterprises and cooperative organisations are mature 
enough in other villages to undertake part of the provision of rural public 
goods needs further investigation. 
In addition to examining rural public goods provision through the macro 
angle of institutional change, the provision system is investigated. Public 
goods provision system includes four subsystems: decision-making, 
fundraising, allocation (mainly transfer of payments), and production and 
management. The first three subsystems are essential to explaining the change 
of public goods provision system. The change of fundraising system results in 
the change of public goods provision system: from the government as the sole 
provider of public goods to provision sharing with villagers and to provision 
by private person or villages’ cooperation.  
The works by Linda Li Chelan and Hu Zhiping in this area deserve 
attention. Based on the examination of the reforms of towns in Xian’an county, 
Hubei province, Linda Li demonstrates that increased public spending alone is 
insufficient for improving public services. Examining institutions on 
allocating and spending of public money, surveying needs and decision-
making process, as well as analysing the capability of providers need to be 
conducted as well.43 Similarly, Hu argues that strong policy support for rural 
public goods provision by the central government alone does not improve the 
situation. To re-establish the rural public goods provision system, the 
functions of town government need a revamp.44 However, both of Li and Hu 
did not explore the processes of rural public goods provision such as the 
fundraising process for a certain public project. 
The decision-making process of rural public goods provision has been 
studied by scholars, many of whom suggest instituting a bottom-up decision-
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making process in order to improve the poor provision of public goods in rural 
China.45 The decision-making mechanism decides the quantity, scale and 
method, and influence the efficiency of public goods provision, while the 
deliberative democratic discussion in the process of rural public goods 
provision should be attached great importance as attested by its successful 
implementation in Zheguo Town, Wenling, Zhejiang province.46 To places 
without financial difficulties like Zheguo Town, the improvement in the 
decision-making system may enhance the efficiency of public goods provision. 
However, the improvement of decision-making system alone is limited as it is 
not applicable to other places where the major problem with rural public 
goods provision is the lack of funds. 
Scholars debating on the fundraising system often focus on the non-
institutional way of funding before the TFR and AAT. In addition to the fiscal 
revenue of towns, including budgetary and extra-budgetary revenue, current 
rural public goods are provided non-institutionally.47 Ye Xingqing maintains 
that the current non-institutional way of rural public goods provision 
developed from the time of the PC48 should be reformed since a large part of 
the funds for rural public goods provision came from peasants before the TFR 
and was a heavy burden for them.49 
On the other hand, Sun Tanzhen and Zhu Gang argue that the non-
institutional way of financing rural public goods, to some extent, has acted as 
an effective supplement to the current system of funding rural public goods. 
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This is despite the heavy burden it had imposed on farmers and the corruption 
it had engendered due to the lack of standardised management.50 However, 
rural public goods provision in many villages that mainly depends on the non-
institutional way of funding is facing a crisis since most funds raised in this 
way had been abolished due to the TFR.51 Current debates have failed to 
address problems during fundraising process for rural public goods provision 
after the TFR and AAT. 
Scholars have also examined the effects of other formal institutions such 
as the election of village leaders and fiscal decentralisation of rural public 
goods provision. Besley and Burgess show that the election of local leaders 
has a positive effect on public goods distribution and calamity relief based on 
data from India.52 Zhang Xiaobo et. al. based their findings on a survey of 60 
villages in Jiangsu province from 1995 to 1999. The findings show that 
election and power sharing improve transparency, thereby reducing the 
possibilities of profligate spending and enlarging the impact of elections on 
the efficiency of public investment.53 Luo Renfu et al. also argued that the 
direct election of village leaders resulted in increased public goods provision 
investment in villages54. They measured whether the village leader is elected 
or appointed. However, this simplified the causal relationship between 
election and public investment. The causality between election and rural 
public goods provision in China may be spurious. In the villages, the election 
of a certain person may simply be due to his or her personal network with 
upper-level officials, which could facilitate fundraising for public goods 
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provision. In such a case, the causality does not lie with the election-public g-
oods provision relationship.  
The	  Funds	  Issue	  
Lin Wanlong and other scholars point out that the poor provision of rural 
public goods is the result of a lack of funds.55 Many scholars have emphasised 
the effect of TFR and the subsequent AAT on rural public goods provision. 
The agricultural tax reform in China has been regarded as another drastic 
change since the implementation of HRS.56 Yep suggests that based on 
national and provincial level data, TFR would hurt rather than help the poorest 
regions.57 Many of the poorer towns have become ‘administrative shells’, 
which are unable to provide basic services, deepening their reliance on 
counties.58 Luo Renfu et. al. demonstrate that the TFR has a negative effect on 
public goods investment of the village.59 Sato also finds that the TFR has 
negatively impacted on the expenditure of public services at the village level 
and on public funding input at the county level.60 These scholars share the 
same conclusion that the TFR has adverse effects on public goods provision in 
rural China. 
However, Fan Baohong argues that the AAT had both positive and 
negative effects based on an intensive study of 11 towns in Taizhou city, 
Jiangsu province. He states that the AAT may stimulate villagers’ contribution 
of funds to rural public goods provision as it has alleviated the burden of 
villagers. He further demonstrates that the funds available for town 
governments have maintained at a certain level due to the transfer of payments 
from upper-level government to town government. 
                                                
55 Lin, Wanlong and Liu, Xianjuan, “Shuifei Gaigehou Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji 
Jizhi Chuangxin”, no. 4 (2006): 30-34. 
56 Gong, Shumei, “Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Xu Qidong Peitao Gaige” (Supporting Reforms 
Needs to be Initiated During the Period of Tax-For-Fee Reform in Rural China), Renmin 
Luntan, no. 2 (February 2001): 14-16. 
57 Yep, Ray (2004), “Can ‘Tax-for-Fee’ Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, 
Progress and Limitations”, China Quarterly, no. 177 (March 2004): 42-70. 
58 John James Kennedy, “From the Tax-for-Fee Reform to the Abolition of Agricultural 
Taxes”, no. 189 (March 2007): 43-59. 
59 Luo, Renfu et. al, “Elections, fiscal Reform and Public Goods Provision in Rural China”, 
35, no. 3 (2007): 583-611. 
60 Sato, Hiroshi, “Public Goods Provision” (2008): 289. 





Fan’s argument on the transfer of payments was refuted by other scholars. 
The central government has made the transfer of payments to support rural 
construction in recent years, but it is still inadequate.61 Long Bifeng points out 
that the limited transfer of payments from central to lower level governments 
is far from enough given that the town government is at the lowest rung. China 
is huge and rural public goods provision may vary across territories. Fan’s 
study is based on Jiangsu province, one of the richest provinces in China, 
which is not representative of the general situation of transfer payments in the 
whole country. Further analysis of transfer payments in other places is thus 
necessary.  
 
The	  Role	  of	  the	  State	  
From the aforementioned studies, there is a general consensus that the 
existing rural public goods provision system needs innovation and 
improvement. However, scholars disagree on whether the role of state should 
be weakened or strengthened.  
Some scholars suggest that rural public goods provision should not rest 
solely on the government. Non-government organisations, village 
organisations and villagers for instance could be a contributor of fund and 
labour for rural public goods provision.62 Jia Yan divides rural public goods 
into three levels: pure public goods provided by the central government; 
public goods that are between pure public and private goods and jointly 
provided by central, provincial and municipal governments and village 
organisations; and semi-public goods provided by private capital in rural 
areas.63 Tan Tongxue believes that the solution to the problem of rural 
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irrigation is cooperation among villagers.64  
Jia Xianwen and Huang Zhengquan propose weakening the role of the 
government during the process of rural public goods provision. This is 
because based on history up till the ancient period when it was organised by 
village elites, the current system with powerful government’s interference in 
rural public goods provision hinders the development of rural elites. 65 
However, it will be a hasty conclusion if it is based on history without 
controlling other factors. The political and financial systems have evolved. 
Hence, without systematic comparative studies, weakening the role of the state 
in the provision of rural public goods is not convincing. 
Some other scholars propose strengthening the role of government. He 
Xuefeng and Luo Xingzuo argue that the government must invest in and 
enforce rural public goods provision after examining five villages in Jinmen, 
Hubei province. They found that the water user association lacks the power of 
enforcement and free-rider behaviour is prevalent, thus impeding fund 
raising.66 Qu Yanchun argues that the rural public goods provision system, the 
major source of funding public goods especially in agricultural villages, 
should be reformed after the AAT. The government needs to play an active 
role instead of simply letting the market provide public goods; its 
responsibilities at different levels should also be specified.67 Shen Duanfeng 
also suggests that the roles of town government and village committee should 
be emphasised since villagers’ voluntary actions do not necessarily result in 
rural public goods provision. Based on his case study in Gao Town, Jinmin, 
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Hubei province, Shen argues that there is a need for the government to 
organise.68  
This dissertation agrees that rural public goods provision cannot merely 
depend on the government, as it requires the support and coordination of 
farmers. However, existing literature is vague regarding the functions of the 
government in the whole process. The important funding issue has not been 
dealt with and the feasibility of farmers’ cooperation in most agricultural 
villages has yet to be further explored.  
 
Perspective	  of	  Collective	  Action	  and	  Cooperation	  
The massive citation of Olson in the area of collective action in public 
goods by scholars studying a similar subject has made Olson an authority. 
Olson asserts that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve 
their common or group interests unless the group is quite small, or there is 
coercion or some other special devices that make individuals act in their 
common interest.69  
The heart of collective action model is the free-rider problem.70 Binmore 
concurs with Olson and argues that unless some explicit, exogenous 
mechanism is available to enforce commitment of players would not be able to 
commit about their future conduct.71  
Margolis, however, emphasises the role of altruism or social 
responsibility or group interest and the role of persuasion.72 Similarly, Taylor 
asserts that rational choice theorists including Olson have excluded three 
important types of motivations: altruistic motivation, expressive motivation 
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and intrinsic motivation.73 Altruists could be the initiator of the conditional 
cooperation, finance a political entrepreneur working on the non-altruists, and 
might shame others into cooperation or bring other informal social sanctions 
to bear on them.74  
Ostrom, however, analyses collective action differently, emphasising 
contextual factors. Cooperation levels vary in different situations due to 
different contextual factors that may be conducive or detrimental to collective 
actions. Contextual variables include the predictability of resource flows, the 
relative scarcity of the good, the size of the group involved, the heterogeneity 
of the group, the size of the total collective benefit, the marginal contribution 
by one person to the collective good, the size of the temptation to free ride, the 
loss to co-operators when others do not cooperate, the presence of leadership 
and other factors.75 After examining irrigation cooperation in South India, 
Bardhan considers a list of factors that might influence the level of 
cooperation which includes group size, group heterogeneity, physical 
condition of water availability, government involvement, local context, history 
of cooperation and use of guards for monitoring.76  
Credible mutual commitment and cooperation can help to improve the 
situation of defection and the collective action dilemma.77 Some scholars 
claim that peasants need to organise and cooperate to solve their own 
problems.78 Villagers’ cooperation is critical since the government could not 
provide full financial support for rural public goods provision currently.79 
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Among literature on the effect of villagers’ cooperation on public goods 
provision in rural China, some scholars focus on the positive effect using the 
social capital theory or social solidarity theory, while others doubt the 
possibility of cooperation among villagers.  
Dong Leiming contends that history shows Chinese peasants’ strong 
cooperative capability when they helped each other out and cooperated 
through kinship networks in the construction of public facilities and against 
foreign invasions.80  Scholars who study solidarity or cooperation among 
villagers often cite the term social capital by Putnam. Trust, which is an 
essential component of social capital, can arise from networks of civic 
engagement and norms of reciprocity.81 Miao Yuexia defines social capital as 
trust, norms and networks based on informal social mutual reciprocity and 
cooperation.82 She attaches great importance to the study of social capital and 
argues that the great achievement of mutual aid and cooperative movement 
during the PC period was a result of the tradition of villagers’ cooperation 
such as kinship networks, families and folk beliefs.83  
Similarly, Luo defines it as the network formed during long-term 
interactions among villagers, which can be promoted, by trust, reciprocity, 
tolerance and sympathy. Interactions and trust among villagers contribute to 
their cooperation.84 These scholars however did not show how social capital is 
measured.  
Lili Tsai develops Putnam’s social capital theory by advancing a model of 
informal governmental accountability with the explanation of social solidarity. 
She argues that even in villages with weak formal institutions of 
accountability, “solidary groups” that overlap with government structures 
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could incentivise local officials to provide public goods and services. Clans, 
ethnic groups, fraternal organisations, philanthropic groups and religious 
groups are “solidary groups” with membership based on ethnical standards 
and moral obligations.85 Tsai argues that “solidary groups” can promote social 
trust, improve cooperation skills, encourage attitudes and habit of cooperation 
and thus reduce free riding. Moreover, since village officials are members of 
or related to “solidary groups”, group pressure will stimulate officials to be 
accountable for providing public goods for villagers. 
However, her study left room for further examination. First, Tsai’s focus 
is on the causal link between “solidary groups” and informal accountability, 
and not the funds issue. Second, as Tsai only studied villages from four 
provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, Jiangxi and Fujian, an investigation of solidarity 
groups in most other places of China is necessary. Third, Tsai’s study focuses 
on the period before the abolition of agricultural taxes and fees. A study of the 
relationship between solidarity groups and public goods provision after the 
AAT in rural China will supplement her findings. 
Few scholars are as positive as Tsai about villagers’ cooperation in rural 
China. Miao Yuexia raises the issue that many autonomous villages lack 
villagers’ cooperation.86 He Xuefeng et. al. point out that it was not easy for 
the association of irrigation and water conservation to organise farmland 
irrigation in most places since the level of social solidarity of large groups of 
farmers is low and the mechanisms for punishment are not well established.87 
Jiang Yufu attributes the low cooperation level to the lack of mechanisms for 
punishment, leading to the failure to provide running water in a village in 
Changshan county.88  
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A review of social capital and social solidarity shows that scholars 
emphasised the importance of mutual trust and cooperation. This study argues 
that the study of farmers’ cooperation has to take into account contextual 
factors in different villages and different public projects. In order to 
understand whether farmers could be depended on in the provision of rural 
public goods, a more detailed micro-level comparative study is needed. 
 
2.2	  Theoretical	  Framework	  
Theory	  of	  Local	  Governance	  and	  Institution	  
The quantity and quality of public goods provision by governments will 
be directly affected both by their allocation mechanisms and their modes of 
governance.89 Governance encompasses the way individuals and institutions, 
public and private, manage their common affairs. It includes formal 
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance and informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed upon or perceived 
to be in their interest.90 Gerry Stoker examines in depth governance as a 
theory and raises five propositions. First, governance refers to a complex set 
of institutions and actors that are drawn from not only the government but also 
beyond. Hence, private and voluntary sectors are involved in service delivery 
and the decision-making process. Second, governance takes into account the 
blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic 
issues. The responsibilities of the government could be shifted to the citizens 
and to private and voluntary sectors. Third, governance identifies power 
dependence in the relationship between institutions involved in collective 
action. As a result, governance as an interactive process engages various forms 
of partnership. Fourth, governance is about autonomous self-governing 
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networks of actors. Fifth, instead of coercion, there are new tools and 
techniques that the government can employ to get things done.91  
In their analysis of rural governance in China, Feng Xingyuan et. al. 
define governance as the behaviour of different levels of economic, political 
and administrative institutions dealing with public affairs. It includes 
mechanisms such as the common characteristics of grassroots' management, 
process including influence among various entities or among variables within 
and outside the village, and institutions, which are entities that are constrained 
by certain rules.92   
Formal	  Institutions	  
To understand what institutions constitute, it is necessary to differentiate 
them from organisations. To Kiser and Ostrom, organisations are composites 
of participants following rules governing activities and transactions to realise 
particular outputs, and institutional arrangements are rules that are 
components of all organisations.93 Hu Biliang points out that all organisations, 
be they political, economic, educational or social, are not institutions because 
they are players and not the rules of the game.94 
North defines institutions as rules of the game in society or humanly 
devised constraints shaping human interaction. Institution includes both 
formal rules (political and judicial rules, economic rules and contracts) such as 
constitutions, statutes and common laws, specific bylaws, individual contracts, 
as well as informal rules such as codes of conduct, conventions and norms of 
behaviour.95 Institution is often regarded as a structural feature of society or 
policy. The structure may be formal such as a legislature, a legal framework, 
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or an agency in the public bureaucracy, as well as an informal structure 
including network of interacting organisations or a set of shared norms.96  
Based on North’s definition, Anthony Lanyi in his analysis of economic 
reforms in India defines institution as the ‘rule of the game’ that governed the 
economy and economic policymaking. They include fundamental legal, 
political and social rules that establish the basis for production, exchange and 
distribution, which can either be formally written down and enforced by 
government, or unwritten and enforced by informal sanctions.97 Yu Keping 
defines formal and informal rules as institutional environment which included 
the following aspects: constitution, ordinary laws, administrative regulations, 
decrees and rules, party policy regulations, as well as informal institutions.98  
Formal institutions related to financing public goods provision includes 
taxation, general funds and subsidies to private provision.99 Taxation can force 
individuals to contribute more than their voluntary contribution to boost 
financial backing to public goods provision. General fund is set up by 
individuals to ensure that funds are allocated to various public goods 
according to some defined proportions. Subsidies to private provision are 
granted by the government.100 Linda Li Chelan emphasises other institutions 
that are related to rural public goods provision in China, such as the allocation 
of public money, supervision of money spending, survey of public goods 
needs, decision-making process and training of service providers.101  
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Formal institutions in this dissertation focus on the funding institutions, 
decision-making institutions and institutions for the allocation of rural public 
goods provision. This would include financial institutions, cadre management 
and motivation institutions, and policy implementation institutions. These 
formal institutions would be examined based on their various government 
policies and regulations.  
Informal	  Institutions	  	  
Informal institutions have played notable roles throughout China’s 
recorded history. China is regarded as being ruled more by men than by 
laws102 as it has attached great importance to informal institutions. The latest 
version of the Constitution passed on 14 November 2002 indicates that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rules the country both by law and by 
virtue.103 Although state institutions and policies are important in the process 
of rural public goods provision, informal institutions are also salient. 
As defined by North, informal institutions include conventions and codes 
of behaviour. To Schlicht, custom is the most influential informal institution 
consisting of a set of habitual, emotional and cognitive regularities.104 Hu 
Biliang argues that informal institutions such as village trust, village rotating 
savings and credit associations, and guanxi community are critical to 
facilitating modernisation and social economic development in rural China.105  
       Path-dependence is a very useful conceptual tool to explain the 
significance of history and culture in determining the future development of 
society. David defines path-dependence as important influences upon eventual 
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outcomes that can be exerted by temporary remote events including 
happenings dominated by chance elements instead of systematic forces.106  
To sum up, based on the aforementioned definitions of institutions, this 
study would present an institutional analysis that would discuss both formal 
and informal institutions. Institutions in this study are ‘rule of the game’ that 
governs the whole process of public goods provision and decision-making. 
They include laws, administrative regulations, rules and decrees related to 
rural public goods provision, as well as informal institutions such as history of 
rural public goods provision, guanxi, conventions and tradition in China.  
  
Theory	  of	  Guanxi	  
Guanxi is so important in contemporary China that its implications and 
intricacies must first be understood before a good study of Chinese society 
could be conducted.107 The source or origin of guanxixue (the practice of 
guanxi) is rural culture dominated by kinship ties and a tradition of labour 
exchange and mutual aid and obligation.108 Yang Mei-hui focuses on the use 
of guanxi to fulfil purposes such as obtaining employment, housing, education 
and various other purposes in urban areas.  
In the existing literature, guanxi is often defined as relationships. Pye 
regards guanxi as “friendship with implications of continued exchange of 
favours”. Nan Lin defines guanxi as enduring and sentimentally based 
instrumental relations that invoke private transactions of favours and public 
recognition of asymmetric exchanges.109 To Nan Lin, the private transaction 
of favours is the process of negotiating for a favour. Fan Ying agrees that 
                                                
106 Paul A David, “Understanding the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History”. In 
Economic History and the Modern Economist, (ed.) Willliam N. Parker (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), p. 30. 
107 Qiao Jian, “Guanxi Chuyi” (My Humble Views on Guanxi). In Shehui Ji Xingwei Kexue 
Yanjiu de Zhongguohua (The Sinicisation of Social and Behavioural Science Research), (eds.) 
Yang Guoshu and Wen Congyi (Taibei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1982), p. 
354. 
108 Yang Mei-hui, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China, 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 76. 
109 Nan Lin, “Guanxi: A Conceptual Analysis”. In (eds.) Alvin Y. So, Nan Lin and Dudley 
Poston, The Chinese Triangle of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong: Comparative 
Institutional Analyses. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 153-159. 





guanxi is a kind of relationship, including relationship by birth or blood 
(family, kinship and in-laws), relationship by nature (locality, classmate or 
alumni, teacher-student, co-worker, neighbour), as well as relationship 
acquired (acquaintance, knowing the same person, friend and sworn brother). 
But Fan argues that relationships do not necessarily produce guanxi. Guanxi is 
a process with a beginning and end, and needs to be developed and maintained 
by time, energy and money. Guanxi is a process involving a series of activities 
such as having a meal together, gift giving or doing a favour.110 
Guanxi in the Chinese context is unique as it has been pervasive in the 
entire Chinese society throughout much of its historical, political and 
economic contexts. Guanxi could influence a wide range of situations in China 
such as receiving permits for a second child,111 getting a job or changing jobs, 
getting tickets for a train, entering a preferred school and other situations.112 
Guanxi exists in various contexts in urban areas such as obtaining employment 
and promotion, enabling geographical mobility, seeking healthcare, and 
obtaining housing and better education.113  
Guanxi could be produced through everyday actions and formal occasions. 
Everyday actions include using kinship terms, visiting and helping out, and 
embodying ganqing (specific human emotions) in the daily life like showing 
concern when someone is sick. Formal occasions include banquet, wedding 
and funeral.114 Guanxi is represented and generated via material exchange and 
human feelings. The material exchange of gifts directly generates ganqing and 
guanxi. People with close guanxi would give big gifts to each other, even 
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more than to friends, and those who wish to claim a close friendship give more 
than those who did not.115 
Cadres are frequent targets of gift giving and guanxi overtures because 
they have at their disposal decision-making and resource-allocation powers. 
They have more opportunities to engage in private guanxi transactions since 
they lead a relatively leisurely and mobile life, with more opportunities for 
travelling on business and attending meetings with other cadres.116 
Unlike economic transactions, the payoff in guanxi is not measured by 
money and could not be balanced. The payoff to the favour giver in guanxi is 
the broadcast by favour seekers that favours have been rendered by the giver. 
Word diffusion of a successful guanxi enhances the reputation of both the 
favour giver and seeker. For the favour seeker, it shows his or her capability of 
obtaining valued resources in society.117 The concept of “face” in China refers 
to an individual’s public image as one of the key elements of guanxi.118 For 
the favour giver, performing one or more specific social roles that are well 
recognised by others is an enhancement to public image. 
Among all kinds of guanxi, family guanxi is the most important, 
encompassing family members, kinship and in-laws.119 Family is emphasised 
in Chinese society, unlike western societies where individuals and 
organisations are more important than the family.120  
Lin Nan uses the word pseudo families to denote family-like structure. 
This structure is based on some shared identities such as classmates (tongxue), 
shared work unit such as colleagues, same ancestral origin or birthplace, and 
living in the same place. They often call each other “old brother/sister” 
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(laoxiong/laojie) and “old uncle/aunt” (laoshu/laoshen). The adjective ‘old’ 
distinguishes pseudo families from blood relations.121  
A person’s guanxi is measured by the access to and influence in various 
networks.122 Personal networks are the relative importance of major social 
roles, such as those played by next of kin, friends and co-workers.123 
Ruan Danching conducted a study of personal network in two Mainland 
Chinese and Taiwanese villages respectively. The personal network is 
indicated by this survey question: “From time to time, most people discuss 
important matters with other people. Looking back over the last six months, 
with whom have you discussed important matters—spouse, parent/parent-in-
law, child, sibling, other kin, co-worker, neighbour, former classmate, 
friend?”124  
The same survey question has been posed to farmers in S and N Villages, 
T Town, Hunan province in this study. It is found that kinship plays an 
important role in the discussion of networks in village societies and that the 
role of kinship is even greater for S Village than for N Village. 
Based on the aforementioned theories, this study will combine both 
formal and informal institutions. The incentive theory will be incorporated 
into the formal institutional analysis to examine the effects of cadre 
performance evaluation system on rural public goods provision. The 
discussion on guanxi theory will be combined with an analysis of informal 
institutions to explore the dynamic fundraising process. This study also 
uncovers how unclear and immature formal institutions provide room for the 
implementation of informal institutions. 
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Public goods provision needs to be clarified before defining who the 
providers are. Musgrave points out that social goods may be produced by 
private firms and sold to government, or produced directly under public 
management.125  
The government is the main provider of funds for public goods through 
the collection of taxes and fees.126 It is common to use investment of rural 
public goods as a measure of public goods provision. Hiroshi measures public 
goods provision by the proportion of expenditure of public services to total 
village expenditure.127 Luo et. al. examine three dimensions of public goods 
investment including investments in roads and bridges, irrigation and drainage 
systems as well as schools.128 Tsai measures by both government investments 
as well as the observable objective measure like the existence of public goods 
such as school facilities, roads and running water infrastructure.129 The latter is 
measured by the existence of facilities, thus simplifying the situation of rural 
public goods provision, as the provision process including the funding body is 
unknown. 
Zhang Linxiu et. al. gauge public goods by the number of public goods 
projects.130  Since the provision of different public goods varies, the sole 
measure of investment may not fully represent the situation. The use of both 
the investment of public goods and the number of public goods projects by 
Zhang Linxiu et. al. will be adopted in this study.  
                                                
125 Musgrave, Richard Ael. and Musgrave, Peggy B. Public Finance In Theory and Practice 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973). 
126 Fan, Baohong, Xiangzhen Caizheng Yu Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji Yanjiu 
(Study of Town Finance and Rural Public Goods Provision) (Beijing: Zhongguo Nongye 
Chubanshe, 2007). 
127 Sato, Hiroshi, “Public Goods Provision and Rural Governance in China” (2008): 281-298. 
128 Luo, Renfu et. al, “Elections, fiscal Reform and Public Goods Provision in Rural China” 
(2007): 583-611. 
129 Tsai Lili, "Solidary groups, informal accountability, and local public goods provision in 
rural China", no. 2 (2007): 355-72. 
130 Zhang Linxiu, Renfu Luo, Chengfang Liu and Scott Rozelle, “Investing in Rural China-
Tracking China’s Commitment to Modernization”, The Chinese Economy, 39, no. 4 (July-
August 2006), 57-84. 





In the case studies, public goods provision was only possible if the 
required funds were raised. So fundraising is crucial to public goods provision 
and is the main focus of this study. The successful provision of rural public 
goods in this research is measured by whether:  
1. a certain public goods is provided. 
2. upper-level government funds have successfully reached to the public 
projects at village level and have not been siphoned off to finance 
other projects. 
3. farmers were willing and successfully raised the required amount of 
supporting funds. 
The independent variable of clearly defined local government policies 
means that local government (below provincial level) has little or no flexibility 
in deciding funds allocation. It can be measured by whether the amount of 
funds allocated by each level of government is specifically stated, and whether 
the criteria of funds allocation are objective and consistent to follow. 
The visits to the Highway Department and Water Resources Bureau at Z 
City have left a strong impression on the author. The funds allocation followed 
specific and clear guidelines set by the local government. The data on the 
length of inter-village roads of each village, the total investment, the amount 
of funds allocated from each level of local governments, and the progress of 
each project have been digitally compiled between 2006 and 2009. The staff 
also kept all the relevant documents detailing the measures and guidelines of 
inter-village road construction. The interviewees were all having good 
knowledge about the details of the road construction projects. 
The Water Resource Bureau offered a sharply contrasting scenario. There 
is rarely a specific guideline on funds allocation to follow. The documents and 
government reports on funds allocation were all left lying on the desks. The 
available data were incomplete for each water resource project compared to 
that for inter-village road project. The author was surprised by the information 
given by the Director of Water Resource Bureau that the funds allocation was 
often based on the discussions with major officials in this department and not 
on clearly defined allocation policies or guidelines. Since the guideline was an 





abstract and general one set by the provincial government, it is difficult to 
follow in practice. Decisions were usually made by participants of the meeting. 
Hence, guanxi plays an important role in deciding the recipient of funds. 
Villages with anyone having good guanxi with officials participating in the 
meeting would have an advantage to obtain the needed funds. 
Besides the public goods that depended mainly on government allocated 
funds, a number of small-scale public goods were supposed to be provided by 
village itself. Interviews with farmers or village officials showed that a large 
amount of public projects had to depend on farmers’ contribution of funds, 
without government allocated funds. Most of these public projects fell through.  
In this dissertation, rural public goods can be divided into three categories 
based on the indicator of whether the clear local government policies on funds 
allocation exist. The first category consists of public projects with most clear 
local government funds allocation policies. The inter-village roads 
construction and ponds desilting projects are the two examples of this category. 
The second one makes up of public projects with unclear local government 
funds allocation policies, such as the water aqueduct construction and 
environment improvement projects. These two categories of public projects 
were funded mainly by government allocated funds. The third category is 
composed of the voluntary provision of public projects by farmers themselves 
with no or little government funds such as small-scale irrigation projects, 
small roads and bridges renovation projects. These projects depended largely 
on the capacity of villages, and government funds, if available, come in the 
form of subsidy or award money.  
2.4	  Research	  Method	  and	  Data	  Sources	  
In this study, rural public goods can be divided into three categories based 
on the indicator of whether there are clear local government policies on funds 
allocation. 
One category of rural public goods such as inter-village roads 
construction is provided mainly through organisations of the county 
government. The other category is provided mainly by villagers, such as 
small-scale drinking water facilities construction. This dissertation aims to 





investigate rural public goods provision at the village level and even village 
group level. The data at village level is not available from published statistical 
yearbooks that often record provincial or city data. Hence, data were collected 
mainly through the author’s field trip in China from November 2009 to 
February 2010, as well as the field trip in September 2010. 
The data of inter-village roads construction was mainly collected from the 
Highway Administration Bureau of Z City, Hunan province, while the data of 
water resources related projects were solicited from the Water Resources 
Bureau of H District, Z City. The environment improvement related data were 
gathered from the Office of New Socialist Countryside Construction at H 
District, Z City. The data of villagers’ contribution of inter-village roads 
construction, small-scale drinking water facilities and other public goods 
compiled from interviews with villagers, village officials and town 
government officials. 
Data regarding local policies guiding rural public goods provision in Z 
City were extracted from government documents and records at the Highway 
Administration Bureau of Z City, Water Resources Bureau of H District, the 
Office of New Socialist Countryside Construction of Beihu District, Z City, 
Office of Finance, Operation and Management Station, and Office of Statistics 
at T Town. The examination of policy implementation and the information on 
informal institutions such as traditions, lineage information and guanxi 
network were obtained through interviews with villagers, village officials and 
town officials.  
Hunan province is located at the south central part of the Chinese 
mainland. It is one of the major agricultural provinces in China with 14 cities, 
122 counties and districts, as well as 2,354 towns.131 It has been one of the 
demonstration sites for yishi yiyi132 (one case, one meeting) village level 
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public works projects in China since 2009 (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Maps of Hunan Province 
Source :<http://www.hummingbirdminerals.com/300px-Hunan-map-en.gif> 
Access on 20 March 2010. 
 
Two administrative villages were selected from T Town, Z City of Hunan 
province. Z City whose economic development is close to the average 
economic development of Hunan province has been selected. For district, H 
District within Z City was selected for study.  
Demographic factors such as location and size, economic factors such as 
annual net income per capita, policies regarding public goods provision in the 
same town, fiscal transfer from upper-level government and development of 
private or village corporations were analysed. S and N Villages belonging to T 
Town in H District were selected for comparative study based on factors 
examined and feasibility. These two administrative villages are similar in their 
formal administrative structures and enjoy similar policies from the same 
                                                                                                                           
Ministry of Agriculture’s Announcement on the Management Methods of the Villagers' Yishi 
Yiyi on Raising Funds and Recruiting Workers.  
 





provincial, municipal and district/town government. They share similar 
institutional designs and arrangements such as the relationship between town 
government and village committees as well as between village committees and 
village groups, and similar demographic factors such as village size. Moreover, 
they have similar need of certain kinds of public goods and similar fiscal 
transfer from upper-level government.  
They differ only in the type of public goods, kinship network, 
development of voluntary organisations and other factors. By controlling the 
similarities, a comparison of these two villages would reveal the relationship 
between levels of social solidarity and public goods provision.  
Within each administrative village, village group leaders, village head, 
town government officials and around 20 ordinary villagers were interviewed. 
The comparison of the two villages in Hunan province is to explore the 
benefits and problems of rural public goods provision in agricultural villages. 
The effects of formal institutions on rural public goods provision in 
agricultural villages in China such as funds allocation, fundraising and project 
application systems, and informal institutions such as guanxi, farmers’ mind-
set, kinship and tradition were given particular emphasis. 





Chapter 3  
History of Rural Public Goods Provision 
 
Rural China has undergone three revolutions according to Garnaut and 
Ma Guonan: the land reform after 1949, the de-collectivisation and shift to 
household responsibility system (HRS) since the 1980s, and freeing of the 
markets for farm products.133 The three revolutions have greatly impacted on 
rural public good provision in China. History has shown the importance of 
institutional design and policy changes in the rural public goods provision 
process, which includes subsystems such as fundraising, funds allocation, 
decision-making and management.134  
The fundraising and allocation issue as a result of the reduction in funds 
especially in central and western parts of China with the introduction of TFR 
would be the focus of this dissertation. Through the examination of history, 
the changing role of local governments especially town governments, the 
different mechanisms of fundraising and allocation, and the incentive of both 
government and farmers would be examined. History was divided into three 
periods in this paper: People’s Commune (PC) period, HRS to the pre-
agricultural tax-for-fee reform (TFR), as well as TFR and post-TFR. 
 
3.1	  The	  People’s	  Commune	  System	  (1958-­‐1983)	  
PCs were established to replace town governments after the enactment of 
the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 
Establishing the People’s Commune in Rural China in August 1958. 
Thereafter, the Decision on Several Issues regarding the People’s Commune 
was legislated in December of the same year. PC was regarded as the basic 
political and economic unit in the Chinese countryside. Below the PC were the 
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production brigade (PB) and the production team (PT). The PT, which was 
about the size of a natural village, was the unit of collective production. 
Rural public goods were provided through the unified planning of village 
collectives, the owner of the basic means of production. PC and PT were the 
main providers of rural public goods. They controlled the majority of 
economic resources and farmers did not have any property right. PC was 
tasked with the construction of irrigation facilities, roads, education, militia 
training, cooperative medical service, cultural services and popularising of 
agricultural techniques.  
 
Fundraising	  for	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	  
Fundraising for the provision of rural public goods during the PC period 
took the form of government expenditure, such as agricultural expenditures, 
educational, scientific, cultural and healthcare expenses, social welfare cost 
and other administration fees, as well as the commune’s collective economic 
income largely from agriculture with little industrial income. 135  Local 
government extra-budgetary expenditure or the commune’s extra-budgetary 
revenue covered expenditures on public welfare. Table 1 shows that the 
economic income of the commune was used for agricultural production, 
expansion of corporations of communes, social welfare and administration.136 
Part of the income of communes for rural public goods provision came 
from two channels of cost sharing: one was through gongjijin (public 
accumulation funds) and gongyijin (public welfare funds)137 Gongjijin were 
used for the construction of irrigation facilities, purchase of agricultural fixed 
assets and establishment of collective enterprises, while gongyijin were used 
for supporting five guarantees family, meaning family of the aged, the infirm, 
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old widows and orphans, the poor and other social welfare expenses.138 These 
two types of funds accounted for five to eight per cent of the total income of 
the PB in a year.139 Literature shows that of the total income of villages in 
1957 and 1965, village collective deductions accounted for 33-35% and 
39.93%, national tax accounted for 10-11% and 5.73%, respectively.140 
  
Table 1 Channel of Funding for Various Public Goods 
Forms of Public 
Goods Channels of Funding 
Irrigation facilities 
The state invested 76.3 billion yuan, and funds invested by the PC 
and the PBs were 58 billion yuan during the 30 years since the 
People’s Republic of China was established. 
Small-scale irrigation 
projects 
The PC and the PBs undertook the funding without subsidies from 
government if they had the capacity. In villages without such 




Government budgetary funding and collective funds from villages. 
Education costs for 
primary and 
secondary schools 
The costs of schools set up by the Ministry of Education were 
covered mainly by government budgetary funding and supplemented 
by local government revenue, as well as fees submitted by students 
and others. 
The costs of schools established by the PC and PB were covered by 
their collective funds and fees submitted by students and others. 
Healthcare expenses 
Health centres set by the PC were funded mainly by the PC, with 
subsidies from the government when necessary.  
Rural cooperative medical service costs were covered by fees 
charged to farmers in a village. Basic medical service fees were 
covered by the PC collective funds. The subsidies from the 
government were mainly used for staff training expenses and others. 
Health centres in the PBs were covered by the collective economic 
income of a village. 
Cultural 
undertakings 
The costs were mainly covered by funding from the PC and 
supplemented by government budgetary expenditure. 
Social welfare 
Government covered a part of the social welfare fees, while the PC 
undertook another part of social welfare such as establishing homes 
for the aged within the PC. 
Sources: Fan Baohong, Xiangzhen Caizheng yu Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Gongji Yanjiu, 2007, 96.  
Another source of cost sharing was gongfen, or work points, which were a 
measure of work attendance. Farmers as members of the production team—the 
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basic unit of collective production—contributed to rural public goods 
provision by replacing capital with labour. Their performance was measured 
in the form of work points, which were awarded daily. All work points per 
individual awarded in the previous year were totalled to pay the individual in 
form of cash or others for his or her labour.141  
For instance, the commune could mobilise villagers to contribute labour 
to construct roads or irrigation facilities. Villagers would then be given work 
points accordingly. There were two types of work scores: one that was fixed 
beforehand for working on a project and the other was assigned based on the 
number of days the individuals had worked. The performance of an individual 
was evaluated after comparing it with the performance of others and ranked 
from six to ten. The total score of work for an individual at the end of the year 
was calculated by multiplying the rank and the number of days he or she had 
worked.142 The provision of grain for villagers was closely linked to the score 
system. In Jiangsu Province, the total amount of money used for basic 
farmland construction in the 30 years after the establishment of PRC was 
RMB15 billion, among which government invested RMB3.6 billion, the PC, 
PB and PT generated RMB3.6 billion and the farmers contributed to the rest 
of the RMB7 billion in the form of labour.143 This work point system at the 
time of collective production was quite effective.  
 
Incentives	  of	  PC	  and	  Farmers	  in	  the	  Process	  of	  Rural	  Public	  
Goods	  Provision	  
The PC and PB were incentivised to improve rural infrastructure in order 
to guarantee agricultural production, a task assigned by the state. At that time, 
agricultural products were planned, controlled and allocated nationwide in a 
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unified way. The production team was responsible for farming. The PC and 
PB would decide on the size of land on which crops were planted and the way 
farming should be carried out. Farmers participated in the collective 
agricultural production. Each production team was also assigned a quota for 
agricultural production. To ensure that agricultural products produced were 
enough to be submitted to the state, rural infrastructure as the basis of 
agricultural production was crucial.  
Farmers participated in the construction of rural infrastructure to earn a 
living. The food ration system was closely linked to the work point system. 
The PC allocated food among farmers after submitting the agricultural 
products assigned by the state and setting aside enough seeds and feedstuffs 
for the next round of production and ensuring enough grain reserve. The 
remaining part of the food was allocated among farmers according to the work 
points they obtained during the production. The key link between the food 
ration system and the work point system was that farmers had to rely on the 
commune for food. Hence, they needed to follow the instructions and 
regulations of the commune and participate in the agricultural production as 
well as construction of rural infrastructure.  
 
Situation	  of	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	  
Rural public goods came in various forms during the period of the PC. 
Apart from the earlier mentioned public goods and services, new forms of 
public goods such as medical care, social welfare and education were also 
provided. The investment in infrastructure for agriculture during the Second 
Five-Year Plan by the government was emphasised, which accounted for 
11.3% of the national total. From the First Five-Year Plan to the 12nd Five-
Year Programme, this percentage was the highest (see Table 2). 
The average annual investment in rural public goods by the government 
was RMB6.96 billion, RMB3.19 billion (45.8%) of which were allocated to 
infrastructure construction and RMB2.42 billion (34.8%) for supporting 
agricultural production and various fees involving agriculture during the 





period of the PC from 1958 to 1978.144 In 1978 in particular, government 
investment in agriculture was 13.4% of the national total, the highest during 
the period after the establishment of the PRC. The funds the government 
utilised for supporting agriculture were more than RMB10 billion in 1976, 
RMB15 billion in 1978, RMB17.4 billion in 1979 and RMB15 billion in 
1980.145 Some of the public goods had been constructed including the 50,000 
kilometres of electric line constructed during the period from 1958 to 1962.146 
By the end of 1978, 674.48 million mu (or 44.97 million hectares) of farmland 
were effectively irrigated. Investment in rural water resources infrastructure 
and agricultural meteorology was a respective RMB3.567 billion and RMB74 
million.147  The top-down unified supply of rural public goods under the PC 
was effective at that time as farmers had fewer diversified demands.148 
 
Table 2 Percentage of Investment in Rural Basic Construction to Total Investment 













Source: Data from Department of Rural and Social Economic Survey, 2009. 
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3.2	   From	   Household	   Responsibility	   System	   to	   the	  
Tax-­‐for-­‐Fee	  Reform	  (1984-­‐2001)	  
The PC was officially abolished in 1983. The top-down unified provision 
of rural public goods has been gradually changed after the abolition of the PC 
and the implementation of the HRS. Town governments were re-established149 
with roles and functions that are different from that of the PC. The mind-set of 
the farmers has also undergone changes as a result of the HRS. 
 
Towns	  and	  Villages	  
The town government was established as the lowest level of government 
after the abolition of the PC according to the “Circular on Separating the 
Functions of Government from Commune Management and Establishing 
People’s Town Governments” issued by the Communist Party of China 
(CPC)’s Central Committee and the State Council on 10 December1983.150 A 
typical town had a town head and a deputy head, and a deputy head if the town 
was very big. A town government had departments of public security, civil 
administration, judicial administration, culture, education and public health as 
well as family planning.151 According to the Constitution of the PRC, the 
function of a town was to administer economic and social planning and 
budgeting, and handle administrative works such as economic development, 
education and social development. 
After the abolition of agricultural collectives, an administrative village 
(xingzhengcun) replaced the PB and a village group replaced the PT. A 
villagers’ committee run by members who were recommended or elected by 
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villagers and approved by the town government governed the administrative 
village. It was not a formal part of government administration and its members 
were local leaders instead of employees of the state.152 The Village Committee 
Organisation Law took effect on 1 June 1988. The Village Committee (VC) 
was defined as an autonomous organisation that administered and educated 
farmers and served their interests. The main tasks were managing public 
affairs, fulfilling the state grain quota, administering agricultural land use, 
ensuring compliance of villagers in meeting their obligations, developing 
village industries, maintaining social order, mediating conflicts among 
villagers, conveying feedback of villagers to higher authorities and managing 
birth control.153 Village leaders had four major responsibilities: collecting 
taxes and levying fees, enforcing family planning, fulfilling grain procurement 
quotas and providing public goods and services. Village leaders had often 
placed public goods and services provision at a low priority.154 
An administrative village comprised several village groups, each of which 
covered between 30 and 50 households. The leaders of village groups were 
elected or recommended by farmer households and responsible for collecting 
agricultural taxes and fees, acquainting villagers with government policies, 
mediating disputes, organising public projects construction and other tasks 
related to agricultural production, and ensuring villagers’ livelihood. 
Unlike the PC, a town government had no direct control of agricultural 
production in its subordinate villages and had weaker administrative power 
over villages than the PC. However, most towns controlled villages through 
financial and personnel management. The leading functionaries of villages 
were mostly appointed by and accountable to town party committees. Village 
finance was checked by the management administration station (jingying 
guanli zhan) in the town government. Village cadres’ salaries were paid after 
their performance evaluated by town government at the end of each year. 
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Town and town governments provided guidance, help and support to village 
committees, which in turn assisted town and town governments in their work. 
In most situations, the town government decided the salaries of village 
officials.155 These institutional changes in the countryside had changed the 
interests of both the government and farmers. 
Legally, village committee was a self-governing organisation and 
politically independent from the town as town government cannot appoint or 
dismiss village committee members. However, in reality, town government 
could intervene in village affairs through organisational and economic 
relations as the Party had its branch at the village level and the town 
government determined the salaries of village committee members and village 
group leaders. 
 
Financial	  System	  and	  Village	  Income	  of	  the	  Town	  
Government	  	  
In the late 1980s, all provinces except Tibet had set up fiscal departments 
at the town level. Town budgets were part of county budgets, which meant 
that all revenues were collected by counties and all expenditures at the town 
level were disbursed from county budgets. 156  After the 1980s, Contract 
System on Revenue and Expenditure (CSRE) for local government (caizheng 
baogan)157 had been implemented requiring the county to set a revenue 
baseline for each town The town would have to submit revenue to the county 
based on a certain percentage. Meanwhile, another expenditure was for higher 
authorities, called shangjie. The baseline for shangjie had also been set for 
each town. It meant that if the baseline of revenue exceeded that of 
expenditure, the excess would go to the county treasury through shangjie. If 
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revenue was lower than expenditure, the county finance would provide 
subsidy to town revenue.158 
Town governments had three categories of revenue: budgetary, extra-
budgetary and self-raised funds.159 The most important budgetary revenue 
included four agriculture-related taxes, industrial commercial tax and other 
taxes from levies. The agriculture-related taxes included agricultural tax, 
agricultural special products tax, slaughter tax and deed tax. Agricultural 
special products tax was introduced in 1994 as a special variant to agricultural 
tax. Local governments imposed higher rates of taxes on more profitable 
agricultural products such as tobacco, tealeaves, flowers, fruits and aquatic 
products.160 
The agricultural tax reflected the growth of crop products and the other 
three agriculture-related taxes showed the growth of cash crops and livestock 
raising industry. The industrial commercial tax included both value added tax, 
sales tax and enterprise income tax of local enterprises, and miscellaneous 
taxes such as personal income tax, resource tax, property tax, stamp tax, 
operation tax of vehicle and ship, and other taxes. Of the budgetary revenue of 
town government, the revenue deriving from the four agriculture-related taxes 
was more than the sum of industrial commercial tax and other taxes such as 
fines and charges, which was a typical characteristic of the finance of a less 
developed town.161  
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The formal budget was not the most important part of the fiscal system.162 
Extra-budgetary and self-raised funds might constitute a large part of town 
government revenue. Major revenue from extra-budgetary taxes came from 
fees and charges, including educational surcharges, surcharges of agricultural 
taxes, agency development funds, rental incomes from public housing, market 
management fees, management fees from private enterprises or individuals 
and others.163  
Self-raised funds were also called off-budget revenue. The issue of off-
budget revenue was first raised by Sun Tanzhen and Zhu Gang in 1993. 
Budgetary and extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure followed the unified 
nationwide institutional restriction. Under off-budget finance, town 
governments could decide on the scope, standard and ways of charging based 
on the actual situation of the town.164 
Off-budget revenue of town involved four categories: The first was profit 
and management fees paid by town enterprises and rental fees of collective-
owned lands, mountains and rivers. They were stable sources of revenue, a 
reason for the towns’ keen interest in developing town-village enterprises and 
planting bases. The second was expenses retained for the village’s collective 
undertakings (or three deductions) including gongjijin, gongyijin and 
guanlifei,165 as well as retained fees from five charges. Three deductions 
referred to public reserve funds, public welfare funds and management fees.166 
Five charges were fees for unified management of town public undertakings, 
including charges for rural education, family planning, militia training, inter-
                                                
162 Wong, Christine P. W. and Richard M. Bird, “China’s Fiscal System: A Work in Progress”. 
In China’s Great Economic Transformation, (eds.) Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 442. 
163 Wong, Christine, P.W, 1997, 201-202 
164 Sun Tanzhen and Zhu Gang, “Woguo Xiangzhen Zhiduwai Caizheng Yanjiu”, Jingji 
Yanjiu, 1993, no. 9, 38; Lin Wanlong, 2003, 96. 
165 Gongjijin means public reserve funds used for covering expenses for farmland irrigation 
and costs of collective economy; gongyijin means public welfare funds used to subsidise the 
five guarantees for the family (the aged, the infirm, old widows and orphans), poor families 
and other social welfare costs; guanlifei includes management fees which cover salaries of 
village officials and management expenses. See Xiong Wei, “Woguo Nongcun Gonggong 
Chanpin Gongji Fenxi yu Moshi Xuanze”, 2002: 36-44 
166 Public reserve funds are used for constructing facilities for farmland irrigation and 
afforestation, purchasing fixed assets for production as well as setting up village collective 
economy. (Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council), 2003, 6; see also Xiong, 2002. 





village road construction and subsidies to entitled groups. 167  Off-budget 
revenue also included various raised funds, donations, etc. The last category of 
off-budget revenue included income from imposition of fines and sales from 
confiscated goods collected from farmers. Table 3 shows that revenue raised 
by town governments not only had accounted for a large part, but was also the 
main source of total town government revenue.  
 
Table 3 Proportion of Town Government-Raised Revenue to Total Town Revenue: 
Several Cases168 
Place 
Percentage of town 
government-raised 
revenue in total revenue 
Year 
One town in Beijing 77.4 1989 
One town in Zhejiang  72.5 1989 
One town in Dalian 74.6 1991 
One town in Hunan 41.7 1991 
One town in Yicheng County, Hubei 59.7 1992 
One town in Jiangmen city, Guangdong 85.7 1993 
One town in Leqing city, Wenzhou 63.2 1993 
One town in Hebei (A) 45.1 1996 
One town in Hebei (B) 43.6 1997 
One town in Hebei (C) 45.9 1998 
One town in Hebei (D) 59.6 1999 
Source: Cases 1 to 4: Sun Tanzhen, Zhu Gang (1993); Cases 5 to 7: Fan Gang (1995); Cases 8 to 
11: Lin Wanlong (2002). 
 
The funds raised were used mainly for four purposes: to complete the 
revenue base, to pay for the salaries of staff on contract and the welfare of 
staff on payroll, to cover the daily administrative operation costs such as 
hospitalisation fees, travel charges, communication fees, newspaper 
subscription fees, water and electricity fees and other administrative fees, and 
to provide rural public goods and services.169 
Villages had also set aside certain funds for operation costs and public 
welfare. The funds mainly came from two sources: fees transferred from town 
government back to the villages, the collective income of village from profit 
and income from leasing land or fishponds to farmer household, enterprises or 
town governments, leasing collectively owned machines to farmer households 
and other fees. 
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The income of villages should generally be first transferred to the town 
government before they were returned to the villages after checking. Large 
expenditures must be approved by the town government. In general, villages 
with robust economy and strong leadership enjoyed more autonomy than those 
with weak economy and poor leadership170 as they were heavily dependent on 
the town government. 
 
Fundraising	  for	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	  
The funding of rural public goods after the implementation of the HRS 
remained the same as that of the PC, which largely depended on off-budget 
revenue. But the ways of cost sharing shifted from directly deducting from 
collectives’ revenue under the PC system to farmers submitting taxes and fees 
under the HRS.171 In official words, public goods provision in this period 
followed the principles of ‘whoever benefits pay’ and ‘collect funds from 
farmers to be used for them’. Farmers had to pay for public goods according to 
the extent of benefits they enjoyed.172 
The costs of public goods were shared among local government, village 
committee and farmers. A survey in 2002 by the State Council’s Development 
Research Centre showed that town government and village committee 
contributed 78% of compulsory education costs, the county governments nine 
per cent, provincial governments 11% and the central government two per 
cent.173  
But in some villages with good development of town-village enterprises 
and rapid development of collective economy, such as Huaxi village in 
Jiangsu province and Nanjie village in Henan province, infrastructures (roads, 
electricity and water facilities), education, medical care and pension system 
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were provided by village collective without government subsidies or farmers’ 
contribution of funds.174  
 
Role	  of	  Town	  Government	  in	  Fundraising	  
Town governments had played an important role in the process of rural 
public goods provision after HRS was implemented. Rural public goods were 
provided through off-budget finance and farmers undertook a large part of the 
responsibility. As mentioned earlier, funding for rural public goods provision 
depended on off-budget revenue.175  
The town government collected funds from farmers for public goods 
through three channels before the TFR. The first channel was by four 
agricultural taxes (agricultural tax, agricultural specialty tax, farmland 
occupation tax and contract tax) and slaughter tax. The tax levied was decided 
by the central government and town government had no decision power 
regarding the taxes. Hence, town government depended on the second and 
third channels of collecting tax for rural public goods provision.  
The second channel was from three deductions and five charges 
(tongchou).176 Three deductions and five charges covered almost all aspects of 
rural public goods and services. In 2002, county and town governments had 
undertaken almost half (around 42.86%) of the expenditure for supporting 
various agricultural undertakings, while central, provincial and municipal 
governments had undertaken 13.42%, 29.49% and 14.23%, respectively.177 
Lin Wanlong pointed out that “three deductions and five charges” come 
under collective funds instead of financial funds since they are similar to funds 
raised by community, which was outside of the governments’ financial system 
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during the period of the PC.178 The third channel for public goods was the 
various impositions of contributions and the mandatory fundraising.  
 
Table 4 Fiscal Expenses from Different Levels of Governments in 2002 
Percentage of total is indicated in parentheses     Unit: 100 million 



























Source: Feng Xingyuan, (2009: 287). 
One reason for the huge revenue collected from farmers was the need to 
meet the shortfall in funds obtained from county and above governments. 
Agricultural taxes accounted for 30% to 40% of town revenue, or only four 
per cent of central government revenue in Anhui province in 1998.179 Table 4 
shows that RMB26.96 billion or almost half of total funds was used for 
various agricultural expenses, while RMB15.438 billion or more than half of 
total funds for agricultural production came from county and town 
government revenue in 2002. County government, especially town 
government, was given the huge burden of providing rural public goods 
without adequate funds from upper-level government. 
The second reason was the tax-sharing reform in 1994, which made town 
more independent. Town governments gradually became a separate interest 
group after economic reforms in especially property rights and marketisation 
of economic management, giving town governments the right to ownership of 
local resources. Another possible reason was the flexibility in deciding the 
standard and method of levying fees with no national regulations. There was 
also a lack of regulation on fund usage.180  
However, the agricultural tax, three deductions, five charges and other 
fundraising channels were not used solely for rural public goods provision but 
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for accomplishing county government’s revenue tasks (see Figure 2). As 
mentioned earlier, based on the caizheng baogan, there was a revenue baseline 
the town government had to submit to upper-level government, failing which 
town expenditure would be reduced, affecting the payment of salary to 
government staff and the town’s daily operation. This submission was 
mandatory even when revenue fell. The failure to submit will had an adverse 
effect on the performance of town government officials. As a result, town 






                                                                           
 





                                                                                                  
 
 
Figure 2 Expenditure of MS Town 
Source: Zhou Feizhou and Zhao Yang, (2003: 32). 
 
Off-budget funds were used to pay for the allowances of town staffs and 
for hiring temporary staffs as budgetary revenue only covered the basic 
salaries of town staff. Temporary staffs were hired to collect agricultural taxes 
and fees, for instance, after the streamlining of town government. These funds 
were also for meeting daily operating expenses and costs, as well as for 
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making investment decisions on local public projects such as the construction 
and maintenance of village schools and healthcare facilities.181 
 
The	  Incentives	  of	  Town	  Government	  
Rural infrastructures such as roads and electricity and farmland irrigation 
facilities were necessary for agricultural production, without which the 
farmers would not be able to harvest and submit various agricultural taxes and 
fees. Town governments collected various fees including three deductions and 
five charges in the name of public services from farmers. Some form of 
expenditure on public goods or services such as the maintenance of 
classrooms and roads would have to be provided; in most cases, the funds 
allocated were quite small.182  
Theoretically, the main function of town government should be on 
providing rural public goods and social welfare. However, in reality, town 
governments were busy with various tasks including collecting agricultural 
taxes and various fees, conducting family planning activities and rural 
compulsory education. Village group leaders had been tasked with collecting 
taxes and fees before handing them to the village committee for onward 
submission to the town government. The task of collecting taxes and fees was 
so important that it was tied to the salary (around two-thirds) of village 
officials.183 The failure to accomplish the task could mean a pay-cut at the end 
of the year. This put village officials under huge pressure.  
The collection of taxes and fees for public goods provision in a way had 
its plus points. First, it increased the frequency of contact between town 
government officials and village officials, as well as between village officials 
and farmers. Farmers could voice their demands for various kinds of public 
projects in their meetings with village officials during the tax collection 
process. Second, as the town government had to depend on village officials, 
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who in turn had to rely on farmers for tax payments, they would have to meet 
farmers’ demands. Hence, it promoted the provision of rural public goods. 
 
The	  Incentive	  of	  Farmers	  
The need for rural public goods provision for agricultural production was 
a motivation for farmers to make their contributions dutifully. Unlike farmers 
during the PC, farmers in this period had more autonomy in their agricultural 
production since the implementation of HRS. 
From the late 1970s, the economic reform in countryside had begun and 
the HRS implemented. All proceeds went to the farmers after the submission 
of agricultural tax to the central government, and various fees collected were 
channelled to the coffers of the collective and town government. 
The implementation of the HRS brought dramatic changes to the 
countryside. One change was the ownership of property rights. The collective 
under the PC was the sole owner to common property. Under the HRS, 
common property was owned by both the collective and farmers.184 Farmers 
obtained private property rights that were not available before, meaning that 
farmers had the autonomy of activities in relation to production and 
management, as well as the control of profits gained.  
The implementation of HRS initially aimed to promote agricultural 
production by providing incentives to farmers through the leasing of land. But 
it gave autonomy to peasant household as a unit of production as well. The 
most common form of responsibility system in operation was baogan daohu – 
leasing land and allocating output quotas to each household. The collectives 
had land ownership, while the households had utilisation right.  
This gave great incentives to farmers to increase agricultural production. 
Household as a chief unit of production was responsible for all field 
management, from sowing, harvesting to controlling the whole process. This 
contrasted with production under the PC whereby decision making on the type 
of crops and the production process, and management of all production tasks 
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came under the production team.185 For farmers who operated their own 
private business, public services such as electricity, roads, and water were 
essential.  
 
Situation	  of	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	   	  
Public goods were diversified after the implementation of the HRS as 
farmers had different demands for public goods. Those who worked in the 
plantation demanded for good irrigation facilities, while those who specialised 
in poultry breeding required good roads to facilitate travel downtown to make 
their sale.  However, more often than not, these demands could not be met as 
rural public goods provision was by the upper-level government. Town 
government and village committee had to accomplish assigned tasks, which 
were often irrelevant to the demands of farmers. Sometimes, public projects 
that were totally unrelated to the needs of the farmers were constructed to 
showcase the achievements of county and town governments.186 
Funds for rural public goods provision were also far from adequate during 
this period. Investment by central government on rural infrastructure 
accounted for 13.4% of national total in 1978, and further down to 9.98% in 
1990, 7.75% in 2000, and only 2.73% in 2001.187 At the national level, rural 
infrastructure investment accounted for only 2.5%, the lowest in 1994; it rose 
to 7.3% in 2002, which was still lower than the 11.3% of the Second Five-
Year Plan from 1958 to 1962.188 On transportation and resources, 83% of 
villages had no secure drinking water, 13% had no road, 53% had no phone 
connection and electricity supply was not constant. Medical care services were 
not only inadequate. In many villages, many educational facilities such as 
classrooms, dormitories and equipment were old and dysfunctional, teachers 
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were under-qualified and salaries were often delayed. Alkaline soil, vegetation 
deterioration, droughts and floods were common complaints of a deteriorating 
village environment.189  
The lack of funding had left town governments with little rural public 
goods provision. This was worsened by the introduction of the Tax Sharing 
Scheme in 1994; the central share in total budgetary revenue had increased 
rapidly at the expense of the local government. The percentage of central and 
local government revenue in total revenue was a respective 22% and 78% in 
1993. A year later, the situation was reversed to 55.7% and 44.3% 
respectively.190 It was reported that large portions of local government budgets 
were channelled to payroll and staff-related costs, leaving little funds for 
public investment.191 For instance, of total expenditure of local education in 
2001, payroll for teaching and administrative staff accounted for 62.7%, 
housekeeping 8.8%, operational costs 6.5%, purchase of equipment 7.1%, 
minor renovation 8.7%, reception and entertainment 0.4% and others 5.7%.192  
Some towns even had huge debts. In 1999, of 45,000 town fiscal 
departments, 52% required financial subsidies from upper-level government to 
cover administrative and everyday expenses.193 The financial situation only 
witnessed slight improvement in 2000, where 950 (46%) of 2,074 county 
fiscal departments needed subsidies from upper-level government.  
Furthermore it became difficult to require farmers to contribute funds and 
labour to public goods provision. Farmer households’ income had grown 
quickly due to the implementation of HRS, giving farmers a free hand in 
agricultural production, thus resulting in rapid rural economic development. 
The annual average gross social production value grew by 15.1% from 1978 to 
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1996, which indicated rapid growth in rural economy.194 But income growth 
was uneven. Farmers reacted differently to rural public goods provision. Some 
were more willing than others to contribute both funds and labour. Under the 
HRS, farmers became individual work units, which worked for their own 
gains. It was thus not easy to get them to work for free.  
 
3.3	  Conclusion	  
The study of the history of rural public goods provision had shown that 
farmers had made large contributions. During the PC system, rural public 
goods were provided by top-down unified supply and funded by deductions 
from the commune’s income. Farmers were mobilised by the PC and PB to 
work and share the costs of public goods provision under the gongfen system. 
They contributed by replacing capital with labour. The close link between 
daily food and work points provided the incentives for farmers to work hard. 
The PC and PB that were tasked with providing rural public goods had the 
incentive to guarantee agricultural production. This unified top-down supply 
of rural public goods was effective at that time.  
With the abolition of the PC system and the implementation of the HRS, 
farmers still contributed to rural public goods with the submission of various 
taxes and fees. Town governments collected three deductions and five charges, 
as well as other impositions and mandatory fundraising from village 
committees for rural public goods provision.  
After the implementation of HRS, rural public goods provision was 
compromised due to limited investment. Town government with limited funds 
allocated from upper- level government had to shoulder the huge burden of 
meeting the revenue baseline assigned by county government. The funds 
collected from farmers were not fully used for rural public goods provision, as 
there were other expenses to pay for as well. To collect various taxes and fees 
from farmers, town governments had to provide a minimal level of rural 
public goods. As farmers had become individual work units and had to work 
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for their own agricultural production, town governments faced challenges in 
getting farmers to replace capital with labour for rural public goods provision. 





Chapter 4  
The Impact of Tax-for-Fee Reform and Abolition 
of Agricultural Tax on Rural Public Goods 
Provision 
 
The tax-for-fee reform (TFR) and abolition of agricultural tax (AAT) 
were implemented after two rounds of rural fiscal reforms. The first was the 
decentralisation reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s to improve 
incentives for revenue generation. The reform increased local revenue but 
decreased central government revenue. The second was the recentralisation 
reform in 1994 to share tax between central and local governments. With the 
tax-sharing system, the tax revenue of local governments fell.195 Villagers 
were imposed various taxes and fees by local governments in the late 1990s 
which later became one of the most serious concerns of the central 
government. Rural TFR (feigaishui)196 was to reduce the burden of farmers, 
but it had also affected rural public goods provision.  
Before the TFR, farmer households were imposed agricultural taxes, three 
deductions and five charges (tongchou) and other surcharges. The main tasks 
of TFR were to abolish the “five charges”, administrative fees, slaughtering 
tax and village compulsory labour services, adjust the agricultural tax and tax 
on agricultural specialty products, as well as reform the “three deductions”.197 
The TFR was initiated in Anhui province as a national demonstration site 
(shifandian) in the year 2000, with other provinces selecting some counties or 
cities as pilot localities. By 2002, 20 provinces undertook this reform, an 
attempt by the central government to relieve villagers of their tax and fee 
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burdens in the 1990s and to simplify the collection of local revenue.198 The 
loss in local fees was to be offset by direct transfers from the county 
government.  
The basic policy changes were summarised as “three abolitions, two 
adjustments, and one reform”(sange quxiao, liangge tiaozheng he yige zubu 
quxiao). Three abolitions meant the termination of town levies and charges, 
the levy on rural education, and other levies. Two adjustments referred to 
changes to agricultural tax and the special agricultural tax. One reform 
denoted reform of the collection and usage of the administrative village 
levy.199  
In the initial phase, TFR included several changes to rural taxes. First, 
most of the town levies and charges such as the earlier mentioned five charges 
and slaughter taxes were abolished without requiring farmers to contribute 
other forms of funds. Second, the labour obligations to provide 10-20 days of 
labour per year or its monetary equivalent during the collective era were 
terminated by 2003. In order to compensate for the loss of revenue, 
agricultural tax was readjusted to seven per cent on average.200 Third, three 
deductions (tiliu), which were used to cover remuneration of village cadres, 
social relief, and administration expenses were abolished. These expenses had 
since been financed by an agricultural tax equivalent to the maximum of 20% 
of the tax payment imposed on farmers.201 In general, the newly adjusted 
agricultural taxes replaced all former informal fees collected from farmers.202 
Agricultural taxes went to the prefectural and county finance bureau first after 
collection before they were channelled back to town finance to meet the quota 
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set. The new agricultural tax designated for the town and surcharge on the 
agricultural tax was earmarked for the village.203  
In 2002, around 20 provinces implemented the AAT on a province-wide 
basis. Pilot programmes involving a full abolition of agricultural tax were 
conducted in the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin. Eleven 
agricultural-based provinces were required by the central government to 
reduce agricultural tax rates by three per cent while the rest of the provinces 
had to reduce agricultural taxes by one per cent since 2004.204 By the end of 
2005, 26 provinces in Mainland China had abolished agricultural tax and the 
rest did likewise in 2006.205  
Meanwhile, to improve rural infrastructure construction, constructing the 
New Socialist Countryside was advanced at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 
16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2005. The 
investment by the central government on the countryside was expected to 
increase. With the joint efforts of local and central governments, rural 
infrastructure would be improved, especially the construction of roads. 
 
4.1	  Finance	  of	  County	  and	  Town	  Governments	  after	  
the	  TFR	  and	  AAT	  
The TFR and AAT have been well received in rural China for relieving 
the burden of farmers. However, their negative effects on rural public goods 
provision are substantial. After TFR and AAT, village expenditure for public 
goods and services and funding input from the county level have dipped.206 
Farmers’ ability and willingness to contribute to public goods and services 
have also waned.207 
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Both county and town governments, as well as primary providers of 
public goods and services in China, were financially affected by TFR and 
AAT. For instance, unlike most countries in the world where central and 
provincial governments are the chief providers of education and medical care 
services, in China, the responsibility largely rests with county and town 
governments. In general, the finance of county and town governments 
accounts for more than 70% of total education expenditure and around 60% of 
total medical care expenses.208 
The impact of AAT on the finances of county and town governments was 
greatest for the western and central parts of China as they depended heavily on 
agriculture for revenue. For instance, agricultural tax accounted for 55.15% of 
revenue and 33.11% of total expenditure of a county in Anhui province in 
2000.209 The importance of agricultural tax and related taxes varied among 
different towns. For instance, on average, the agricultural tax and agriculture 
special product tax accounted for a respective 20.2% and 39% of local revenue 
in less developed towns, and only 5.0% and 9.1% in local revenue in more 
developed towns.210 
After the AAT, the county has lost an important source of revenue and 
faced budget deficit. Some counties could not cover daily operating costs nor 
pay their staffs. A report of YJ county in the western part of China showed 
that 74.9% of total county expenditure was for salary, 13.1% for operation 
costs and only 12% was for providing rural public goods.211 Although there 
                                                
208 Zhao, Quanhou, and Gao Jinshui, “Zhongguo Xianxiang Caizheng Shouru Nengli Tisheng 
de Zhengce Xuanze” (The Policy Choice of Improving the Revenue of County and township 
Government in China), Caijing Wenti Yanjiu, no. 9, (Sep, 2009), 86. 
209 Chang Wei and Su Zhenhua, “Nongcun Gonggong Chanpin Wenti de Lishi Kaocha” 
(Historical Examination of Rural Public Goods Problem), Zhonggong Ningbo Shiwei 
Dangxiao Xuebao, 2008, no. 6, 83. 
210 Fan Baohong, “Nongcun Shuifei Gaige du Xiangzhen Caizheng Yingxiang de Shizheng 
Fenxi—Yi Jiangsu Taizhou 4 Shi 1 Qu 11 Zhen Weili” (Positive Analysis of Tax and Fee 
Reform’s Impact on Township Finance: A Case Study of 11 Towns of Taizhou in Jiangsu 
Province), Nanjing Nongye Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexueban), vol. 6, no. 4, (December 2006): 
20.  
211 Qu Zhiyong, Yuan Jianqi and Yang Lin, “Xianxiang Caizheng Guanli Tizhi Cunzai de 
Zhuyao Wenti yu Duice Jianyi—Yi Xibu Neilu Mousheng Weili” (The Main Problems and 
Suggestions to County and Township Financial Management—An Example of a Province in 
the Western Part of China), Jingji Cankaobao, no. 61, 2009: 56. 





was fiscal transfer from upper-level government, it had failed to bring about 
an improvement in rural public goods provision.212  
The financial relationship between town and county governments has 
changed since the TFR, which resulted in less autonomy of town government. 
The loss of revenue of the latter has weakened their autonomy and financial 
power, making them an agent of county governments.213 Some scholars even 
suggest changing town governments as a level of government to an agency of 
county government.214 
First, the main income of the town government has changed from 
collecting agricultural taxes, three deductions and five charges to a heavy 
dependence on the fiscal transfer from upper-level government. Before the 
TFR and AAT, the town government was responsible for the salary and 
incentives of its staffs. After the TFR and AAT, town government staffs as 
well as teachers are paid directly by the county government, which is also 
empowered to appoint and deploy personnel, funds and materials of rural 
education.215 
An investigation of C town in 2007 showed that the fiscal transfer from 
county finance for the salaries of town officials, village committee cadres and 
teachers, as well as the funding of rural compulsory education and direct food 
subsidy, was as high as RMB9.17 million. The funds were directly allocated 
from county finance in the name of special funds.216 
For central and west China, more than half of the town revenue comes 
from fiscal transfers by upper-level government. The town government only 
collects industrial revenue, which accounts for a small part of the town 
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revenue. 217  The funds for public goods and services are mostly direct 
investments by the county government. 
Second, town governments have thus lost the ability to generate funds and 
could barely function as semi-autonomous administrative units since fiscal 
transfers are insufficient to compensate for the financial loss. It was reported 
that every town in Anhui province had lost an estimated RMB9 billion on 
average after the TFR.218  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the funds raised by town governments were 
mainly used to meet revenue baseline, pay for staffs’ salary, cover daily 
administrative costs and provide rural public goods. After the TFR and AAT, 
county transfers could only cover the payroll of the staff. Before the reforms, 
town governments had more autonomy on their expenditure, including 
budgetary expenditure and the part controlled by town government used for 
covering costs for basic operation and public goods and services provision. 
The basic operating costs were called chicaizhengfan and included wages and 
basic administrative expenditures. The costs for public goods and services 
were called banshi de qian.  
For instance, before the TFR, the total expenditure of a town could 
amount to RMB3.415 million, consisting of a budgetary expenditure of 
RMB2.57 million (75% of the total), and the banshi de qian of RMB0.963 
million The RMB2.57 million was used entirely for staffs’ payroll and any 
outstanding amount would be offset by the remaining funds from banshi de 
qian. After giving part of it for staff payroll, the banshi de qian, which 
included the five charges and other fees charged among various departments, 
was also utilised for hiring temporary staff and relief teachers (bianzhiwai),219 
as well as for daily operation costs such as expenses for hosting guests, 
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subscribing to newspapers and journals, as well as maintaining a fleet of 
official vehicles.220 
After the TFR, the allotment for banshi de qian has been drastically 
reduced with the abolition of various agricultural taxes and fees. The tight 
financial constraints have reduced any incentive to provide rural public goods 
and services. Table 3 in the previous chapter showed that revenue raised by 
town governments accounted for around 40% to 80% of total revenue in the 
late 1990s. After the AAT, this part of town government revenue has been 
largely lost, leaving little fund left for banshi de qian.  
Data from agricultural provinces has shown that the growing budget 
deficits of counties have a direct bearing on their subsidies to the towns.221 
Town governments have no choice but to loan from channels including rural 
collective funds and rural credit associations. 
Town debts form as a result of the unscientific evaluation system of town 
officials and a financial system lacking regulation. Town officials are 
evaluated based on the collection of industrial and commercial taxes after the 
AAT. Without an effective regulatory system for the management of extra-
budgetary revenue and funds, town government expenditure becomes 
unaccountable.  
A survey of town government officials in Shanxi province showed that 
the most difficult issue facing them was high debts.222 In 2004, towns on 
average had incurred debts of RMB16.74 million in Hunan province, RMB5.9 
million in Chongqing, and RMB8.99 million in Jilin.223 Town debts consisted 
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of visible and invisible debts.224 Visible debts included bank credits or other 
official loans such as credits from investment funds for all areas of public 
infrastructure (streets, schools, irrigation systems, etc.). Invisible debts were 
those incurred for daily allowances for travel, medical insurance premiums, 
electricity, water and phone bills, or for unpaid wages.225 
Town governments also face financial pressure from villages. The TFR 
had the unintended consequence of reducing the resources available for public 
goods investment at the village level based on the survey by Luo Renfu et. 
al.226 Village revenue has also dipped due to the TFR and the AAT. Villages 
have to cut their investments in new types of public goods provision and 
sought funds from town governments for repair works. 
 
4.2	  Incentives	  for	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	  
The	  Incentive	  of	  Town	  Governments	  
Town governments have little incentive to provide public goods due to 
their financial crisis. Besides the financial crisis of county and town 
governments, the incentive to provide rural public goods was reduced due to 
the new responsibilities of town governments, the new evaluation criteria for 
town cadres and the new relationship between county, town and village.  
After the implementation of the TFR and AAT, the functions of town 
governments could be classified into three categories: (1) providing basic rural 
public goods and services: (2) maintaining social stability and village 
construction including policy propaganda, village financial management, 
agriculture and forestry work, land management, civil administration, public 
security administration, family planning and New Socialist Countryside 
Construction; and (3) promoting investment attraction.227 The latter two tasks 
are given high priority by town governments as towns are evaluated based on 
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the two categories. Notably, the sequence of importance is economic 
development, social stability and security, rural culture, education and medical 
care services, modern agriculture construction and rural public goods and 
service provision.228  Most towns are evaluated based on their ability to attract 
investment and utilise foreign capital. In some counties, about half of the 
indicators in the evaluation of town governments are related to economic 
development, and not about residents’ income level, employment rate and 
provision of other social welfare services.229  
The basic rural public goods such as compulsory education, militia 
training, road repair and construction, public health care and epidemic 
prevention and family planning were mostly covered previously by self-raised 
funds generated from rural residents under the name of five charges. After the 
abolition of these self-raised funds, town governments with less autonomy of 
revenue could hardly afforded the provision of rural public goods. 
Town government has less incentive to provide rural public goods due to 
the change in function and relationship between town and county governments. 
As town government is no longer needed to collect agricultural taxes or fees 
from farmers after the abolition of agricultural tax, it shows less enthusiasm 
for caring for or catering to farmers. This is clearly shown in the following 
discussion of the relationship between town government and villages when 
analysing the incentive of villages to provide public goods. 
 
The	  Effect	  of	  TFR	  and	  AAT	  on	  Villages	  and	  the	  Incentive	  for	  
the	  Provision	  of	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  
The village balance sheet has constantly registered deficits after the TFR 
and AAT, leading it to cut rural public goods investment. The revenue of a 
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typical village in Anhui province was slashed by as much as 40% in 2003.230 
Before the TFR and AAT, the three deductions and five charges as well as the 
lianggong system231 worked as the institutionalised guarantee for providing 
rural public goods and services. Public projects after the TFR and AAT are 
called one-time projects (yicixing) provided by ad hoc funds such as farmers’ 
contributions and fiscal allocation from upper-level governments, unlike the 
routine projects in the past.232  
The development of the collective economy varies greatly among 
different villages. A survey of 37 villages by Feng Xingyuan et. al. in 2004 
showed that in terms of collective income, six villages (16.22%) had zero 
collective income, 14 villages had below RMB50,000, five villages had 
between RMB1 million and RMB3 million, while one village had more than 
RMB3 million.233 It had also shown that eight villages had debts below 
RMB0.1 million and one with a debt of between RMB1 million and RMB1.5 
million in 2004. The debts were incurred for infrastructure construction, 
advances for village cooperative medical care, overdraft of operation costs the 
year before, and unplanned costs. The survey on Xiangyang county, Hubei 
province indicated that town and village debts were RMB1.41 billion, with 
town governments and villages constituting RMB0.41 billion and RMB1 
billion of the debts, respectively.  
Except for villages that have a well-developed collective economy, most 
villages have different levels of debts.234 The sources of collective income 
come from the income of village or village group-owned enterprises, land 
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expropriation fees, land contracting fees, leasing income from mining 
outsourcing and village tourism, and leasing village collective resources. 
The implementation of the TFR and AAT has also changed the 
relationship between town, village and villagers. Before the TFR and AAT, 
towns and village committees had common interests, working together to 
collect agricultural tax and various agricultural fees to provide public goods as 
the fee collected were often in excess of the actual amount needed for a public 
project. For instance, the irrigation of farmland cost RMB30 per mu, but fees 
collected from farmers were RMB50 per mu. In a town with 0.1 million mu of 
farmland, town and village committees could obtain RMB2 million from the 
collected fees.235 The economic incentive promoted the provision of rural 
public goods by town and village committees. 
After the reforms, the pressure on village committees from town 
government has no longer existed. Non-institutional personal relations become 
important as the core task is now on attracting investments that has little to do 
with the villagers. Town governments and village committees have little 
incentive to actively provide public goods and services for the sake of 
accomplishing their core task as before. Moreover, without frequent face-to-
face interaction like that during the collection of taxes and fees, village 
committees hardly feel the need to provide public services for villagers.236 
  
The	  Incentive	  of	  Farmers	  
Unlike many countries where upper-level governments have to take the 
responsibility of providing public goods, it is the farmers who have to 
shoulder a larger share of the responsibility of public goods provision in China. 
From 1998 to 2003, only 36% of total public projects were funded solely by 
upper-level governments, while 46% needed matching funds from villages and 
18% were solely funded by villages.237 
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Farmers’ mind-set has also undergone changes after the TFR. After the 
TFR, the heavy burden of various taxes and fees on farmers has been removed. 
Farmers no longer submit agricultural taxes and fees that pose several 
problems. First, it is no longer easy to organise and coordinate farmers in the 
provision of rural public goods as farmers’ demand for public goods are 
different. They have the freedom not to pursue agricultural production. Many 
have gone to cities to work as migrant workers and become less interested in 
rural public goods and services. It is those who remain in the village that have 
higher demand for public goods and services, making it rather difficult for 
town governments to satisfy unequal demands.  
Second, many farmers become more dependent after the AAT, believing 
that they can depend on the government for public goods and services without 
the need to contribute funds. The abolition of agricultural taxes and fees has 
given the misconception that the government would eventually change certain 
policies to cover the expenses later. The interviews with farmers in the case 
studies mentioned in Chapter 7 will provide evidence to this. 
 
4.3	   The	   Problem	   of	   Rural	   Public	   Goods	   Provision	  
after	  the	  TFR	  and	  AAT	  
The implementation of the TFR and AAT has had an unintended negative 
effect on public goods investment as it has reduced the resources available for 
it. The investment in infrastructure such as irrigation and school after the TFR 
has been reduced systematically compared with the situation before the 
reforms.238 The TFR and AAT have negative effects on rural public goods 
provision due to the reduced revenue of town government, the altered 
relationship between county government, town government and farmers, and 
the mind-set of farmers. 
The survey by the Ministry of Finance and World Bank on about 500 
farmer households in six counties in China in 2005 is indicative of the severity 
of the problem of rural public goods provision. A study presented that overall 
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more than 50% of farmer households were dissatisfied with the rural 
transportation network and about 62% felt that medical care expenses were too 
high.239 
 
Fundraising	  for	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	  
The lost revenue of towns is expected to be covered by either economic 
development or fiscal transfers from upper-level government. In some areas 
that are close to cities, the convenience has stimulated the establishment of 
plants and abundant collective industries, thus offsetting lost revenue with 
local economic development. However, for most towns in the central and 
western parts of China that have few industries, they have to depend on fiscal 
transfers from upper-level government. Table 5 has shown that the funding for 
public project before 2006 came from the village including three deductions, 
collective income and fundraising by farmers. Since the AAT in 2006, the 
funding has come from fiscal transfers from upper level government. 
The investment from villages and upper-level governments and their joint 
investments in public projects such as irrigation facilities and schools have 
witnessed a cut. Except for investment in roads, total investment in irrigation 
and schools after 2004 had dipped from 15.1% and 18.2% to 10.2% and 
14.0% respectively. Among the investments, the funds by villages for all three 
types of public projects have systematically declined due possibly to the loss 
of revenue after the TFR. Investment in irrigation projects from upper-level 
government had likewise dwindled dramatically after 2004, from 4.0% to 
2.7%, while investment in schools had marginally increased from 3.4% to 
3.6%. Only roads construction has been sustained after the TFR due to the 
government’s emphasis on roads. In the fifth session of the 16th Central 
Committee of the CCP in 2005, the central government decided to further 
boost investments in rural infrastructure to construct the New Socialist 
Countryside as well as to attract foreign investments.240  
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Table 5 Public Projects in C Town, F County 
Year Item Source of funds Cost (RMB) Others 
1982-








construction Three deductions N. A. Twice a year 
1982-
2002 Road repair Three deductions 2,000/year Twice a year 
1982-
2002 
Dig ditch and 
river Three deductions N. A. Once a year 
1982-
1995 Rural education Three deductions 2,500  Every year 
1989 School establishment Fundraising by farmers 3,000  
1998 School establishment 
Collective income of 
village 30,000  
2002 Road construction 
Collective income of 
village 0.256 million 
Contract out to 
private sector 
2002 Sewer repair Collective income of village 18,000 
Contract out to 
private sector 
2005 School establishment 
Collective income of 
village 
0.2 million of 
fund 
allocation 






Fiscal transfer from the 
county Organisation 
Department of CPC 
60,000 
Organised by the 
Organisation 
Department 
2006 Bridge repair Fiscal transfer from the county 3,000  
Source: Lv Dewen, (2010: 97). 
 
 
Fiscal	  Transfer	  	   	  	  
The centre has gradually implemented a programme of fiscal transfer 
(zhuanyi zhifu) after the tax-sharing reform in 1994. There are three types of 
central transfer: tax rebates (shuishou fanhuan), special subsidies (zhuanxiang 
buzhu), and transfer payments (zhuanyi zhifui). Tax rebates were distributed to 
the provinces according to their contribution of tax revenues to the central 
government, and the fiscal strength of the province concerned.  
Special subsidies, also known as earmarked grants, are for the 
implementation of specific policies in areas such as education, healthcare, 
social welfare and rural development. Special subsidies, as the biggest 
category among central subsidies, increased from 21.5% in 1995 to 53.6% in 
2002.241 However, the allocation to provinces is uneven and poor provinces 
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are at a disadvantage as they are underrepresented in the central decision-
making process.242  
 
 
Figure 3 Changes in Local Fiscal Revenue (1994-2004) 
Source: Onishi, Yasushi, “The Current Status and Future Prospects of the Public Finance 
and Tax-System of China”, China Statistical Abstract, 2004 
Transfer payments include general fiscal transfer, transfer payments to 
minority areas, financial award and aid for county and town governments, 
fiscal transfer for salary adjustment, rural TFR and others.243  The Ministry of 
Finance had issued a ‘measure of transfer payment from central to local 
government during the period of agricultural tax-for-fee reform’ to subsidise 
villages in the western and central parts of China in 2003. This was to offset 
local governments’ loss in revenue engendered by the TFR and subsidise 
village expenditure and rural compulsory education. The centre has transferred 
huge funds to support the sannong—agriculture, farmers and rural areas (see 
Figure 3). According to this measure, subsidies by transfer payments were 
mostly for town expenditure, village expenditure and rural compulsory 
education.244 The fiscal transfer is allocated by the centre to provinces, which 
will funnel funds to counties and eventually to towns.  
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A survey showed that towns received RMB58 subsidies per person from 
upper-level government before the TFR and AAT and RMB84 per person 
after the reform. The amount of subsidies had increased by 30%. The subsidy 
per person accounted for 83% of the town revenue in 2000 and 127% in 2004.  
On paper, subsidies have exceeded town revenue after the reform. 
However, this is not the case, as town government has to submit more to 
county government through shangjie after the reform. Before the TFR and 
AAT, the amount submitted to county was RMB34 per person in 2000 and 
RMB93 per person in 2004. Of the RMB84 subsidy, RMB23 went strictly to 
the special fund for subsidising lost revenue after the TFR and AAT, and the 
remaining amount of RMB61 constituted the net revenue of the town in 2004. 
After submitting RMB93 to the county, the net income of the town was a 
negative RMB32 (61 – 93) as against a net income of RMB24 (58 – 34) per 
person in 2000, before the reform.245  
A similar scenario could be witnessed for the fiscal transfer for rural 
education. In Taigu county, Jinzhong city, total fiscal transfer from 1999 to 
2000 for rural education was RMB14.54 million; from 2001 to 2002 after the 
TFR, the amount was slashed to RMB9.88 million, a reduction of RMB4.57 
million.246 
 
Table 6 Central’s Fiscal Transfer in Support of Sannong 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Funds Transfer for Agriculture 
(billion) 266.6 297.5 339.7 391.7 595.5 725.3 
Source: Data gathered from Wen Jiabao, the government work report of 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
An analysis of county expenditure in Shanxi Province showed that the 
declining level of local services had not been reversed by the growing support 
of the centre.247 Many of the middle and small-scale public projects in less 
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developed areas could not satisfy the national or provincial criteria and are 
thus not entitled fiscal transfer.248 
Fiscal transfers are aimed at balancing regional financial gap by 
subsidising local finance in less developed regions. Funds are allocated based 
on the fiscal strength of the locality, success of the province in revenue 
collection and political considerations meaning that ethnic minority, 
revolutionary and border regions are given priority.249 Fiscal transfers from the 
central government have registered a rise recently, from RMB266.6 billion in 
2004 to RMB725.3 billion in 2009 (see Table 6 and for the trends). However, 
only a small portion of transfer payment was made to the targeted towns of the 
agricultural provinces.250 A survey showed that only RMB5.19 billion (43%) 
of the RMB12 billion were funnelled to the villages.251 
Furthermore, local governments or villages have to provide supporting 
funds for the transfer payments that burden local governments and village 
finance. In 2002, the construction of a water resources project in Dongbao 
district required a supporting fund of RMB13.02 million, or 29.88% of the 
budgetary revenue of the district, before it could receive the central fiscal 
transfer of RMB11.2 million. However, as such a huge fund was beyond the 
affordability of the district government, fiscal transfer from central 
government ended with only RMB0.6 million (4.61% of amount required).252   
Between 1998 and 2003, only 35.6% of public projects were invested by 
upper-level government, leaving almost half (46.5%) of the public projects to 
be funded by villages, and 18% by villagers. In rich areas such as Jiangsu 
Province, villages generally provided 74% of funds for public projects, while 
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Gansu province’s was only 23.1%.253 The supporting funds accounted for a 
large share of local government revenue (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7 Overview of Supporting Funds of a County in Western China 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Supporting Funds (SF) 
(million yuan) 276.8 277 278.05 278.05 282.86 294.33 
Local Government Revenue (LGR) 
(million yuan) 237.07 265.43 277.43 304.55 510.05 582.89 
Percentage of SF to LGR (%) 117 104 100 91 55 50 
Source: Zhao Quanhou and Gao Jinshui, (2009: 86). 
 
The fiscal transfer is also fraught with problems. First, the procedure of 
allocating fiscal transfer from provincial government to lower level 
governments has not been regulated or institutionalised.254 The current scheme 
of fiscal transfer only covers the transfer from central to provincial finance. 
There is no unified scheme of fiscal transfer from provincial to county 
government as well as from county to town government.255 The allocation of 
fiscal transfer is flexible, leading to allocations based on various personal 
relationships. 
Towns obtain funds through various ways. First, towns apply for special 
funds through guanxi. Relationships such as former colleagues, ex-classmates 
and old work associates became important considerations for the extent of 
assistance to be rendered. Second, town would form interest groups with 
county government to gain funds from upper-level governments such as 
municipal, provincial or even central government. Third, fund applications by 
towns are characterised by over reporting or making applications from 
different departments for the same project. 256 For instance, if a public project 
requires a budget of RMB50,000, the town government would apply for 
RMB70,000-100,000 to cater for expenses in other areas. 
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The second problem lies with the allocation that is not scientifically based. 
The more revenue a region has submitted, the more fiscal transfer it would 
obtain.257 Poorer regions that submitted less revenue would get less fiscal 
transfers even though they are genuinely in great need of fiscal transfers. The 
success of an application is also dependent on the success of the first 
application of funds by a village. As the village has to provide supporting 
funds for fiscal transfer for a certain project, a good record of successful 
fundraising would facilitate its future applications.  
Moreover, town governments may not get the entire amount that they 
have applied for. For instance, a special fund of RMB60 million was allocated 
for the construction of agriculture-related facilities in a county in the south-
western part of China. Of this, 75% went to the payroll of county government 
staff, while only 25% went to the town government for rural public goods and 
services.258 
  
Yishi	  Yiyi	   	  
Rural public goods provision correlates more with political considerations 
than with economic factors. Villages with high level of political participation 
tend to be more public service oriented. 259  Farmers are encouraged to 
participate in the provision of rural public goods through yishi yiyi (one case, 
one meeting). After the TFR, farmers could discuss issues related to rural 
public goods provision such as the contribution of funds and labour through 
democratic decision-making at villagers’ assembly or villagers’ representative 
assembly.  
The provision of public goods includes construction of farmland irrigation 
infrastructure and roads, forestry, land improvement projects, and other public 
welfare projects for farmers and collective agricultural production.260 The 
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implementation of yishi yiyi varies among different villages. To avoid 
burdening farmers, contributions of funds have been capped at mostly RMB15 
per person261. Many scholars have criticised this contribution as funds required 
for projects such as improving roads and constructing irrigation facilities are 
way beyond such meagre contributions.262 
The implementation of yishi yiyi has not been smooth sailing either. First, 
the organising of village meetings is difficult, as many residents of the village 
have gone to the cities to work as migrant workers. Most of them are young 
males and females who are key persons of a family who could participate in 
the construction of rural public goods. The elderly who remain behind usually 
lack the enthusiasm and relevant knowledge to participate in the discussion of 
village affairs.  
 
Situation	  of	  Rural	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	  
As mentioned in previous chapters, the provision of rural public goods 
and services has been far from satisfactory. In 2005, about 83% of villages 
nationwide had no tap water, 13% had no paved road and 53% had no access 
to phone. The price of electricity for the countryside was also twice as 
expensive as that in cities.263 
The No. 1 document of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
and State Council addressed rural issues consecutively in the eight years from 
2004 to 2011. The No. 1 document of each year was to improve farmers’ 
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income in 2004, boost agricultural integrated production capacity in 2005, 
propel New Socialist Countryside construction in 2006, develop modern 
agriculture in 2007, boost farmers’ income in 2008, continually promote 
farmers’ income in 2009, improve the basis of agricultural development in 
2010 and accelerate the water resources reform in 2011. The No. 1 document 
released on 29 January 2011 was the first time that the Party focused on water 
conservation. According to this document, in the next decade, the average 
investment in water resources would be doubled compared to a year earlier, 
amounting to around RMB4 trillion for improving water conservation.264 It 
specified that 10% of land transfer fees would be used for farmland water 
resources construction. 265  However, there exist discrepancies between 
documents and the real implementation. 
The infrastructure of medical care at county, town and village levels has 
been improved but the development is far from enough. The centre allocated 
RMB300 billion for the construction of rural infrastructure in 2007. From 
2002 to 2007, 666.7 hectares of farmland had been irrigated, 1.3 million 
kilometres of roads repaved and drinking water facilities for 97.48 million 
farmers improved.266 There were 1,451 counties in the new rural cooperative 
medical care trial sites, which accounted for 50.7% of total counties. Of the 
total rural population of 0.72135 billion, only 0.41 billion farmers (56.8%) 
participated in this new rural cooperative medical care programme in 2007.267 
The TFR has led to a reduction in village clinics due to the elimination of 
town fees. A case in point is that of Shanxi province which witnessed a 25% 
reduction in clinics between 2001 and 2003.268 Irrigated farmland accounted 
for 48% of total farmland in China in 2008. The provision of rural public 
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goods after the TFR is facing various problems, which will be studied in depth 
in the next few chapters. 
In a survey of 2,459 villages among six provinces conducted by Luo 
Renfu et. al in 2003, nearly 80% of households were dissatisfied with the 
current condition of the infrastructure. Meanwhile, 90% of households had 
expressed that if a grant from upper-level government is provided to their 
village, they would provide supporting funds to public goods. A total of 60% 
of households were even willing to contribute RMB20 per capita (or around 
RMB100 per household) to the provision of public goods.269 
  
4.4	  Conclusion	  
After the TFR and AAT, the financial situation of town and county 
governments has worsened.  To lessen the burden faced by farmers after the 
TFR, various forms of fiscal transfer from the centre have been effected and in 
increasing amounts. This shows that the central government has been 
undertaking the main responsibility of providing rural public goods. 
Although the centre has allocated huge sums to support rural development, 
the utilisation of funds could be better managed if the procedure of fiscal 
transfer from upper level governments to villages were more clearly defined 
and well incentivised.  
The provision of rural public goods is less of a problem with eastern 
coastal provinces that have a well-developed rural industry, than in central and 
western China where agriculture is the dominant industry. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
would attempt to answer the question of how villages with little collective 
funds deal with the problem of public goods provision. 
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Chapter 5  
Inter Village Road Construction and Ponds 
Desilting Projects in T Town 
Rural public goods provision on the whole was poor in agriculture-
dominated villages. A variation in the level of public services provided could 
however be observed. What account for this differential in public goods 
provision? Chapters 5, 6 and 7 would identify the factors by looking at several 
public project constructions in villages at T Town, Hunan province. In general, 
projects could be categorised into three project types based on funder and 
policy implementation: those funded by government with clear government 
policies and institutional design; those funded by government without clear 
policies; and those funded mainly by villages. Case studies of inter-village 
road construction and targeted fund projects in two villages of T Town, 
Chenzhou City, Hunan province would be examined in Chapter 5.  
Institutions and policies played an important role in fundraising for rural 
public goods provision. Clear policies and the backing of the government as 
an organiser and fund provider were critical determinants of the success of a 
public project. This chapter would look at two successful public projects in 
detail. These projects were both funded mainly by the government with clear 
policies of fund allocation.  
 
5.1	  Profile	  of	  T	  Town	  
T Town, an agriculture-dominated economy, was located at the 
northwestern part of H District in Z City of Hunan province, 16 kilometres 
away from the city centre. Of the 14 towns270 governed by H District, T Town 
was one of its biggest agricultural towns. T Town governed 14 villages and 
three resident committees. It had a total area of 120.8 square kilometres, of 
which 15.25 square kilometres were farmland. In 2009, T Town had a total 
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population of around 24,012 and 6,716 households. The annual per capita 
income of T Town was RMB5,600 in 2006 and around RMB6,300 in 2007 
and 2008.271 
 
The	  Financial	  Situation	  of	  T	  Town	  Government	  
T Town government depended heavily on county government for salary 
payment and had little revenue to invest in public goods and services. Hence, 
funding for rural public goods provision depended on upper-level government. 
From 2003 to 2008, agricultural income on average constituted 20% of total 
income of three sectors, namely, agriculture, industry and services. With little 
industrial income, it had to depend on financial subsidies and fiscal transfers 
from the district government based on the completion of tasks assigned.  
There were generally two types of towns in a district or county: the richer 
ones were those with resources such as mineral resources that contributed to 
county or district revenue, while the poorer ones had little resources and were 
highly dependent on subsidies from county or district governments. T Town 
was the latter with few enterprises or resources. According to a conversation 
with the finance director of T Town government, a town or town government 
worked like an agency appointed by county or district government to complete 
certain tasks. Thus the payroll and welfare benefits of local officials would be 
subsidised by the upper-level government. 
T Town had little funds that could be freely utilised by its own finance 
department after the TFR and AAT. From 2004 to before the AAT, T Town 
submitted agricultural tax of around RMB1.6 million to H District finance, of 
which 20 to 30% was returned in the form of subsidies. T Town used this fund 
to cover staff salaries and other expenses. After the TFR and AAT, T Town 
could no longer pay staff salaries and had to wait for annual allocated funds 
from H District  (see Table 8). However, as these funds were for specific 
purposes, they could not be freely channelled to other uses.  
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Agricultural and animal 
husbandry tax 
Fees for irrigation, 
weather service, culture, 
education and health care 
Farmland occupation tax Fees for pension, social relief and welfare 







Agricultural and animal 
husbandry tax, tax on 
agricultural specialty 








and construction of town 
and village enterprises 
Tax on urban public 
utilities and education 
Administrative 






Profits handed over by 








Fees for infrastructure, 
maintenance and 
administration 
Revenue of administrative 
and institution revenue 
Fees for development of 
agriculture and forest, 
culture and education, 
sanitation and irrigation 
Fees for unified 
management of town’s 
public undertakings 
Expenditure on social 
relief and welfare  
Others Others 
Source: Qiu Xinghe (1996) and Lin Wanlong (2003)  
T Town derived its income primarily from the growing of tobacco, which 
contributed around RMB260,000 (around 10% of total tobacco tax submitted 
to central coffers as national tax) each year to town government revenue. 
Annual contributions from small enterprises such as power stations and 
several mineral-processing factories made up around RMB220,000. It was 
used to pay for the salaries, overtime premium, subsidies and business trips of 
24 contract-based employees working in the town government. In recent years, 
even the contribution from these enterprises had dwindled as the viability of 
these enterprises had been at stake due to the financial crisis. A mineral-
processing factory was hard hit by the downslide in demand and had to stop 





operation. A graphite-producing factory had also greatly reduced output, while 
other factories were doing no better.  
Table 9 Expenditure of T Town in 2009 (RMB thousand) 
Items of 













Salary and subsidies for 





Insurance and subsidies 






medical care 24.7 
Subsidies for 





Maternity insurance 4.1 
 
 
Insurance and subsidies 






medical care 7.4 
Subsidies for 





Maternity insurance 1.2 
Unemployment 
insurance 2.5 




Annual bonuses for staffs 
of government affiliated 
institutions 
7.6 
Special funds for people 
with special needs 80 
Total (RMB thousand) 1,071.2 






Operating capital outlay 589.4 
Welfare for government 
permanent staffs 10.3 









for staffs of government 
affiliated institutions 
2.5 
Total (RMB thousand) 613.5 
Percentage (%) 24.4 
Subsidies for Annual old-age pension 258.6 







Annual bonuses for 
retirees  11.5 
Public accumulation funds 
for housing construction 
for permanent government 
staffs  
20.6 
Public accumulation funds 
for housing construction 




Salaries for village 
officials and village group 
leaders 
391.8 










Subsidies for community 
committee 18 
Total (RMB thousand) 706.7 





Subsidies for management 
fee at village level 28.6 
Subsidies for inter-village 
roads construction 45.8 
Subsidies for disabled 
servicemen, and family 
members of revolutionary 
martyrs and servicemen 
44.6 
Total (RMB thousand) 119 
 Percentage (%) 4.7 
Total Expenditure of T Town 2,510.4 
Source: data collected from the Department of Finance, T Town during the author’s 
fieldwork between 2009 and 2010. 
Thus T Town was dependent on the subsidies of county or district 
government to cover staff payroll and other operating costs. A case in point 
was the subsidies that T Town received in 2009. The data collected during a 
fieldtrip showed that T Town received RMB2,510,400 from H District 
government in 2009 after fully completing the assigned tasks, a prerequisite 
for subsidies. 
The fund received from H District government mainly covered four 
categories of expenses. Table 9 shows that salaries and welfare, including 
insurance, subsidies and bonuses of permanent staffs and staffs of government 
affiliated institutions within T Town, constituted the major component of its 





expenditure (43.2%272 of the total amount received). The expense on public 
goods and services was so negligible that it could hardly qualify as a category. 
The subsidies for inter-village road construction (1.8%) were included under 
subsidies from fiscal transferred fund (see Table 9). 
According to the deputy head of T Town, the salaries of 32 government 
staffs (23 permanent staffs and nine staffs of government-affiliated institutions) 
were covered by the allocated funds from the district government. The payroll 
of around 24 contractual staff, a necessity due to the heavy workload, would 
have to be borne by the town government. Often times, the fiscal constraints 
left T Town government with no choice but to dismiss a few contractual 
employees. Or in the words of T Town officials, they would have to resort to 
using “the wall in the east to fill the wall in the west (chai dongqiang bu 
xiqiang)”. However, even this might not be possible without funds. The large 
amount of funds available at the disposal of the town government before the 
TFR and AAT were no longer attainable (see Table 8).  
The special funds from the district government were also not deployable. 
The funds for agriculture, rural area and farmers (sannong) for instance were 
for rural infrastructure including inter-village roads improvement, ditch and 
pond construction, water resources construction, as well as popularisation of 
rural science and technology.  
The limited financial resources and the insignificance of rural public 
goods provision in the performance evaluation of government officials had not 
given T Town government enough reason to act actively in rural public goods 
provision after the TFR and AAT.  
Town government officials were of the opinion that the financing of rural 
public goods provision should not be their responsibility. The finance 
department head at T Town maintained that the provision of rural public 
goods once financed by the three deductions and five levies (santi wutong) 
would be covered by special funds from district, municipal or provincial 
government after the TFR and AAT. The job of town government was to 
                                                
272 It includes the total expenses of the first category and the expenses on welfare of the 
second category (Table 9). 





provide a link between county government and the villages and to organise the 
provision instead of direct investing in it. The main tasks of town governments 
were to complete the tasks assigned by upper-level governments. The finance 
department head in T Town added that rural public goods provision followed 
the principle of “allocated by district government, subsidised by town 
government and self-raised by villages”. (Quzhengfu boyidian, Zhenzhengfu 
buzhu yidian, nongmin zichou yidian). 
 
Profiles	  of	  S	  and	  N	  Villages	  
There were 14 villages in T Town, among which S and N Villages 
provided interesting comparison. They shared similar economic background 
and formal institutional design, and were neither the richest nor the poorest in 
T Town. Both had little collective income and had the same policy 
environment. The two villages had been selected as demonstration sites for the 
New Socialist Countryside Construction programme. Only S Village remained 
a demonstration site, as N Village did not have the cooperation of villagers. 
On the whole, rural public goods provision in both S and N Villages left 
much to be desired as the two villages were financially constrained. Much of 
their collective incomes had not been wisely utilised due to the lack of 
disciplinary supervision. 
S Village was located at the eastern part of T Town, around 12 kilometres 
away from the town centre and 21 kilometres away from the city centre. There 
were 13 village groups with 457 households and a population of 1,487 in 2009. 
The total land area was 6.951 square kilometres, consisting of 1.201 square 
kilometres of farmland, 0.17 square kilometres of dry land, 1.031 square 
kilometres of wetland and 3.5 square kilometres of forest management area.  
N Village on the other hand was located at the southwestern part of T 
Town, eight kilometres away from the town centre and 12 kilometres away 
from the nearest city. The nine village groups had 385 households and a 
population of 1,379. The village groups originated from three natural villages: 





village groups 1, 2 and 3 were offshoots of one natural village,273 4, 5 and 6 
came from another, and 7, 8, and 9 were originally of one natural village. Each 
village group had a population of between 120 and 200 in 2009. It registered a 
land area of approximately 8.993 square kilometres, 0.846 square kilometres 
of which were farmlands, 0.114 square kilometres of dry land, 0.732 square 
kilometres of wetland and 6.015 kilometres of forest management area. 
The main income of farmers in both villages came from the cultivation of 
tobacco, watermelon and vegetables, and the leasing of the forest management 
area. In 2009, the output of tobacco and eggplant was about 34 hectares and 
20 hectares in S Village respectively. A farmer informed that the profit from 
the planting of tobacco, watermelon and rice on a per mu274 basis was a 
respective RMB3,000, RMB6,00 and RMB1,500. Seventy percent of S 
Village farmers grew tobacco of one or two mu to six or seven mu each, 
making an annual profit of about RMB2,500 per mu. 
Hence, most farmers only set aside a small piece of land for growing rice 
for their own consumption. As discussed in the earlier chapter on farmers’ 
incentive, many farmers, especially the young and those in their 30s and 40s, 
had gone to the cities to work, leaving behind the elderly who preferred to 
grow vegetables or fruits rather than farming grain due to high risk and high 
cost.   
There were more vegetable bases in N Village than in S Village. A farmer 
in S Village said that operating a vegetable farm was risky due to the poor 
purchasing system. He recalled how he made huge losses in the last few years 
as the relevant department did not purchase vegetables from them and they 
had difficulties selling them due to the poor transportation and the distance to 
the market.  
The whole vegetable base was also vulnerable to natural disasters such as 
a snow disaster or flood. In a good harvest, the best outcome was only a few 
thousand renminbi after deducting business overhead such as vegetable shoots, 
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274 One mu equals to around 0.07 hectare. 





fertilisers and transportation. Farmers in S Village thus preferred to cultivate 
tobacco plants instead. Although the profit gained from each mu of tobacco 
was less than that of a vegetable base, there was an element of certainty in 
returns. A vegetable base of about 100 mu (or 6.7 hectares) would give a profit 
of around RMB4,500 per mu. In the case of N Village, it was profitable for 
farmers to grow vegetables, as it was closer to the city and involved only 
around half an hour’s bus trip. 
 
Weak	  Collective	  Income	  
The major collective income of S Village was the profit from timber. 
However, trees had a growth cycle of around 10 years and were depleting 
quickly due to frequent logging. The head of S Village informed that logging 
in the forest management area produced an average net income of around 
RMB300,000 per year in the past. Now income had dwindled especially in 
2008 after the snow disaster when trees were destroyed, leaving many 
previously forested areas barren and little for the coffers of S Village in 2009.  
At H District and T Town, villages could contract part of the barren forest 
management area to farmer households collectively or put up for bidding. The 
awarded households would have to plant trees in the contracted area within 
two years, failing which the collective would have the right to expropriate the 
area. The profit gained from this land lease would be used for public goods 
and services provision within the village. 
S Village had adopted this strategy and gradually leased out the forest 
management area that once belonged to the collective. Until the author’s trip 
in 2010, little was left to the collective because of frequent logging and leasing 
to farmer households to fund operational costs of village collectives. In 2008 
the profit from logging of forest management area was around RMB10,400 
which was used fully for repaving village roads.  
A similar situation could be observed in N Village. The profit from 
logging was about RMB5,976 in 2007 and RMB10,200 in 2010. Barren areas 
had also been leased to farmer households. Income from logging had thus 
become less significant. 





Town officials admitted that the move was not a long-term solution. 
Given the limited resources and underdeveloped off-farm industries, it would 
be difficult for villages in the future to implement any public project. 
The two villages had registered decreasing collective income and 
mounting debts. Average operating income amounted to RMB23,470,000, 
while debts remained at RMB54,692.55 from 2005 to 2008. In 2010, debts 
nudged up to around RMB66,911.65. In 2010, though N Village had a lower 
debt burden of RMB5249.4 than S Village, the operating income was only 
RMB10,200. 
The financial capacities of village committees in these two villages were 
weak and would worsen in the coming years due to the dip in collective 
income. With limited collective income, the two villages would need to apply 
for funds for any public project in their villages. The accounts of these two 
villages showed that management expenses including lavish dinners to receive 
visiting officials constituted the major item, followed by travel expenses, 
newspaper subscriptions, costs of office stationery and payroll. The account 
books also showed an active application of funds. S Village’s management 
expenses were RMB87,679 while N Village’s were RMB66,359 in 2008. 
Among these expenses, most had been spent on meals with officials. 
 
Weak	  Supervision	  of	  Collective	  Income	  	  
The policies of cuncai zhenguan (town government took charge of village 
finance and was responsible to villages), cunwu gongkai (publicised village 
affairs) and minzhu licai (democratic management of village finance) had been 
implemented to supervise the use of funds in villages. However, the actual 
implementation still fell far short of its initial objective. 
The villages’ finance was managed by the Station of Operation and 
Management of T town. It required villages to report on the flow of funds to 
town government. Any receipt issued by N Village would have to be checked 
by the town finance office. Official receipts of expenditures were required to 
be submitted. For expenditure such as social assistance costs and family 
planning expenses, the signature of the recipient was needed.  





The expenditure of villages included productive construction expenditure, 
public welfare expenditure, bonuses of village officials, administration costs 
and entertainment expenses, poverty alleviation expenses, land expropriation 
compensation, family planning expenses and other costs.  
Expenditure below RMB200 could be approved by village committee 
head, but anything more would have to be examined by the village branch 
secretary first before it was submitted to the head for approval; this was an 
internal check and balance mechanism of village finance. The balance sheet of 
the village, as well as the receipt and disbursement statement would be 
publicised by a neutral audit group, called the Democratic Financial 
Management Group (DFMG) (minzhu licai xiaozu) for public scrutiny on a 
quarterly basis. 
Feng Xingyuan pointed out the importance of minzhu licai in raising fund 
for public goods provision at villages in a case study of Maliu Township in 
Chongqing city.275 However, the case studies of villages in Hunan province in 
this study reflected the limitations of the minzhu licai system. Theoretically, 
expenditure of every village should be examined and verified by the DFMG 
before it was endorsed by the group leader and then submitted to the head of 
the village committee for approval.  
In practice, the actual operation in villages was flawed. The DFMG in S 
Village was comprised of the village branch secretary, village head, village 
secretary, head of village’s women federation and two other Party members. It 
was helmed by the village branch secretary, the decision maker of village 
affairs. Consensus on the expenditure could thus be easily arrived at, as the 
village branch secretary often had the real power and other members seldom 
disagreed.  
The situation in N Village was another extreme case. The village branch 
secretary had absolute power and the final say over almost every village affair. 
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Cunzhuang Zhili, (Village Organizations and Village Governance in China), Beijing: 
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe. 2009. 





Other village committee members told the author that interviewing the branch 
secretary would be enough as he managed everything in the village. 
Another policy of cunwu gongkai (publicised village affairs) also helped 
in the supervision of village finances. Items to be publicised covered 12 
categories of village affairs such as financial plan, various expenditures, assets 
and debts, national funds allocation, various fees collection, rural collective 
land use and others. 
Both N and S Villages had a 10-sq metre publicity board at the gate of the 
village committee office. Some village affairs such as the information on rural 
new medical insurance programme, the fines on family planning, the 
allocation of subsidies covering households were under the “five 
guarantees”. 276  Farmers were asked if they are aware of the financial 
information displayed on the publicity board. Some displayed ignorance while 
others said they had read the information sometimes.  
However, the consensus of farmers was that the information provided was 
useless as it lacked details. They were also of the opinion that the financial 
information only involved numbers, something that they could not 
comprehend, as they did not have the details of village finance. They also 
questioned the authenticity of the figures displayed, as the supervisors were 
the managers of the funds. To them, the financial information on the publicity 
column was only for the benefit of upper-level government officials and was 
of little meaning to ordinary farmers. 
 
5.2	  Inter-­‐Village	  Road	  Construction	  
The construction of inter-village roads connecting administrative villages 
to town (inter-village gonglu)277 in T Town at Z City of Hunan province, the 
central area of China, illustrated the joint efforts of government and farmers in 
the fundraising process, with the latter playing a secondary role.  
                                                
276 Households of childless couples and infirm old persons enjoy the five guarantees such as 
guaranteed food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses. 
277 Inter-village gonglu refers to roads connecting the closest county road to where village 
committee or school is located. Usually village committee and village school are housed in the 
same building. 





Rural roads were of three types: xiandao (road connecting counties), 
xiangdao (road connecting towns with counties and connecting different 
towns), as well as cundao or inter-village road. In 1978, rural roads in China 
spanned only 586,000 kilometres, making most townships and villages 
inaccessible. In 2002, rural roads reached a length of 1,337,000 kilometres.  
The upgrading of rural roads kick-started in 2003 when the Ministry of 
Transport (MOT) greatly increased its investment in rural roads construction, 
promising good concrete paved roads for farmers. The plan to construct paved 
roads to connect villages to towns in the eastern area, link towns with counties, 
join different towns in the central area, and bridge different counties in the 
western areas in China had begun since 2003.  
The State Council approved the Construction Plan of Rural Highway in 
2005, while the MOT had implemented the “100 Billion Yuan Project in Five 
Years” since 2006. According to MOT statistics, total investment from both 
government and society for rural highway was RMB752.8 billion between 
2006 and 2009, with the central government taking up a share of RMB166.1 
billion. New roads had since been built for 2,200 towns and 100,000 
administrative villages, and rural roads had been paved with concrete for more 
than 7,900 towns and about 145,000 administrative villages between 2006 and 
2009.278 
 
The	  Role	  of	  Government	  in	  the	  Construction	  Process	  
The central government had attached great importance to village road 
construction and had assigned specific organisations with the task and backed 
it up with a plethora of rules and policies and huge funds from various levels 
of government. In Z City, Hunan province, roads construction and 
maintenance in various counties and towns in Z City came under the purview 
of the county-town highway department. The roads improvement projects in Z 
                                                
278 Ministry of Transport, “Nongcun Gonglu Shiyiwu Fazhan Chengjiu: Huiji Yiwan Baixing 
Hongda Shiye” (The Achievement of Rural Highway during the 11th Five-Year Progrmme: 
Great Achievement Benefiting People), 30 October 2010. Available at  
<http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuantizhuanlan/qita/huigushiyiwu/meitibaodao/201012/t20101206
_883526.html> (accessed 23 May 2011). 





City had been conducted in stages under the principle of first tongda (which 
meant that village was accessible but the road was sands paved instead of 
concrete or asphalt paved) and then tongchang (which meant that roads were 
concrete- or asphalt-paved). The sands-paved road was around 3.5 or 4 metres 
wide, while the concrete- or asphalt-paved road was 4.5 metres wide and 20 
centimetres thick.  
From 2003, roads connecting county road to villages had been planned 
and only villages with enough collective income would be advised to construct 
concrete-paved roads. Since 2005, tongchang had been widely advocated. The 
construction and improvement of roads would involve joint efforts and be 
backed by provincial government, subsidies of local governments such as 
municipal, county, district and town governments, donations from society, as 
well as funds raised by ordinary people. 
As early as 2002, the highway department had started to assess the road 
conditions of towns including whether a road was located in the mountain or 
along a reservoir, the existence or non-existence of roads in a village, as well 
as the ability of villages to raise funds by themselves. The nationwide 
investigation of inter-village roads began in 2004 and Z City had been a 
participant.  
According to the investigation of roads in 2005 in Z City that T Town 
belonged to, 65 out of the 250 towns (26%) did not have the required 764 
kilometres of concrete- or asphalt-paved roads, while 29 administrative 
villages had no road, not even muddy roads. Only 893 (30%) of 2,951 
administrative villages had concrete- or asphalt-paved roads. Since then, Z 
City had stepped up efforts to build more inter-village roads. Administrative 
villages were now all accessible, with 40% reachable by buses by 2007. By 
2009, 99.6% of towns and 76% of administrative villages had concrete or 
asphalt roads, while 72.3% were accessible by buses, a huge improvement 
from that of 2005.   
The investigation would determine if a project was called for. Every town 
government would name the villages that had a need for roads. The highway 
department checked the names of villages against the investigation data and 





temporarily established a project for the village. After the establishment of a 
project, the village organised fundraising activities within the village. The 
village could either use collective income or mobilise farmers to contribute 
funds. After raising enough funds, the village would submit a report to the 
town government for verification and further transmission to the highway 
department. The highway department would give the final green light to the 
project and prepare for the funds allocation. 
The construction project would be put up for bidding by the town 
government. According to the deputy head of the highway department, the 
construction team was vital, as it would affect the budget. A professional 
construction team would save costs on concrete used and prevent wastages. It 
would also be able to give fairly accurate estimation of material usage and 
costs, thus avoiding the need to call for a second quote in the event of a 
shortfall in estimation. 
Farmers would be scheduled to supervise the construction. As one of the 
contributors of the funds, they would be concerned with the performance of 
the construction team and the type of materials utilised. 
According to the highway department director, road construction cost was 
around RMB200,000 per kilometre in 2005. National funds made up 
RMB100,000 to RMB120,000 per kilometre. Z City subsidised inter-village 
road construction with an allocation of RMB5,000 per kilometre. The different 
counties or district governments contributed different levels of subsidies based 
on their financial situation. The subsidies ranged from several thousand 
renminbi per kilometre to RMB70,000 per kilometre (as in the case of H 
district). The funds from provincial, municipal, district and county level 
governments were pooled and managed by the highway administration bureau 
of H district, which was reportedly the first among other districts or counties 
to complete the construction of inter-village roads. 
The huge progress of inter-village roads construction could be attributed 
to first, the emphasis on inter-village roads construction by each level of 
government. The central government had allocated huge funds, while each 
level of government had also attached great importance to it. The number and 





length of roads to be completed had been stipulated by the provincial 
government.  
 
Table 10 The Evaluation of Road Station at County Level 
Items and 
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Source: data from documents gathered in the field trip in 2010. 
For instance, Z City worked according to the demands of the provincial 
MOT, which initiated 467 roads projects and added 1,190.6 kilometres of 
roads in 2009. By end 2009, 1,682.21 kilometres of roads had been made 
accessible even though the provincial funds only covered 1,041.1 kilometres. 
Z City accomplished this by initiating fundraising activities within the city. 
The enthusiasm could be motivated by the inclusion of inter-village roads 





construction and road maintenance in the performance evaluation of county 
and town officials (see Table 10).  
Since 2007, the H District Party’s Committee and District Government 
had regarded the construction of main roads in the rural areas as essential to 
promoting balanced development between urban and rural areas, optimising 
economic development environment and constructing New Socialist 
Countryside. The objective was to link all villages within H District by 31 
May 2009. A fund of RMB16.952 million from district finance had been 
allocated to the construction. 
 
Table 11 Summary of the Objective and Performance of Counties and Districts in Inter-

















district 80	   93	   90.87	   93	   113.6 
X 
district 80	   93	   81	   93	   113.6	  
ZX 
county 180	   85	   223.43	   87	   124.1	  
AR 
county 160	   88	   210.35	   88	   131.5 
YX 
county 210	   84 237.6	   84	   113.1	  
GY 
county 250	   85	   274.5	   88	   109.8	  
JH 
county 90	   90	   94.4	   90	   104.9 
LW 
county 80	   86	   82	   86	   102.5	  
YZ 
county 90	   87	   96.7	   87	   107.4	  
RC 
county 140	   83	   145.16	   83	   103.7 
GD 
county 140	   86	   146.2	   87	   104.4	  
Source: Data from the highway department of Z City in 2010. 
From 10 February to 25 February 2009, Z City had conducted an 
investigation of roads construction in the villages of all its counties and 
districts. The investigation had laid a foundation for the examination of inter-
village road projects completed in the year of 2008 by the provincial 
transportation department from 17 June to 23 June 2009. The inspection team 





of N Province examined the inter-village roads construction of 2009 from 1 
December to 4 December 2009. Thereafter, the inspection team of Z City 
would examine the inter-village roads construction from 7 December to 12 
December 2009. Table 11 shows that the 11 counties and districts had 
outperformed their targets of inter-village roads construction and attained the 
accessibility percentage; ZX, GY and GD counties had even surpassed the 
tasks allocated. Take H District for instance. The objective of rural 
construction was 80 kilometres and accessibility was set at 93%. H District 
had not only attained 93% accessibility, but also built a road length of 90.87 
kilometres. 
The enthusiasm could be attributed to the opportunity to participate in the 
appraisal for counties or districts that have completed the tasks assigned at a 
score above or equal to 80. Z City also implemented many relevant policies to 
gain the support of various departments and its residents.  
Furthermore, it was the general belief that roads construction was 
essential to get rich (yaoxiangfu, xian xiulu). The ease in attracting investment 
for the government and the ease in the transportation of goods for the farmers 
was a win-win situation for all. Farmers interviewed said, “Building of roads 
is a good thing liked by almost everybody.” 
 
Fundraising	   within	   Villages	   for	   Inter-­‐village	   Roads	  
Construction	  in	  S	  and	  N	  Villages	  
The construction of inter-village road in S Village began in 2007. It 
would be six kilometres long. The highway administration bureau of H district 
had allocated RMB700,000, while the village contributed RMB590,000 from 
the selling trees in the forest management area.  
There were 13 village groups in S Village with a total population of about 
1,700 in 2009. Village groups 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 were under an area called 
dawanli as they share the same surname and are too closely knitted to be 
distinguished. Almost 90% of residents in S Village had Wang as their 
surname, indicating a common ancestor. They had many relatives within the 
same village and not all of them had the need for an intra-village road. Village 





groups 2 and 4 were located close to the inter-village road and village group 5 
was at the entrance of the village that is close to the main county road. These 
three groups did not require an intra-village road. The other 10 village groups 
were given subsidies totalling RMB200,000 from S Village committee.  
Farmers were mobilised to contribute funds to the construction of intra-
village road and inter-village road in S Village. The fundraising process was 
organised by the village group leader who collected between RMB150 and 
RMB200 from each farmer. Distance from the inter-village road was taken 
into consideration. The further a village group was located, the more it had to 
pay. Hence, village groups 3, 10 and 11 which were located furthest away 
contributed the most. Farmers showed enthusiasm towards the project, with 
more than 600 farmers contributing a sum of around RMB146,000. See Table 
12 for the fund contributions of government, village committee and farmers 
for the two construction works. 
 
Table 12 Channels of Fundraising for both Inter-village and Intra-village  
Roads Construction in S Village, 2007-2008 




Funds allocated by the Highway Administration Bureau, 
H District 700,000 48.7 
Funds within 
village279 
Funds from the village committee, 
mainly from 
forest management area in S Village 
590,000 41.1 
Farmers’ contribution of funds 146,000 10.2 
Total 1,436,000 
Source: Data was sorted out based on the data gathered in my field trip in 2009 to 2010. 
 
The 7.1-kilometre-long inter-village road of N Village ran through the 
village from the east to west, the longest road in H district. The construction 
began comparatively late in 2009. According to the initial project plans, a 3.8-
kilometre inter-village road connecting the village committee at the village 
centre to the main county road was scheduled. The highway administration 
bureau of H district initially allocated RMB145,000 per kilometre or a total of 
                                                
279 The funds from S Village are for both inter-village road and intra-village road construction, 
with government subsidising more for the former. 





RMB551,000 (RMB145,000 multiplied by 3.8) to N Village, with a village 
contribution of RMB480,000.  
However, this proved to be a vast underestimation, as the road did not 
reach village groups 7, 8 and 9 with such cost estimates. A reapplication for 
funds and road extension to 7.1 kilometres was submitted to the H district 
government and the traffic office of H district. An additional RMB290,000 
was finally secured, making it a total subsidy of RMB841,000.  
The outstanding sum of RMB480,000 would have to be raised by N 
Village to kick-start the construction project. After numerous fundraising 
efforts, the village managed to secure a contribution of around 33% of the 
total project costs. First, farmers were mobilised to raise RMB80,000 at 
RMB100 to 120 per person. Not all responded to this call, as the disabled old 
people for instance did not have the capacity to do so. In total, about 80% of 
farmers in N Village contributed. Farmers who lived close to the main county 
road contributed RMB100 per household. The baseline in which the distance 
was calculated was set at the village committee. So farmers from village 
groups 7, 8, 9 contributed RMB120 per household. Second, village officials 
initiated a donation drive among village officials, Party members and 
entrepreneurs. The village branch secretary donated RMB5,000, while 
entrepreneurs handed in RMB10,000 to RMB20,000. Party members donated 
several thousand renminbi per person. Total donation from this donation drive 
was RMB80,000. Donors were named on a memorial tablet (gongdebei) 
constructed in 2010. Third, efforts by a Ms Li, deputy to the People’s 
Congress, to secure donations from other deputies to the People’s Congress of 
H District brought in RMB75,000 for N Village. Fourth, the forest 
management area was sold at an auction for RMB285,000. In total, funds 
raised by the village was RMB520,000 (see Table 13). 
Both S and N Villages had successfully constructed a respective six-
kilometre and 7.1-kilometre of inter-village road. The success comes from the 
support of specific institutions and the backing of strong policies. Each level 
of government has attached great importance to the construction, while 





farmers had shown great interest, stimulated by the government’s strong 
funding. 
 
Table 13 Fundraising Channels for Road Construction in N Village 2008-2009 
Channels Amount (RMB) 
Approximate Percentage 
(%) 
Allocated funds from upper-level government 841,000 61.8 
Funds within village 
Farmers’ contribution 80,000 5.9 
Donations within village 80,000 5.9 
Forest management area 285,000 20.9 
Donations from deputies to the People’s Congress, 
H district 75,000 5.5 
Total 1,361,000 
Source: data from an interview made by the author during a field trip from 2009 to 2010. 
 
5.3	  Ponds	  Desilting	  Projects	  
The third category of fund application was mainly based on provincial 
policies named duikou zijin (targeted fund). The desilting of ponds on hills and 
reservoirs was a case in point. In November 2009, Hunan province decided to 
channel the allocated central financial funds of RMB0.24 billion for 
agricultural materials to desilting ponds on hills that had not been reforested 
for a long time in prevention of drought. Of the 60 million mu of farmland, 
one-third was large or medium irrigated area, while the remaining had to 
depend on ponds on the hills for irrigation. Before the implementation of 
Household Contract Responsibility System, the collective did the desilting 
work. However, the migration of young workers to the cities had caused the 
long-term neglect of the ponds.  
In H District, the desilting and expansion of ponds on the hills had also 
been conducted accordingly since 2009. Farmers, water users’ associations, 
other special cooperative organisations and village committees were invited to 
tender for this project by the Water Resources Bureau and Finance Bureau of 
Z City (see Table 14). The inclusion of drought relief in the performance 
evaluation of government officials and ponds desilting project was a possible 
push for this enthusiasm.  
Altogether 216 ponds from 59 villages of 14 towns in H District had been 
desilted. In 2009, 0.14 million cubic metres of ponds had been desilted and 
3,957 mu (around 2.64 square meters) of irrigated area improved. The total 





investment was around RMB2.06 million in 2009. Funding came from various 
subsidies, namely, RMB1,179,840 from provincial level, RMB147,480 from 
municipal level and RMB147,480 from county or district level, as well as 
RMB589,920 raised by farmers through one-case-one-meeting (yishi yiyi). 
Farmers’ contribution outstripped subsidies from municipal and county/district 
governments, and second only to provincial subsidies. This represented the 
spirit of minban gongzhu.  
 
Table 14 Selected Registration Form of Ponds on the Hills of H District, 6 January 
2010280 





Amount of Funding from Different 
Channels (renminbi)281 














630  5,400 675 675 2,700 9,450 
S 
Village Gantang 630  5,400 675 675 2,700 9,450 
T 
Village Longtangjiao 560  4,800 600 600  2,400 8,400 
Source: The form was obtained from the Water Resource Bureau, H District during the 
author’s fieldtrip from 2009 to 2010. Some categories such as specific area of irrigation, area 
of containing water, increased area for containing water, and renovated area of pond in the 




Inter-village roads and targeted fund projects were two examples of the 
first category of public goods that were funded mainly by government with 
clear policies. In inter-village roads construction and targeted fund projects, 
formal institutions and policies of fund application and funds allocation were 
determinants of their success. Most rural public goods provision needed funds 
from both the government and villages. The county or district government had 
taken the responsibility of supporting rural public goods provision as town 
                                                
280 This form was a part of the complete registration form of 216 ponds from 59 villages in 14 
towns, H District in 2010. 
281 P indicates provincial level subsidies, M is municipal level subsidies, C is county or district 
level subsidies and F is funds raised by farmers. 





government had little financial capacity to do so. Thus, formal institutions and 
policies were critical to ensuring smooth fund allocation to town government 
and subsequently to targeted villages. The success of such projects hinged on 
clear application procedures and specific allocation of funds.  
Inter-village road and ponds desilting projects had been systematically 
constructed. First, special organisations took charge of the organisation 
process. The Highway Administration Bureau of H District was tasked with 
road construction and the Water Resources Bureau and Finance Bureau of Z 
City were held responsible for the ponds. Second, these two projects were 
initiatives of the central or provincial government, a top-down provision. The 
inter-village road construction was under the “100 Billion Yuan Project in 5 
Years” implemented by the Ministry of Transport, and a series of rules and 
policies at local levels were based on this plan. Ponds desilting came under 
targeted fund projects.  
Third, fund allocation at each level of government was specifically 
defined. Inter-village road construction had been allocated funds based on the 
length of the road. The provincial, municipal and county or district 
governments subsidised on a per kilometre basis RMB100,000 to 120,000, 
RMB5,000, and up to RMB7,000 respectively. S Village and N Village had 
obtained a respective RMB700,000 (about 49% of total cost) and 
RMB841,000 (around 62%) from upper-level governments. The funds 
allocated for ponds desilting were based on pool size. On a per cubic metre 
basis, the provincial government subsidised about RMB8.5, while municipal 
and county/district governments subsidised about RMB1.07. Government 
funds thus constituted about 71% of the total costs of ponds desilting in 
villages such as S and N Village.  
Fourth, the specifically defined funds allocation at each level of 
government gave farmers the confidence of contributing to inter-village road 
construction. Fund allocations by government were contingent on the villages 
raising a required sum on their own. This had motivated village officials to 
mobilise farmers to contribute funds within the village. However, the small 
proportion of funds undertaken by the villages had likewise promoted a 





similarly small contribution from farmers. In S Village and N Village, 
farmers’ contribution for inter-village road construction was about 10% and 
0.6% of total costs respectively. For the three ponds desilting projects, 
farmers’ contribution accounted for about 29% of total costs of each of these 
projects.  
Finally, the inclusion of inter-village road construction in the 
performance evaluation system of government officials had positively 
impacted on the success of the project in H District. To sum up, the success of 
the first category of public projects, however, found no resonance in many 
other public projects due to flaws in formal institutions and policies. These 












Chapter 6  
Water Resources Related Projects and the New 
Socialist Countryside Construction Project at H 
District 
 
Unclear policies were a hindrance to the success of public goods 
provision. A comparative study of the construction of two drinking water 
projects would shed light on how guanxi is a major deciding factor in the 
success of these projects. Unclear and unspecific policies of fund application 
for public goods provision had given rise to the implementation of guanxi. 
Villages with good guanxi had better access to government funds than those 
without.  
The unscientifically designed policies and the lack of specific guidelines 
for the provision process had impeded the progress of public goods provision. 
The initial ob jectives of the New Socialist Countryside Construction (NSCC) 
project were to strengthen agricultural infrastructure to guarantee production 
of grain products and to narrow city-village income gap. However, problems 
with application eligibility and fund allocation, and local officials’ 
overemphasis on showcasing achievements had put the project in check.  
 
6.1	  Water	  Resources	  Related	  Projects	  
Unlike the inter-village road project, water resources related projects 
encompassed a broad range of works that require more funding and energy. 
The tasks of H District water resources bureau included enhancing middle- 
and low-yield fields by strengthening farmland irrigation construction, 
restoring projects to protect drinking water, increasing water use efficiency in 
agricultural production, reinforcing reservoirs, constructing drinking water 
facilities, building a crisis management system such as flood relief and 
drought control, and conserving water and soil by regulating river flows.  





The central government had attached particular importance to some water 
resources related projects such as small-scale farmland irrigation. Farmland 
irrigation was emphasised in the No. 1 Document of central government in 
2005 titled “Suggestions on the Policy of Further Strengthening Rural Work 
and Improving the Comprehensive Production Capacity of Agriculture in 
2005”. The document clearly stated that alongside large- and medium-sized 
farmland irrigation construction developments, the investment in small-scale 
developments had also been increased since 2005.  
The special subsidized funds would be arranged from the budgetary 
revenue of central and provincial government for the construction of small-
scale farmland irrigation facilities. The municipal and county/district level 
governments would also correspondingly increase their investment.282  
Farmland irrigation had also been mentioned and discussed in the No.1 
Documents of the subsequent years.283 . The Report of the 17th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007 pointed out that the weak 
rural foundation and underdevelopment of rural areas necessitate the 
strengthening of the construction of rural infrastructure and water resources 
projects. In the Government Work Report at the First Session of the 11th 
National People’s Congress in 2008, then Premier Wen emphasised the 
construction of small-scale farmland irrigation projects and the renewal of 
irrigated districts. 
Though the central government had repeatedly stressed the importance of 
rural irrigation, the improvement of local irrigation had not been as notable as 
that of rural roads construction. A Water Resources Bureau staff at H District 
said that although the central government has allocated large sums of money, 
                                                
282 Yu Weiya, ed, “Suggestions of the State Council of the P.R. China on the Policy of Further 
Strengthening Rural Work and Improving the Comprehensive Production Capacity of 
Agriculture”, 30 January 2005, Xinhuanet, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-
01/30/content_2527272.htm> (accessed 19 April 2011). 
283 See “Suggestions on Impelling the New Countryside Construction” in 2006, “Suggestions 
on Actively Develop Modern Agriculture and Impel the New Countryside Construction” in 
2007, “Suggestions on Conscientiously Strengthening Agricultural Infrastructure 
Construction” in 2008, “Suggestions on Promoting the Steady Development of Agriculture 
and Continuous Increase of Farmers’ Income” in 2009, and “Suggestions on Increasing the 
Development Efforts of Balancing Urban and Rural Development and Further Consolidating 
the Foundation for Agricultural and Rural Development” in 2010.  





the funds were limited by the time they were funnelled down. He also said that 
project such as large river regulation had priority over small-scale farmland 
irrigation projects for the allocation of funds at the provincial or municipal 
level. 
Furthermore, there were no specific mechanisms for project application 
and funds allocation at the local government level. In July 2005, the Ministry 
of Finance and Ministry of Water Resources implemented measures (banfa) to 
manage central special funds of minban gongzhu284 for the construction of 
water resources facilities. The measures spelt out the general principles, the 
mechanisms of project application and approval, the use and management of 
funds, the implementation of projects and maintenance and others. The core 
idea of the measures had been minban gongzhu. Central finance has allotted 
special funds for supporting water resources facilities construction. 
According to the Government Work Report Measures, Hunan province 
had implemented the measures and provincial finance had allotted the special 
funds (30% of the whole investment in accordance to the standard set by 
central and provincial special funds). The remaining 70% would be borne by 
the village. In the case of small-scale farmland irrigation projects undertaken 
by Hunan province on 12 October 2005, subsidies for irrigation and drainage 
system renewal was less than RMB200 per case, constructing new 
electromechanical pump station was less than RMB2,000 per kilowatt-hour 
and sprucing up the electromechanical pump station was less than RMB1,000 
per kilowatt-hour. The subsidy for desilting small-irrigated areas on per cubic 
metre basis was RMB2 to RMB4 and constructing a pondlet (<500 cubic 
metres) and a dike was less than RMB50 and RMB2 to RMB5 respectively.285 
Although the Water Conservancy Bureau at the provincial level had set 
the subsidy standards, it had not established a guideline for fund allocation to 
the lower levels. The application system was unclear and incomplete. 
According to the Deputy Director of the Water Resource Bureau at H District, 
                                                
284 This means that the construction would be run mainly by farmers and subsidised by 
different levels of government. 
285  Data obtained from the official government website of SY City of N province, 
<http://www.hnsyczj.gov.cn/syczj/zcfg/nync/sljs/content_751.html> (accessed 20 April 2011). 





Chenzhou City, there were too many applications vying for a limited amount 
of funds; hence, choices would have to be made after a complicated decision 
making process. Priorities were given to serious cases and those with good 
returns. Serious cases referred to projects such as endangered reservoirs and 
good returns refer to economic and social returns.  
Endangered reservoirs were often given priority in the application process 
as they involve the safety of the entire village. They went through the strictest 
application and examination. Once defined as a case of endangered reservoirs, 
the application would be funded. For the huge number of less serious cases, 
assessments were made subjectively, without any set of criteria. A lot thus 
depended on guanxi in real implementation.  
H District had no specific policies for allocating funds to different 
villages. Farmland irrigation in H District was modelled on the one 
implemented at the provincial level. Decisions according to the Director of 
Water Resources Bureau were made in a meeting attended by key personnel. 
When asked if decisions were made based on specific criteria, he revealed that 
it depended on the discussion in the meeting. When I asked whether guanxi 
played a crucial role in the discussion, he only smiled and showed no 
objection to the suggestion. In the words of the deputy director, “guanxi is so 
important that it is often regarded as a productive force (guanxi shi 
shengchanli)”. The following two cases of drinking water facilities 
construction would throw light on the importance of guanxi in the application 
process. 
 
Drinking	   Water	   Project	   at	   S	   Village—A	   Successful	   Case	  
with	  Guanxi	  
The drinking water project in S Village involved village groups 6, 7, 8, 9 
and 13 in an area called dawanli. In the past, water came from wells that were 
polluted and unsuitable for drinking. Together with two village group leaders, 
the village secretary who lived in the area made a formal application for the 
construction of an aqueduct to connect the nearby reservoir to these village 
groups. 





The village secretary when interviewed was proud to reveal that his 
former classmate, WTX who was working at the department of education in H 
District government, had good relations with the Director of the Water Bureau 
in that district. Having good connections with someone who worked in the 
upper-level government was considered a rare privilege. Through WTX’s 
assistance, the village secretary of S village met the director to discuss the 
issue.  
Prior to this, the village secretary met WTX several times for lavish meals 
and splurging him with expensive gifts. With the introduction of WTX, the 
village secretary and village head met the director and other officials. 
According to the village secretary, the costs for establishing good guanxi 
including gifts, meals and travelling between the city and village was around 
RMB10,000. Farmers however believed that this was an underestimation. In 
2008, the Water Resources Bureau finally agreed to launch the project two 
years after the submission of the first application in 2006. Funds allocated 
were RMB440,000.  
 
Table 15 Fundraising for Drinking Water Project at Dawanli, S Village, 2009 




Funds allocated by the Water Resources Bureau, H District 440,000 67.7 
Funds within village Funds from the village committee 30,000 4.6 
Farmers’ contribution of funds 180,000 27.7 
Total 650,000 
Source: Data is based on the interviews with village officials and farmers in 2010 and    
materials obtained from S Village. 
 
The village committee also contributed RMB30,000 to dawanli for the 
project. Villagers from these five village groups contributed about RMB300 
per person or a total of around RMB180,000. A total sum of RMB650,000 
was used for  the construction of a six kilometre-long aqueduct (see Table 15). 
 
Water	   Aqueduct	   Construction	   Project	   at	   S	   Village—A	  
Failed	  Case	  without	  Guanxi	  
Without political guanxi networking, a similar water aqueduct 
construction project application by village group 4 of S Village was rejected. 





The village group leader submitted the application in 2004, two years earlier 
than that of dawanli. The retired village leader revealed in a 2009 interview 
that he was still very regretful about his failure to solve the problem when he 
was the village group leader.  
In terms of location, village group 4 was situated at the entrance of S 
Village in the south. In 2000, the construction of a highway in front of the area 
had destroyed the aqueduct for irrigation. Since then, the village had been 
running out of water for farmland irrigation. For drinking water, they had to 
depend on the wells. Without water, villagers could not work as farmers 
anymore and had to buy their basic necessities such as rice and vegetable like 
urban residents. As a consequence, almost all the young males in the village 
had gone to the cities to work as migrant workers, leaving behind the old, 
young women and children.  
The village group leader submitted separate applications to T Town 
government, H District government and city government in 2004, but to no 
avail. He even went to the Office for Petitions and Appeals (xinfangban) of H 
District to lodge a complaint. A female staff that attended to him asked him if 
he would foot the bill for the dinner with the officials at xinfangban. The 
group leader was indignant with the absurdity of a poor farmer having to 
invite officials to meals. As he had no acquaintance or friends there, the lady 
did not take him seriously. Undaunted, he went to a higher level, namely, the 
Office for Petitions and Appeals (OPA) of Z City to make his appeal. The 
OPA of H District was then contacted and told to act upon it, as the H District 
government, town government, and the highway construction company did the 
damage to the aqueduct. 
H District was thus pressured to deploy people to S Village group 4 to 
assess the situation. A cost of around RMB400,000 was arrived at. While the 
highway construction company was no longer in operation, the H District 
government could not afford the cost of construction; it could only repair the 
aqueduct. However, the thick silt deposits hindered the repair work. As 
desilting would cost more, the repair works did not kick off.  





Without government funds, the cost of RMB400,000 was too much for 
the village group of only 110 people to shoulder. Without the financial support 
of H District, no construction work could be carried out. The group leader 
lamented the village’s lack of guanxi with officials at H District. The impact 
of guanxi was thus positive for the case of dawanli and negative in the case of 
village group 4. 
 
Problems	  of	  Guanxi	  
The construction of drinking water facilities in the rural area was not 
systematic or well organised by government. It was under minban gongzhu, a 
situation where informal institutions such as guanxi prosper. Guanxi had 
resulted in corruption, inefficient deployment of collective funds and 
villagers’ antagonism towards officials.  
The inefficient deployment of collective funds had diverted village 
finance from rural public goods provision. The high expenses on meals, 
accommodation and gifts to cultivate guanxi had added undue pressure on 
villages’ collective finance that was already weakened by developments 
mentioned in Chapter 5. For S Village, expenses on meals and accommodation 
totalled RMB32,550.2, or 37.1% of management fee (see Table 16), which 
was almost equivalent to the total annual salaries of four village officials. This 
was discounting the fact that some of these expenses had been incorporated 
under the “Others” category.  
 
Table 16 Management Fee of S Village in 2008 
Types of Expenses  Amount (RMB) Proportion (%) 
Meals and Accommodation 32,550.3 37.1 
Salary 13,718 15.6 
Newspaper and Magazine/ Office Supplies 716 0.8 
Others 40,694.8 46.4 
Total 87,679.1 
Source: The data obtained from the station of operation and management, T Town, 
during the author’s fieldwork in 2011. 
The image of officials accepting gifts and enjoying lavish meals in return 
for fund allocation had cast them in a bad light. As a result, farmers had low 
trust of local government officials, which inhibited them from contributing to 





rural public goods. While town governments used to collect taxes and fees 
from farmers, the central government successfully abolished the three 
agricultural taxes. Farmers were thus grateful to the central government for 
taking this burden off them. This low trust in local officials was evident in an 
interview with a farmer who affirmed that he would contribute only if there 
was such a project in reality to be constructed. He was particularly perturbed 
with officials’ lavishness on entertainment without accomplishing anything. 
He added, “I trust nobody in this village except myself.”  
 
6.2	  Village	  Environment	  Improvement	  Projects	  
The New Socialist Countryside Construction (NSCC) was raised by the 
“Party Central Committee’s Proposal on the 11th Five-Year Programme of 
National Economic and Social Development” passed at the fifth plenary 
session of the 16th Central committee of Chinese Communist Party in October 
2005. The proposal pointed out that NSCC construction was a major historical 
task in the modernisation process. It was to promote agricultural production, 
raise living standard, boost cleanliness of villages, and enhance democratic 
management in various villages. Each level of government was required to 
invest more on agriculture and countryside and strengthen public goods and 
services provision in rural areas in order to improve the living conditions and 
production capabilities of the farmers. The NSCC was discussed and 
emphasised in the No. 1 Document of the central government titled 
“Suggestions on Impelling the New Socialist Countryside Construction” in 
2006 and “Suggestions on Actively Develop Modern Agriculture and Impel 
the New Socialist Countryside Construction” in 2007. The implementation of 
NSCC began in 2006. 
Yet, there were inconsistences between the central government’s 
ambitious blueprint of a new countryside and local government’s actual 
implementation of the NSCC. The NSCC was to cover various aspects of rural 
life, including increasing financial input in rural infrastructure construction, 
expediting rural roads construction, developing rural communication and 
power networks, eradicating the problem of unsafe drinking water, 





accelerating the development of rural culture and education, reinforcing public 
health and basic medial care service system, establishing a new rural 
cooperative medical insurance system and promoting distance learning. 
However, translating the project into reality might not be that easy. An 
examination of the NSCC in H District, Chenzhou City of Hunan Province 
had presented a micro picture of the NSCC at the local level. 
 
The	  NSCC	  in	  H	  District	  
The core task of NSCC is to improve village environment. The NSCC in 
H District, Chenzhou City, Hunan province involves three cleanings, five 
changes, and one afforestation. Three cleanings include cleaning rubbish and 
weed around houses, cleaning silt and ditches, as well as cleaning roadblocks. 
Five changes refer to improving drinking water sources, changing sand roads 
to concrete or asphalt-paved roads, changing byre and sty to more 
standardised ones, changing shabby kitchens to more modernised kitchens, 
and changing dilapidated toilets to more modernised toilets. One afforestation 
referred to planting more trees within villages to beautify the environment. 
The village environment improvement project was one of the main tasks of the 
New Socialist Countryside Construction Programme (NSCCP).  
The NSCC in H district in 2009 was such a complex project that almost 
all departments of municipal government, district government and town 
government, as well as village committee were involved. Three to five people, 
comprising former officials, teachers, workers, Party members and young 
activists applying for Party membership from each village, form a NSCC 
council to take charge of NSCC issues. A NSCC work team consisting of 
government staffs from various departments at the district level were 
responsible for NSCC affairs in villages that had been chosen as 
demonstration (shifan or tuijin) sites. At S Village, work team members came 
from various departments in H district including the standing committee of 
People’s congress, bureau of agriculture, labour bureau and social security 
administration, construction bureau, bureau of land and resources and highway 





administration bureau. Mr Liao, the team leader, was from the bureau of 
agriculture.  
The application process involves several stages. At the preliminary stage, 
the town government would pick 14 to 20 tuijin and three to five shifan sites 
in H District. Shifan site should have at least 40 households, while tuijin site 
should have no lesser than 20 households; the two sites were subject to 
different application criteria.  
The proposed tuijin and shifan sites would be examined and endorsed by 
the Leading Group of NSCC at the district level. Tuijin sites should satisfy 
five criteria: first, the town government should provide support in the form of 
specific working plan; second, village committee should attach great 
importance to the sites; third, village officials had to propagate NSCC to all 
villagers; fourth, villages should prepare initial NSCC plan; fifth, farmers 
must be active on a voluntary basis. To apply for shifan site, villages should 
satisfy two additional criteria. First was the growth of off-farm industries in 
the village that could boost the wealth of farmers. Second was the availability 
of supporting facilities such as distance learning site. Villages would stand a 
better chance of being granted application if they satisfied the following seven 
criteria: villages with good party branch, speedy completion of three cleanings, 
motivated and enthusiastic farmers who could raise huge funds, good 
foundation for village planning, good prospect for industrial development, 
villages in close proximity to the main national, provincial or county road, and 
a chosen shifan site for NSCC at the provincial or municipal level. 
After the Leading Group of NSCC had approved the sites, the work team 
would be sent to the village to investigate and help the village council work 
out development plans. The Leading Group of NSCC at H District Party 
Committee set the agenda and each village was required to submit its 
development plans based on it. The development plans mainly dealt with 
location, allocation of road, ditch and residential areas, areas for livestock 
rearing, industry development, public entertainment, and refuse area. Each 
team would have to work out a budget before submitting the plans and budget 
to the town government for approval. After the town government had done a 





budget check, it would mobilise multiple channels of fundraising. The 
implementation usually took as long as six months. 
 
 
Table 17 The Development Plan for NSCC of S Village, 2009 
No. Item Content Budget (RMB) 
Completion 
date 
1 Place for village activities 
Renovate the interior and exterior of the room 
and the enclosure. Replace gate, door and 
windows 
128,000 30 July 2009 
2 Road around the village 
Construct road to run 700 metres, with a 3.8-
metre width of and 18-centimetre thickness 258,700 30 June 2009 
3 Ditch within village 
Construct ditch to run 480 metres, with a 2.5-
metre width and 15-centimetre height, paved 
with concrete.  
122,000 30 July 2009 
4 Waste storage tank 
Build five tanks, with a length of 2.2 metres, 
a width of 2.5 metres and height of 1 metre 5,000 20 July 2009 
5 Flower beds 
Build 10 flower beds, with a length of 2 
metres, a width of 1.3 metres and height of 
0.5 metre 
9,000 20 August 2009 
6 Fitness park 
Install body-building apparatus, table, 
greensward and flowerbed sand lay concrete 
paved playground  
96,000 30 August 2009 
7 Restoration of ancient stage 
Tidy the room, repair the backyard and 
renovate the stage 128,000 30 July 2009 
8 The governance of the river way 
Build riverbank for the road around the 
village and the playground 1160,000 
30 November 
2009 
9 Basketball playground 
Pave the playground with concrete and 











11 Landscape paradise Build an arbour and footpath among the hills. 165,000 30 September  
12 Public bathroom Build two public bathrooms, with an area of 3 metres by 8 metres 70,000 30 July 
13 Culture Build a village library TBA286 30 August 
14 
Three cleanings, 
five changes and 
one 
afforestation 
cleaning rubbish, weed around houses, silt 
and ditches, as well as roadblocks. Five 
changes refer to improving drinking water 
sources, changing sand roads to concrete- or 
asphalt-paved roads, changing byre and sty to 
more standardised ones, changing shabby 
kitchens to more modernised kitchens, and 
changing dilapidated toilets to more 
modernised toilets. 
275,000 30 November 
Total 2,506,700 
Source: data obtained from the village committee of S Village during the author’s 
fieldwork from 2009 to 2010. 
                                                
286 Funds would be supplied by the Bureau of Culture, H District. 





Besides the work team, there were two or three contact persons for each 
village chosen as tuijin or shifan site at H district. The work team of NSCC 
should be well conversant with NSCC sites including their natural conditions, 
inhabited environment, economic and social development, infrastructure 
construction, demands for rural construction and the preferences of local 
farmers.  
Five towns in T Town were selected as shifan sites in 2009 and S and N 
Villages were two of them. S Village was approved as a shifan site in 2009. 
Table 17 shows the development plan and budget of S Village. To some 
farmers, items such as flowerbeds, fitness park and landscape paradise could 
be dispensed with. 
The planned budget of RMB2,506,700 was on the high side and not easily 
attainable. The allocated funds from upper-level governments would be 
disbursed to the shifan site or tuijin sites progressively after achieving a task. 
The first batch of funds would reach the sites before the project starts and the 
rest would arrive after clearance of work done by the town government and 
the Office of NSCC. 
 
Table 18 The Development Plan of NSCC at N Village 2008 
No. Item Content Budget (RMB) 
1 Three cleanings Twenty disorderly houses and nine sundries 30,000 
2 Road paved with concrete 
Construct concrete road of 1,000 metres in 
length and four metres in the width. 10,000 
3 Drinking water renovation 
Renovate two wells and establish small 
running water plants. 20,000 
4 Kitchen renovation Renovate the kitchens of 48 households  30,000 
5 Renovate sties and byres 
Dismantle 39 old sties and byres and build a 
new standard place for raising livestock. 28,000 
6 Renovation of bathrooms 
Dismantle 42 old toilets and build new flush 
toilets 8400 
7 Agriculture industry adjustment 
Develop fruit plantations within 2,000 mu of 
land 40,000 
Total 166,400 
Source: data based on the development plan of N Village submitted to the Office of 
NSCC, H District in 2008.  
N Village was approved as a shifan site in 2008. On 25 March 2008, the 
N Village committee submitted its seven-item development plan (see Table 
18). Compared to S Village’, the N Village’s development plan was on a 





smaller scale, more practical and less ambitious. Most of the items were 
related to improving household environment such as kitchens, sites, byres and 
bathrooms. Both S and N Villages had not included many items closely related 
to farming such as irrigation, farmland improvement and other aspects of 
agriculture. 
Contractor companies would undertake the construction of various public 
projects in villages. The village council (Party A) would sign a contract with 
the contractor company (Party B) covering the name of the project, 
construction cost, mode of contract, method of payment, description of project 
quality and safety, duration and final acceptance of construction. Five copies 
of the contract would be prepared, one each to the town government, village 
committee, work team of NSCC, Party A and Party B. 
The implementation process required the collaboration of the work team, 
village committee and the farmers. The work team leader took the 
responsibility of supervising contractor company’s work and coordinating 
with the village council, which in turn was tasked with submitting a monthly 
progress report to the Office of NSCC. The village council shouldered the 
heavy and tedious task of organising, coordinating and explaining to farmers 
the rationale of renovating kitchens or dismantling byres or sties.  
After the completion of these projects, the town government would 
conduct preliminary inspection before the Office of NSCC at the district level 
conducts a secondary inspection. As the project involved huge sums of money, 
the examination by the Office of NSCC was done in two stages, one in mid-
year and the other at the end of the year. The examination directly affected the 
application of shifan or tuijin sites in the following year. N Village did not 
apply for shifan site in 2009 due to poor performance in 2008. According to an 
official at the Office of NSCC at H District, farmers in N Village lacked 
enthusiasm, making it difficult for the village to reach consensus on various 
issues.   
S Village passed the examination stage and was thus successful in its 
reapplication for shifan site in 2010. The summary of the completion of NSCC 
projects at S Village could be seen from Table 19. The inspection of three 





cleanings, five changes and one afforestation in S Village went through 
individual and final inspections. The individual and final inspection forms 
would be jointly endorsed by the head of NSCC council of the village, town 
official in charge, work team leader and member of the inspection group (see 
Table 20 for a sample form).  
 






Renovation of place for recreation and cultural 
activities 209,800 20 July 
Build tntra-village road paved with concrete 187,700 7 August 
Build new village path paved with concrete 41,300 28 July 
Build new ditch 12,000 12 August 
Slope-protection works along river course 141,800 12 August 
Slope-protection works along the road to the village 37,800 15 September 
Renovation of ancient stage 136,400 10 September 
Renovation of ancient bridge 120,800 6 August 
Build public toilets 68,000 20 October 
Waste storage tanks 4500 16 July 
Wall plastering 75,600 26 October 
Total 1035,700 
Source: data obtained from the Office of NSCC, H District during author’s fieldwork 
from 2009 to 2010. 
 
Table 20 Individual Inspection of Three Cleanings, Five Changes and One Afforestation 
Items of Each Household of S Village, H District, 2009 (Excerpt) 
Name Area of Dismantled Sties and Byres and Newly Established Ones (square metre) 
Renovated Bathrooms 
(number) 
A  7.8 1 
B  38.7 1 
C 25.8 1 
D 7.2 0 
E 6.1 1 
F 26.5 1 
Signature of Head of Village Council:                                                 
Signature of Town Official in Charge: 
Signature of Work Team Leader: 
Signature of Inspection Group Member: 
Source: Table obtained from the Office of NSCC, H District, 2009 during the author’s 
field work. 
 
Table 19 shows that NSCC projects construction required an investment 
of RMB1,035,700. The budgeted funds for subsidising NSCC projects in S 
Village by the Office of NSCC, H District were RMB750,000 which were 





insufficient to meet costs. Furthermore, the RMB750,000 were allocated in 
two stages, with the first amounting to RMB350,000 and the remaining of 
RMB400,000 allocated after the year-end inspection. To complete these 
projects, more funds were needed. 
S Village thus had to raise funds from other sources such as the village 
work team, other departments and labour contribution. The village council 
also mobilised fundraising among villagers (see Table 21). Farmers 
contributed RMB137,000, or 11.7% of the total in 2009. Farmers had to 
contribute labour in some construction work with payment. The final amount 
of RMB1,174,300 was enough to foot the bill of about RMB1,035,700.  
 
Table 21 Channels of Fundraising for S Village in 2009 
Channels Amount (RMB) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Funds from allocated funds of the Office of NSCC, H 
District  750,000
287 63.9 
Work team formed by various departments at H District 160,000 13.6 
Farmers’ contribution  137,000 11.7 
Other funds raised by different departments 75,000 6.4 
Funds from u contribution 52,300 4.4 
Total 1,174,300 
Source: compiled from documents at S Village during the author’s fieldwork from 2009 to 
2010. 
 
Table 22 Channels of Fundraising for N Village in 2009 
Channels Amount (RMB) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Funds of project approval by District government 320,000 53.3 
Work team  80,000 13.3 
Donations from deputies of the People’s Congress, H District 150,000 25 
Others 50,000 8.3 
Total 600,000 
Source: compiled from documents at S Village during the author’s fieldwork from 2009 
to 2010. 
 
Funds would be allocated once projects are accepted after examination. N 
Village obtained a total of RMB600,000, including RMB320,000 from 
District government, RMB80,000 from the work team of NSCC at N Village, 
donations of RMB150,000 from deputies of the People’s Congress at H 
                                                
287 It included RMB350,000 that were allocated by the Office of NSCC to S Village, and the 
remaining RMB400,000 were allocated at the end of the year. 





District, and other funds of around RMB50,000. Items on the development 
plan of N Village were furnished in Table 22. 
After the completion of the NSCC projects, the work team of different 
villages would be evaluated by the Organisation Department of H District 
Committee at the end of the year. The evaluation was conducted along with 
the inspection and examination of NSCC projects. The evaluation team 
consisted of a person chosen from the departments that work team members 
came from, the staff from the Party Building Office at H District Committee, 
and the leader in charge of the Party’s organization building at the town level.  
 
Table 23 The Inspection and Acceptance of Work Conducted by the NSCC Project 
Work Team, H District, 2009 
Item Score Method 
Formation of grassroots 
organisations  30 
Check documents and reports, and listen to the 
feedback from farmers  
Infrastructure construction 15 Check materials and examine the field 
Industry development  15 Check materials and examine the field 
Building a harmonious 
society 10 Check materials and visit farmers 
Management of funds 10 Check materials and visit farmers in the field 
The responsibilities of work 
teams 10 Check reports and visit farmers 
The internal construction of 
work teams 10 
Check materials, visit farmers and conduct 
surveys among farmers 
Optional items No more than 5 
Check materials, visit farmers and related 
departments 
Source: The sample form was extracted from the Notification on the Inspection and 
Acceptance of the Work by the Work Team in NSCC of 2009, the Party Building Office, H 
District. 
The evaluation would look at reports, documents and conducting a field 
survey. The evaluation of grassroots organisation building was mostly based 
on the documents and reports submitted by the village secretary. However, as 
documents and reports could be forged, the 30 % score for the formation of 
grassroots organisation was not a good indication of performance. The work 
teams of many villages uncannily received similar score for this item (see 
Table 23 for items of evaluation of work team in 2009).  
The inspection and examination at the end of the year were a way of 
monitoring work done in the villages the work teams had been allocated to. 
The work teams were required to stay in the village to supervise and help in 





the NSCC work, guide village officials in the organising or coordinating of 
work and mobilising villagers to contribute labour to certain tasks such as 
clearing the surrounding areas of their houses, dismantling the sties and byres, 
and clearing the rubbish. Local residents’ impression of work team members 
also mattered in the year-end inspection (see Table 24 for a sample of the 
survey). The appraisal form, based on a four-point scale of excellent, qualified, 
average and unqualified, had to be completed by all attendants of the 
evaluation meeting held in the evaluated village, including farmers and village 
officials. The items in survey on the whole were rather subjective. 
 
Table 24 The Democratic Appraisal of Work Team Members in Different Villages, H 
District, 2009 
Department of Bureau 
where work team 





Excellent Qualified Average  Unqualified 
      
      
      
Source: The form was obtained from the Office of NSCC, H District 2009 during the 
author’s fieldwork. 
 
Institutional	  Design	  Problems	  
The implementation of NSCC at the local level was a hurdle to meeting 
the initial objective of NSCC, which was to improve various aspects of the 
rural areas to greatly improve the agricultural infrastructure and narrow the 
city-village gap. However, it was difficult for NSCC to achieve the initial 
objective as the NSCC at H District covers only a few villages and focused on 
three cleanings, five changes, and one afforestation, which were mainly vanity 
projects. 
First, as NSCC covered various aspects of rural public projects, 
government departments of agriculture, water conservancy, culture, 
construction, forestry, transportation and other departments related to 
agriculture were involved. This in turn meant that the work team would have 
to make up of people from various departments. The participation of several 
departments in a project complicated not only the supervision of each 
department, but also the fundraising of each village. The idea that the more 





departments involved, the more funds raised did not work if there are no 
guidelines or policies on the funds to be raised by each department. The 
flexibility only gave some departments the excuse not to raise funds at all and 
some overzealous departments to employ whatever means possible to raise 
funds. Some village officials and town officials said that as long as money 
could be gotten, they would go anywhere. This mentality had given rise to the 
massive implementation of guanxi. 
Second, the eligibility to become NSCC site, including shifan or tuijin 
site, is so stringent that it precludes some villages. The priority was given to 
villages located close to the main national, provincial or county roads and to 
villages with good industry development potential, which were barriers to 
some remote and often forgotten villages.  
In some cases, only a part of a village was selected as shifan or tuijin site. 
For instance, the shifan site at S Village was only at dawanli where village 
groups 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 were located. Since NSCC focused on places that had 
investment potential, it was a hotbed for tension and conflict caused by 
inequality. As shifan sites of NSCC might not be the entire village, there was a 
clear demarcation where an NSCC site is clean, beautiful, and modern-like 
city, and the remaining part of the village is still a backward rural area. A 
farmer at village group 10 complained that while they lacked funds to build a 
ditch for irrigation in their village group, dawanli had funds to build a useless 
ancient stage and playground. His view was concurred by that of another 
farmer at village group 4 of S Village who believed that NSCC sites were for 
showcasing officials’ achievements and not for the benefit of the farmers. He 
doubted if anyone would use the ancient bridge or perform on the ancient 
stage. 
Moreover, the eligibility for shifan or tuijin site also required active 
participation of farmers in public affairs within the village. However, villages 
that met this requirement often were not the most in need. Their infrastructures 
were often better than villages that failed to meet these requirements. For 
instance, the infrastructure at S Village was better than those of some villages 
located in the mountain area, far away from the main national, provincial and 





county roads. All village groups within S Village were accessible via the intra-
village road. The infrastructure of N Village was poorer than that of S Village, 
and yet farmers in N Village showed less enthusiasm than S Village farmers. 
N Village however failed to raise funds from farmers for the intra-road 
construction. Even though S Village had better infrastructure than N Village, it 
continued to be chosen as shifan site for three successive years in 2009, 2010 
and 2011; N Village was only chosen in 2009 as farmers in N Village did not 
show any enthusiasm and fundraising among farmers also did not make the 
mark.  
 
Table 25 The Allocation of Award Money to Departments and Individuals in 2009 






New industrialisation  (28,000) Departments 10 2000 Individuals 20 400 
Family planning (75,200) Departments 24 2000 Individuals 68 400 
Politics, laws and comprehensive 
improvement (96,000) 
Departments 36 2000 
Individuals 60 400 
Security management (34,000) Departments 8 2000 Individuals 45 400 
Investment attraction (28,000) Departments 10 2000 Individuals 20 400 
Fiscal and taxation work (28,000) Departments 10 2000 Individuals 20 400 
Key construction projects (28,000) Departments 10 2000 Individuals 20 400 
Optimisation of economic development 
environment (28,000) 
Departments 10 2000 
Individuals 20 400 
Agricultural development (28,000) Departments 10 2000 Individuals 20 400 
New urbanisation (28,000) Departments 10 2000 Individuals 20 400 
Development of the service industry 
(28,000) 
Departments 10 2000 
Individuals 20 400 
Optimisation of ecological environment 
(28,000) 
Departments 10 2000 
Individuals 20 400 
Source: data were collected during the author’s field trip from 2009 to 2010. 
Third, the lack of project guidelines had caused the misallocation of 
funds. Funds were often allocated to vanity projects and not to projects that 
serve a functional purpose. For instance, the NSCC in S Village spent 
RMB209,800 (20.2% of total cost) on boosting facilities for recreation and 
culture, RMB136,400 (10%) on upgrading ancient stage and RMB120,000 





(11.7%) and on renovating ancient bridge (see Table 19). About 42% of the 
total costs for NSCC at dawanli had been used for constructing facilities for 
recreational and cultural activities. A farmer when interviewed said that he 
was so preoccupied with farming and related work that he had little time to 
play basketball or to fully utilise these facilities. Farmers who were hard at 
work in the field certainly did not need to work out again at the fitness park 
after work.  To the farmers, the ancient stage was absolutely redundant, as it 
had never been utilised before. Officials on the other hand had very different 
opinions. An NSCC official said that it served the objective of attracting 
investment. This was understandable as investment attraction was one of the 
indexes of economic development, which was given top priority in the 
performance evaluation of town government departments and officials, along 
with industrialisation, agricultural industrialisation, new urbanisation and 
revenue generation (see Table 25).  
Hence, local officials tried to improve the environment of villages to 
improve their potential of attracting investment as in the case of S Village. S 
Village had a primary forest that was located close to dawanli where village 
groups 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 were. The NSCC Office of H District had accepted the 
application of S Village as it could be built into a tourist site due to its primary 
forest. Accordingly, the NSCC site only focused on dawanli area rather than 
the entire S Village. The construction included not only the three cleanings, 
five changes, and one forestation, but also the renovation of the ancient stage 
and ancient bridge and the restoration of the riverbank running along the side 
of the primary forest. The construction of these projects had been heavily 
criticised by farmers in the village, especially farmers outside dawanli. A 
farmer complained that the government did not fund the construction of an 
irrigation facility in his village group at S Village, but had plenty of funds to 
rebuild dawanli where a few useless projects had been built. He questioned the 
rationale of these projects: “What is the use of that fancy ancient bridge? Who 
would visit the primary forest? Who would perform on the renovated ancient 
stage? The entire project is a big showcase and a total waste of money!” (See 
Table 17 for a list of projects planned)  





The NSCC should also be made applicable to a wider range of villages 
and focused on agriculture and infrastructure rather than investment-oriented 
structures. An official at T Town proposed rotating the NSCC project 
systematically from one village to the next each year, rather than repeatedly 
focusing on the same villages, or same village groups. 
 
6.3	  Conclusion	  
The examination of the second category of public projects such as 
drinking water projects and environment improvement projects had shown that 
the success of them was less predictable than that of the first category. The 
success depended on several factors due to problems with existing formal 
institutions and policies in rural public goods provision. Unlike the benefits 
brought about by clear institutional design for inter-village road construction 
and ponds desilting projects discussed in Chapter 5, the unclear institutional 
design for public projects had made the outcome less desirable.  
Although the central government had attached great importance to 
providing agricultural water resources infrastructure, a series of policies such 
as application and funds allocation at local level had hindered progress. Most 
departments at the municipal level had not provided specific measures 
regarding application eligibility and funds allocation. Without specific 
guidelines for projects selection, the selection was entirely at the discretion of 
major officials of the bureau, leaving room for, guanxi to emerge.  
The two drinking water projects within S Village had presented how 
guanxi had played an important role in the process of choosing a project With 
similar formal institutions, policy environment, cost, and farmers’ 
affordability, the two drinking water projects had arrived at two different 
outcomes in funds application. Through the manipulation of guanxi, the 
drinking water project in dawanli had been successful in obtaining 
government funds, while that of village group 4 in S Village had been rejected 
without guanxi.  
Guanxi building and maintaining did not come cheap. The annual costs of 
meals or gifts for guanxi cultivation were almost equivalent to the annual 





salaries of four village officials at S Village. Guanxi had left negative 
impression on farmers as well as lowered their trust of local officials. To 
certain extent, it had also inhibited them from contributing money to rural 
public goods provision for fear of officials squandering their money away on 
lavish entertainment. 
The objective of NSCC projects was to improve the agricultural 
infrastructure and reduce the gap between the cities and villages. However, the 
preclusion of some villages or some parts of a village from the application 
process (priority given to villages with industrial potential, proximity to main 
national, municipal or town road, as well as strong enthusiasm in NSCC 
participation) worked contrary to the aim the project sought to achieve.  
The bias towards projects with industrial potential had also resulted in 
funds going to vanity projects for attracting investment instead of to villages 
most in need of upgrading. The huge funds spent on renovating the ancient 
bridge and stage as well as providing recreation and promoting culture in 
dawanli, S Village was a case in point. The NSCC should have made more 
progress and received desirable outcome if the formal institutions and policies 
had been more scientifically designed.  





Chapter 7  
Public Goods Provision Mainly by Villages 
 This chapter would pay close attention to the third category of public 
goods that includes small-scale public projects such as village path hardening, 
irrigation ditch construction, and river treatment funded mainly by villages 
with little or no government support. The success rate of this category of 
projects was often low because problems such as fiscal constraints of village 
committee, free-rider problem, farmers’ strong dependence on government, 
lack of good leadership, and flawed policies hindered the fundraising. 
Successful cases were usually more of an exception than the norm. 
Overcoming the aforementioned problems was an uphill task that few could 
achieve except huge donations existed. 
While some villages of industrialised provinces could rely on villages’ 
collective income for rural public goods provision, agriculture-based villages 
had little collective income to fall back on. This chapter studied the collective 
income of N Village, T Town at length to unravel its impacts on rural public 
goods provision. Entrepreneurs’ donations to a village served as a supplement 
to fundraising for rural public goods provision. Mr Deng’s donation to B 
Village and Mr Li’s investment in irrigation ditch construction for village 
group 3 of N Village were two examples of entrepreneurs’ donations to public 
projects. This chapter would also show how farmers’ financial capacity and 
mind-set, and the role of leadership had affected farmers’ contribution as 
reflected in a case study of villages in T Town. 
The study of the above cases would also throw light on the effectiveness 
of yishi yiyi as a formal institution for self-development in the rural areas. 
Introduced by the State Council, the effectiveness of yishi yiyi was however 
limited as its functions were largely impractical for implementation in Hunan 
Province. The initial purpose of relieving farmers’ burden could not be 
fulfilled as local officials could circumvent the policy in actual 
implementation. The case study would illustrate why yishi yiyi could not meet 
the needs of rural public goods provision.  






7.1	  One-­‐Case-­‐One-­‐Meeting	  (Yishi	  Yiyi)	  
After the TFR and AAT, the central government had decided to 
decentralise rural public works to villages through democratic discussions via 
yishi yiyi at regular villagers’ assemblies. However, the implementation of 
yishi yiyi might not achieve its desired objective. It was reported in a survey of 
Henan province in 2005 that about 91% of its villages had not practised the 
one-case-one-meeting, while five per cent had conducted it within an irregular 
framework. 288  
 
Yishi	  Yiyi	  in	  Official	  Documents	  
Yishi yiyi first appeared in the Notice of the Central Committee of CCP 
and the State Council on Trial Sites of Agricultural Tax and Fee Reform in 
March 2000. The notice specified that the funding of public and collective 
projects would be conducted through democratic discussions in the form of 
yishi yiyi at villagers’ assemblies, rather than regularly collecting three 
charges (tiliu) or five deductions (tongchou) from farmers. In 2007, the State 
Council issued the Notice of Ministry of Agriculture on the Measures on 
Managing yishi yiyi within Villages, which stipulated the sphere of application, 
and the procedure and management of fundraising. First, fundraising and 
labour contribution would be on a voluntary basis and were for projects such 
as farmland irrigation infrastructure construction, roads construction, and 
public projects for collective production and raising living standards of 
villagers.  
Second, fundraising and labour contribution issues should be discussed 
and passed with the consensus of at least half of the participants at farmers’ or 
farmers’ representatives’ assemblies. Farmers and farmers’ representatives 
should make up two-thirds of the attendees. The proposal would be first 
                                                
288 Meng Zhaozhi, “Dui Nongcun ‘Yishi Yiyi’ Zhidu de Fansi” (The Reflection on One-Case-
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examined by the town government before it was submitted to the county or 
district government.  
Third, a cap on funds and labour contribution from farmers should be set 
based on local economic development and the financial capacity of farmers, 
and approved by the provincial government. Many provinces including Hunan 
province capped funds from farmers at RMB15 per person a year, but differed 
on the ceiling of labour contribution. Raised funds should also come under a 
separate account and be used only for public projects applied. The financial 
management group should take the responsibility of supervising funds and 
labour contribution, and publicise the usage of funds regularly.289  
To promote yishi yiyi, the government had embarked on a pilot project of 
giving out awards and subsidies. This was stipulated in the Notice on 
Conducting Pilot Work on Government Awards and Subsidies for Village 
Level Public Works Projects in 2008 jointly issued by The State Council 
Working Group on Comprehensive Rural Reform, Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Agriculture. The notice also spelled out that such public projects 
should come under projects of existing policies to ensure that no projects were 
left out in the subsidy while preventing duplications. All small-scale irrigation, 
intra-village roads, environmental sanitation facilities, and other farmer-
related public projects would now be financed by funds largely raised by 
farmers through yishi yiyi as well as village collective funds, with government 
subsidies playing a secondary role. 
 Awards and subsidies would only be granted after successful completion 
of the project. All applications would go through a long process. The town 
government would first examine the compliance, feasibility and validity of the 
application of claims, before county or district departments of finance and 
agriculture re-examined the application and sent it to the Provincial Leading 
Group Office on Comprehensive Rural Reform and further to the departments 
of finance and agriculture for examination and verification. After approval, 
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provincial financial departments would allocate the funds directly to county or 
district government that was responsible for its management.290 
In early 2009, the Ministry of Finance released the Notice on Issues of 
Government Awards and Subsidies for Village Level Public Works Projects 
through Yishi Yiyi and put a ceiling of labour contribution at RMB20 a day. 
The central and local governments would undertake one-third and two-thirds 
of government subsidies for yishi yiyi respectively.291 
Subsequently, the State Council Working Group on Comprehensive Rural 
Reform, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Agriculture released the Notice 
of Expanding the Pilot Work on Government Awards and Subsidies for 
Village Level Public Works Projects in 2009. The notice grouped project 
selection from easy to difficult and gave priority to those most needed by 
farmers or those that yielded quick returns such as roads hardening and 
beautifying village environment.  
Since 2009, to conduct province-wide implementation of yishi yiyi, pilot 
areas had been expanded from three (Heilongjiang, Hebei and Yunnan 
provinces) to seven (Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, Hunan, Anhui, Guizhou, 
Chongqing, and Ningxia provinces). Furthermore, another seven provinces 
had been chosen to implement this policy in some areas within the 
provinces.292 In 2010, pilot provinces further increased to 11 to include 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei and Guangxi. Six more provinces had been chosen to 
conduct yishi yiyi in some areas within the provinces.293  
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Following the 2009 notice, different provinces had released notices on 
yishi yiyi on their own. H District had worked out a specific scheme to 
implement government awards and subsidies based on the Notice of 
Implementing Government Awards and Subsidies for Village-Level Public 
Works through yishi yiyi issued by the Provincial Department of Finance, 
Office of Rural Work and the Leading Group of Comprehensive Rural Reform 
of Hunan Province together with the Circular of Hunan Provincial 
Government on Yishi Yiyi Fundraising and Labour Contribution within 
Villages. On an annual basis, a farmer was only required to contribute RMB15 
and labour for 10 days. Government awards and subsidies would be three 
times that raised by farmers.294 
The public projects covered under this arrangement in Hunan province 
include (i) intra-village road construction;295 (ii) small-scale water facilities 
such as ditches, ponds on the hills, culverts, groundwater irrigation wells, and 
other small-scale irrigation and drainage facilities; (iii) public environmental 
sanitation facilities within village; and (iv) afforestation within villages.  
In the application of public project, villages should submit the 
examination form of public projects through yishi yiyi in H District, the 
minutes of farmers’ assemblies and the scheme of fundraising and labour 
contribution. The project would be given the green light after examination by 
the town government and related departments at district or county level. The 
village could apply for government awards and subsidies after project 
completion. An application form along with other documents such as the 
description of funds and labour contribution, statement of account and final 
accounts of project completion to the town government, should be completed 
by the village committee.  
After inspection by the Office of Finance and the Rural Operation and 
Management Station at town government, the endorsed projects would be 
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submitted to the Office of Finance and Office of Reducing Burden at county 
or district level for approval and allocation of awards and subsidies. 
 
Yishi	  Yiyi	  on	  the	  Ground	  
In spite of this arrangement via yishi yiyi, not all villages with public 
projects were successful in obtaining funds. There were simply too many 
urgent projects vying for a small amount of fund. However project selection 
often lacked specific guidelines, again giving room for informal institutions 
such as guanxi to proliferate. 
 
Table 26 Minutes of Farmers’ Representatives’ Assembly on Yishi Yiyi 
 
Minutes of Assembly of Farmers’ Representatives on Yishi Yiyi 
 
Date:    Morning of 26 May 2010 
Place:   Party Members’ Conference Room at S Village 
Quorum: 43 
Number of Attendants: 43 
Chairmen of the Conference: The Village General Secretary, Wang **,  
Minutes taken by: Secretary of village committee, Wang** 
Contents of the Conference: To discuss the project of river treatment and building a 
new anti-flood wall in S Village. 
 
    The standard is as follows: the basic earthwork is 525 cubic metres, concrete needed is 
150 cubic metres, and rubble concrete needed is 336 cubic metres. The overall estimated 
costs of the project are RMB270,000.  
 First, according to the standards of yishi yiyi policy, everyone would contribute 
RMB15, making it a total of RMB24,300 for a population of 1,620. 
 Second, there are a total of 1,100 workers in the village. The fee for labour is RMB10 
per day. If everyone works for five days, it would amount to RMB55,000. 
 Third, encourage donations from non-local businessmen and from more well-to-do 
farmers in the village. 
 Fourth, any outstanding capital required would be filled by funds from upper-level 
government. 
 The head of the village committee, Wang** would take charge of river treatment and 
anti-flood wall construction projects. A supervisory group to check on project quality 
would be established. 
 
Comments of villagers’ representatives: Omitted 
 
Voting and Result:    
      All attendees have voted for this project. 
 
Signatures of all participants: Omitted    
 
Source: The form has been translated from the original Chinese form obtained during the 
author’s field trip in 2010. 





A Rural Operation and Management Station official who was in charge of 
managing funds application in yishi yiyi admitted that the key to the 
application process was guanxi. If the village general secretary were close to 
officials working in town departments in charge of yishi yiyi related issues, the 
success rate of his/her fund application would have been higher. 
A T Town case study in the author’s second field trip in 2010 well 
illustrated this in the process of application.  In practice, the many documents 
and resources required to verify the implementation of yishi yiyi were not 
needed as they would be prepared by the Rural Operation and Management 
Station of the town government. A staff said that most of the documents were 
fabricated. For instance, there were no detailed minutes of villagers’ or 
villagers’ representatives’ assemblies (see Table 26). In many cases, the 
assemblies for yishi yiyi did not take place at all. All the documents were 
prepared by the staffs to meet the requirements of the application as village 
committees had no inkling as to how to prepare them in such a way that they 
would be accepted by the higher authorities.  
Farmers were often reluctant to contribute funds for these public projects, 
as they believe it was the job of the government. The figure of RMB15 per 
person had been included for the sake of application. In reality, farmers might 
or might not contribute depending on the project concerned. In some cases, 
farmers might even contribute more than the required sum if they had urgent 
need of the projects.  
But even the RMB15 per contribution was way too little for a public 
project construction. The yishi yiyi at S Village was an example. Table 27 
shows that the funds raised through yishi yiyi were only RMB138,100, 
representing about 27% of total funds raised within the village. The majority 
of the funds (73%) came from donations.  
The initial objective of advocating farmers to deal with their own issues 
without burdening them through yishi yiyi was thus not fulfilled, as farmers 
would be asked to contribute more than the cap of RMB15 per person. 
However, on paper, only RMB15 per contribution was reflected to meet 
criteria set. The excess would be labelled as donations. 





Table 27 Application Form for Government Awards and Subsidies for Village Level 
yishi yiyi of H District (Excerpt) 
Name of the Village S Village 
Population 
Number of households 400 
Total population 1620 
Number of workers 1100 
Name of 



























The remaining part is omitted 
 
Source: The form is an English translated version of the original Chinese form obtained 
during the author’s field trip in 2010. 
 
At the government level, subsidy for public projects through yishi yiyi 
was also quite limited. Government awards and subsidies for yishi yiyi for 
each public project within a village were set at three times the total amount of 
funds raised by farmers. Table 27 shows that the total cost of river treatment 
and anti-flood wall construction was RMB580,000 and the funds raised by 
farmers were RMB24,300. An application of RMB60,000 (10% of total cost), 
or around three times RMB24,300, for the river treatment and anti-flood wall 
construction projects was made.  
The allocated funds were often less than the applied one. For instance, the 
applied amount of funds of Village X, Y and Z in T Town 2010 was 
RMB139,000, RMB70,000, and RMB 80,000, but the allocated funds was 
RMB90,000, RMB50,000, and RMB 60,000 (see Table 28). These three 
villages received less than the amount applied except S Village that obtained 
more than applied due to special guanxi. The head of the Rural Operation and 
Management Station said that the Chairman of H District People’s Congress 
of CCP had been allocated to S Village as the resident cadre (zhucun ganbu). 
With his special position and guanxi with officials at various departments of H 





District government, it would not be difficult to obtain extra funds for S 
Village. It would not be violating the subsidy policy as it was allowed to 
properly raise the proportion of subsidies based on the standards set for 
subsidy of Hunan province.296 Moreover, being one of the demonstration sites 
in H District, there are grounds for more fund allocation.  
 
Table 28 Funds Applied and Allocated for Yishi Yiyi in Villages S, X, Y, and Z in 2010 




S Village 60,000 160,000 267 
X Village 139,000 90,000 65 
Y Village 70,000 50,000 71 
Z Village 80,000 60,000 75 
Source: data compiled from the author’s field trip in 2010.  
 
The effectiveness of yishi yiyi was questionable. First, the policy 
stipulating the ceiling of RMB15 per person for fundraising and RMB10 per 
day for labour contribution had not been carefully thought-out or researched 
before implementation. Even a large village as S Village with a population of 
around 1,620 could only raised RMB24,300, which was way below project 
cost.  
The low ceiling yielded not only a likewise low contribution from farmers, 
but also government subsidy. Based on this ceiling, the official government 
subsidy for river treatment and anti-flood wall construction in S Village was 
only RMB60,000, which was only 10% of the estimated costs of the project.  
Second, the initial purpose of yishi yiyi to relieve farmers’ burden could 
not be achieved, as farmers were often required to contribute more than the 
stipulated RMB15. Though it was the intention of central and provincial 
governments to relieve farmers’ burden, local governments would always 
manipulate their way to get farmers to contribute more than the required 
amount. As mentioned earlier, the large amount of donation at S Village was 
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derived from extra funds raised within village. Finally, yishi yiyi 
implementation was highly dependent on voluntary contributions from 
farmers, which were contingent on a number of factors to be discussed in 
detail in the following section. 
 
7.2	  Village’s	  Collective	  Income	  	  
The importance of village’s collective income has been presented in 
Chapter 6. For instance, in the construction of inter-village road, S Village had 
contributed funds of RMB590,000, or about 41% of total funds for road 
construction. Likewise a study of 27 villages from five cities in Fujian 
province had shown that the investment by village’s collective income on 
average accounted for 40.1% of total investment for rural infrastructure 
construction.297 
Another good example was A Village of Zhejiang province. A Village 
had collective economy dealing with mining. It had established a village-run 
enterprise for mining marble since 1998. It was reported that the total output 
value of both industry and agriculture of A Village was RMB16 million in 
2005, of which RMB15 million came from the village enterprise. A Village 
had permanent assets of RMB13,113,000 and RMB10,800,000 of savings in 
the bank in 2005.  
A Village had invested part of the collective income on public goods and 
services. Until 2008, it had spent three million renminbi on improving village 
infrastructure, one million renminbi on building inter-village road connecting 
A Village with G Town government and three million renminbi on village 
afforestation and construction of areas for social activities. It had even 
established a social welfare system for local residents, such as allocating 
bonuses of RMB30,000 for each farmer every year-end, subsidising people 
above 60 years old with RMB50 or above a month, contributing 50% of safety 
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insurance fee for each farmer working in the village-run enterprise and 
awarding college graduates. 
 








Cost and expenses 




Cost and expenses 
of selling materials 
Lease revenue Cost and expenses of leasing 
Service revenue 





Cost and expenses 
of providing labour 
Other costs 
Revenue from 
contracting and revenue 

























self-financing Travel expenses 
Funds allocated by 
government for welfare 
undertakings 
 Conference expenses 
Government subsidies  Coordination fee 




Other expenses  
Source: author’s field trip to T Town. 
However, villages like A Village that provided extensive public goods 
and services were rare in China. Rich villages accounted for only 10% of total 
villages in China. Ninety per cent of villages either had little collective 
economic resource or were even in debt.298 Most villages, especially in the 
central and western parts of China, did not have developed collective economy. 
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Villages at T Town had poor collective economies. After the TFR and 
AAT, the collective incomes of village committees comprised mainly 
government transferred funds supplemented by various sources of income 
such as operating revenue, and revenue from contracts and other parties such 
as village-run enterprise, and others (see Table 29). Some might have certain 
level of debts. A study showed that villages with village-run enterprises had 
lower debts than those without.299  
As many villages at T Town had little or no collective economy, the 
income under the category of operating revenue was often negligible or zero. 
The village collective revenue of T Town often came from funds obtained 
through one-issue-one-discussion and other government subsidies. Previously 
many villages such as S Village of T Town received RMB150,000 in 2005, 
RMB470,000 in 2006, RMB676,000 in 2007 and RMB340,000 in 2008 from 
logging. The income from logging was however not guaranteed as the growth 
of trees was constrained by natural conditions. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
snow disaster in 2008 had destroyed the entire forest, leaving many hills bare 
and villages with almost zero income in 2009. 
The forest management area at S Village had been contracted out 
gradually after the snow disaster. When villages were urgently in need of 
money, trees were cut regardless of whether it was just a small tree. In order to 
support the NSCC project, S Village had no choice but to contract out the 
forest management area to individual farmer households. Hence, the collective 
income from the forest management area had dwindled in S Village. 
According to the clerk at the Rural Operation and Management Station, the 
collective income of many villages in T Town, including S Village, was so 
paltry that he was worried how they could fund public projects in their villages. 
N Village had almost no collective funds to conduct village level public 
projects. Few public projects had been organised and limited funds had been 
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raised by farmers. Only small public projects such as the construction or 
maintenance of ditches and ponds had been carried out in some village groups 
such as groups 1, 3 and 5. For instance, the local government had allocated 
subsidies to village groups 1 and 5 of N Village for accepting migrant 
households. The subsidies were partly collectively owned and used by 
individual migrant households. Each of village group 1, 3 and 5 received 
about RMB20,000 as collectively owned funds each year.  
Groups 1 and 3 were also compensated RMB35,000 each for 
expropriating farmland for the construction of a high-speed railway. The 
compensation for doing so was RMB20,000. Seventy per cent of these funds 
were retained as collective funds in the village group, while the remaining was 
allocated to individual households. Hence, total compensation as collective 
funds of each village group amounted to RMB38,577. Village groups 1 and 3 
had each utilised RMB30,000 from the collective funds to construct ditches 
and ponds while village group 5 had channelled RMB10,000 into ditch 
maintenance. 
Collective income of a village or village group was thus important for 
public project constructions. However, public projects larger than a ditch or a 
pond were almost impossible if collective income was solely depended upon. 
The town official of the Station of Operation and Management at T Town was 
pessimistic that villages with limited resources and little industry could 
conduct any public project in the future due to the shortage of collective funds. 
 
7.3	  Entrepreneurs’	  Contribution	  
Donations from entrepreneurs for public projects were common. It was a 
win-win situation for both the donor and the benefactor. B Village of H 
District, Z City had benefited greatly from the donation of a home-grown 
entrepreneur Mr Deng, who was now the Chairman of the JY Ecological 
Construction Group in Y province. In 2006, with over RMB100 million in 
assets, Mr Deng returned to his hometown to revive the dilapidated village. He 
invested RMB30 million in B Village, constructing hundreds of gardens and 





more than a hundred of ecological projects. As offspring of the village, he was 
determined to improve the ecological environment of B Village. 
In the beginning of 2006, Mr Deng urged his former primary classmate 
who was now the village head of B Village to apply to become a NSCCP 
demonstration site. One month thereafter, Mr Deng returned to his hometown 
with his family to discuss the ecological improvement project with village 
officials and NSCCP officials. The aim was to construct the village into an 
ecological garden and jointly develop its agritourism and biotechnology. 
The invested funds were used for various projects such as afforestation, 
sanitation and waste management to improve the village environment. A four-
star hotel within the village had also been built with farmers as shareholders. 
This was on top of a flower cooperative of 200 mu, a pear planting cooperative 
of 450 mu, a fish pond of 100 mu and two piggeries. The average annual 
income of each household in B Village hit RMB25,000 in 2008 and 
RMB30,000 in 2009, a figure that was ten times that of 2005. 
Another example was the irrigation ditch construction for village group 3 
of N Village invested by a local-born entrepreneur Mr Li. Mr Li had his first 
pot of gold in the cities before he returned to the village to operate a holiday 
resort near village group 3. The resort needed a ditch to divert water to it. As 
village group 3 had no running water for drinking and irrigation. Mr Li 
decided to extend the ditch to cater to village group 3 as well. He invested 
RMB125,000 in the entire project and became a household name whenever 
the ditch was mentioned. His contribution had won the respect of the entire 
village as well as the admiration of other village groups. 
Compared to government funds, contributions from entrepreneurs were 
comparatively random and infrequent. Oftentimes, the investment was one-off 
and could not be depended upon for rural public goods provision. 
 
7.4	  Farmers’	  Self-­‐Organisation	  and	  Fundraising	  
As government transferred funds covered only part of rural public goods 
provision, a large part of small-scale public projects needed to be undertaken 
by the farmers. Farmers’ initiative and cooperation in the process of public 





goods provision were vital. Whether farmers would cooperate and contribute 
funds to the rural public expenditure depended on several factors: farmers’ 
financial capacity, farmers’ mind-set and leadership. 
 
Farmers’	  Financial	  Capacity	  
Farmers who derived their incomes from agriculture were usually poorer 
than those whose incomes came from industry. In general, farmers from 
provinces that mainly depended on agriculture had lower income than those 
with various village economies. For instance, based on 2007 statistics, 
farmers’ per capita net income were high in Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, 
Tianjin and Jiangsu at RMB10,144.62, RMB9,439.63, RMB8,265.15, 
RMB7,010.06 and RMB6,561.01 respectively. Farmers in Hunan province 
had per capital net income of RMB3,904.20, ranked 16th among 31 provinces 
included in the statistics.300 
Farmers’ per capita annual net income at T Town were between about 
RMB5,000 according to an interview with village cadres. Farmers were not 
that well off as to contribute enough money to rural public goods provision. 
Based on the funds raised, the affordable level of each household for a certain 
public project that was urgently needed by them is less than RMB2,000 per 
household a year.  
Take the construction of drinking water facility at village group 9 in S 
Village for example. Village group 9 had no running water and used to fetch 
water from wells. Because of pollution, the water in the wells was no longer 
suitable for drinking. Mr Zhou, a resident at group 9 who sold pork for a living 
decided to construct a pipe to divert water from a small reservoir nearby. He 
mobilised 34 households in his village group for this project. At first, every 
household contributed RMB600, but when construction works proceeded, they 
ran out of funds. So they contributed another RMB600 per household. Mr 
Zhou said that he managed to obtain RMB5,000 from the Water Resources 
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Bureau of H District using his personal network with a staff there. The project 
cost about RMB50,000 in total. 
The cost of drinking water diversion facility construction at village group 
9 was considered moderate. Some drinking water projects were pretty costly. 
The failure of village group 4 of S Village in Chapter 6 to obtain government 
funds for its drinking water facility project was a case of cost outstripping 
farmers’ financial capacity. The project needed as much as RMB400,000, well 
beyond the financial capabilities of the farmers as the total population at the 
time was only 110. Farmers would have to fork out as much as about 
RMB4,000 per person. The project was left unfinished eventually. 
 
Farmers’	  Mind-­‐set	  
Farmers’ mind-set had a crucial bearing on their participation and 
fundraising. Farmers would only contribute funds to public goods that were 
most useful to them including inter-village road construction and drinking 
water pipe diversion. Road construction in particular had the financial support 
of the government. Projects such as small-scale farmland irrigation had 
difficulties getting the support of farmers due to high cost and the free rider 
problem.  
Dependence	  on	  Government	  
Local officials revealed that farmers had a strong dependence on 
government (yilaigan taiqiang). An interview with farmers at T Town showed 
that they had a strong dependence on central government and an equally 
strong distrust of local government. 
Farmers believed that the central government would solve their problems 
gradually in the future, including funding for rural public goods and services. 
This confidence was boosted by the central government’s abolition of 
agricultural taxes and fees. A farmer said, “The central government has been 
good to us and really relieved our burden. It has also allocated huge funds to 
construct public projects in rural areas according to television news.” 





Farmers believed that the government would solve their problem sooner 
or later. Farmers in village group 5 of N Village as mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 6 refused to contribute funds for the construction of intra-village road 
after the inter-village road was invested jointly by government funds and 
village’s funds. Some of them including the village group leader believed that 
the upper-level government would implement a new policy to allocate funds 
for constructing an intra-village road in the near future since the government 
had constructed an inter-village road. During a villagers’ representative 
assembly, the most frequent question raised was on the intra-village road. The 
leader of village group 5 appealed to the village branch secretary to raise this 
issue with upper-level government officials.  
Some farmers also regarded rural public goods provision as the task of 
government or village officials. In N Village, a farmer said, “It is the job of 
the government. If government does nothing about it, what can ordinary 
people like me do? It is up to village officials who have connections with 
upper-level government officials to get funding from the government. We, as 
ordinary farmers, can hardly write a decent report or explain such things 
well.” The situation was especially so for farmers who work outside of the 
village and public projects had little relevance to their everyday lives. 
There were also others who were sceptical about the reliability of local 
governments or village officials and reluctant to contribute funds to public 
goods provision. Some farmers informed that they only believed in themselves 
in the village. A farmer said that when a public project needed fundraising, he 
would investigate if the project would really kick-off so that money would not 
go to waste. He said he was aware that the central government had allocated 
huge funds to the countryside based on television news, but had no idea as to 
where had all the funds gone to. The many corruption cases on television 
made them wonder if the allocated funds had gone to the pockets of local 
officials, several farmers added. 





Free	  Rider	  Problem	  
Free rider problem was common in collective actions especially in rural 
public goods provision such as the intra-village road construction and 
farmland irrigation facilities. Individuals preferred not to contribute, but to 
free ride on others’ efforts.301 Some public projects managed to overcome the 
problem by reducing group size, defining the users clearly and constraining 
social norms. 
Olson stated that rational, self-interested individuals would not act to 
achieve their common interests in the absence of small group size, or coercion 
or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interests.302 Collective action was easier in smaller groups. It was rather 
difficult for farmers in S Village to organise a village level public project for 
instance. The size of an administrative village was too big to have smooth 
information flow as some village groups were separated by large areas of 
farmland or small hills. The interviews had shown that it was difficult to 
discuss public issues at villagers’ assemblies, as absenteeism of farmers was 
high.  
In the end, village group leaders and Party members of the village had to 
go door to door to inform households. Party members who came from 
different village groups and happened to be group leaders would help to 
convey information from upper-level governments. In S Village, the frequency 
of Party members’ meetings used to be five to seven times a year. Party 
member was normally awarded RMB10 for each attendance. However, given 
the tight financial constraints, the village branch of the Party could no longer 
afford the participation fee and there was thus little incentive for members to 
attend the meeting. For those who were currently working in the cities, 
attendance at meetings was impossible.  
Farmers’ provision of rural public goods often took place in small groups 
like within a village group or among several groups located near to each other. 
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Take S Village as an example. Most of the small-scale public projects such as 
the construction of a ditch and drinking water diversion project had been 
conducted within village groups. There were 13 village groups in S Village 
with a total population of about 1,700 in 2009. Groups 1 to 13 had 140, 70, 
170, 110, 170, 168, 180, 90, 150,140, 70, 68 and 120 members respectively. 
While some groups had conducted intra-village road construction, some had 
completed drinking water pipe diversion or ditch construction: Groups 2 and 
11 had conducted drinking water pipe diversions, and groups 10 and 12 had 
constructed sand-paved intra-village road. 
Drinking water pipe diversion project was easier and often not regarded 
as a pure public project as it could selectively choose participating households. 
The water pipe would not pass by households that refuse to pay for the 
construction. Neighbours who had good relationship and who needed this 
project could be gathered to bring this project to fruition. Otherwise, the water 
pipe would bypass a person’s house.  
Villages might differ in the provision of rural public goods due to 
different village culture. He Xuefeng had classified Chinese villages into two 
large categories. If a village lacked a basic shared value or understanding, or a 
basic unit of action except family ties, it was an atomised village (yuanzihua). 
The other type was traditional village. Atomized village had little contact with 
others except their own core family,303 thus making cooperation difficult. 
Based on He’s category, N Village was more like an atomized village 
than S Village. A shared value or understanding and a basic unit of action 
existed in S Village that was more like a village dominated by a clan. Farmers 
in N and S Villages reacted differently to the provision of rural public goods. 
Farmers were generally more cooperative in S village than in N Village. The 
interviews with farmers showed that the main difference between N and S 
Villages lied with the different village culture. 
In S Village, about 90% of the farmers had the surname of Wang, which 
means that they shared the same ancestor. Farmers here celebrate big events 
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like wedding, funeral, and house warming together. Their behaviour was 
influenced by traditional norms. For instance, they were supposed to help out 
in big occasions of one’s family such as weddings and funerals. The more 
people who attended these big occasions meant that the more respected and 
regarded this person was among peers. When one played host, his relatives 
would help out by preparing dishes, loaning chairs and tableware as if they 
were living in the same house. This was the typical big family (dajiazu) 
tradition. A lady informed that she belonged to another village and one of her 
relatives lives here. With his introduction, she got married to a resident in S 
Village. Many of the residents in dawanli were thus related to each other.  
Farmers in S Village also had close contacts with each other. The shared 
value had been formed for generations. The village identity was strong in S 
Village. A farmer said that S Village especially at dawanli was known for 
being hospitable and few would attempt anything that would ruin the good 
reputation of S Village. The farmer added laughingly, “That is why young 
men in our village are highly sought after and many young women are happy 
to be married into our village.”  
However, in N Village, almost every village group had its own surnames. 
The annual ancestor worship would see many farmers in N Village joining 
their relatives in other villages. Hence, in N Village, the contacts among 
farmers were far less than that in S Village. 
A punitive measure for free riders in public goods provision was to isolate 
them from the majority. Farmers revealed that few people in S Village were 
free riders. Those who refused to contribute funds to public projects would 
experience some forms of peer pressure. They would often be described as 
houyanwuchi (thick-skinned and shameless), a subject of gossip and shunned 
in his or her big occasions. He or she would suffer from public disgrace and 
felt the social stigma of being separated or ignored by the community. A 
farmer said that in normal situations, people would not risk doing so as living 
in isolation could be rather unbearable. Only farmers who were really poor 
such as the lone elderly who has no income would be exempted from 
contributing to public expenditure. 






The	  Role	  of	  Leadership	  
A good leader was necessary to see public projects to completion. The 
function of the village committee and the coordination with village group 
leaders would determine the success of a public project. 
The village committee in S Village functioned better than that in N 
Village. First, village committee members in S Village who lived close to each 
other in dawanli often met to discuss public issues. In such a clan-dominated 
village, the village committee faced pressure from the clan that also, to some 
extent, supervised the village committee to avoid arbitrary use of power. 
Sometimes, the village committee would exercise clan power to get people to 
participate in the provision of rural public goods.  
In N Village, the village branch secretary who dominated the village often 
made decision without seeking the advice of other village committee members. 
The village head often referred questions directed to him to the branch 
secretary, known as the yibashou (the chief) to the local people, as “he knows 
everything”. In other instances, some village group leaders were not resident 
leaders. The lack of communication and discussion between village committee 
members and village group leaders had negative effects on the organisation of 
rural public goods provision.  
Two cases of drinking water projects in S and N Villages would illustrate 
the role of leadership in the provision process. Village group 2, located west of 
the main village road, was not far from the entrance of S Village. There were 
19 households with about 150 residents. For many years, they had depended 
on a stream for drinking water. However, waste discharge, the operation of 
highway, and the establishment of a coal yard at the upper reaches of the 
stream in the recent years had polluted the water quality of the stream. 
Residents began to fall ill from drinking unclean water. The leader of group 2 
reported the issue to the Party Committee of H District, H District 
Government, Water Resources Bureau of H District and Environmental 
Protection Agency of H District, but still failed to obtain any subsidy.  





Initially, he was hesitant about getting farmers to fund the project as it 
was too costly and too colossal a task. He was however persuaded repeatedly 
by his son, a university graduate who worked in Beijing, to persuade group 2 
residents to go ahead with the project, as safe drinking water was essential to 
their wellbeing.  
The group leader thereafter gathered the representatives of each 
household to his house to discuss the issue. It was no easy job as the sum 
needed from farmers was a little high. After serious consideration and 
discussion, a consensus was reached for every registered resident of the 
village to contribute RMB493. The collective income that came from an 
annual pond lease of RMB200 would also go to the project. Total funds raised 
were around RMB40,000, including a donation of RMB10,000 from a local 
entrepreneur who worked outside the village. 
The group leader took charge of task allocation. The construction work 
was done by free labour contributed by village group 2 residents. Young local 
male residents who had experience working in the construction sector were 
roped in. The group leader who also had prior experience in construction 
oversaw the entire process. Construction materials were purchased from the 
city. Three villagers accompanied the group leader on the purchase trip to 
ensure that no graft or misappropriation took place.  
Drinking water for group 2 would have to be diverted from the nearest 
reservoir on the hill via a 500-metre underground pipe to connect the reservoir 
to the pond located at the centre of the village group. The pond was 
constructed by bricks, with a perimeter and height of six metres each. The 
whole construction work lasted 300 days, with each farmer contributing 30 
labour days on average. The project had been regarded as the most successful 
among all the projects in S Village. 
N Village, on the other hand, was an example of bad leadership. The 
leader of group 5 not only was unenthusiastic about public goods provision, 
but also stressed repeatedly that the village group had no funds to contribute to 
public goods provision. At the Party members’ meeting, instead of pursuing 





self-development, he would often urge the village branch secretary to apply 
for funds from upper-level government to construct intra-village road. 
 
7.5	  Conclusion	  
Public projects funded mainly by agricultural villages with little or no 
government support were normally fraught with problems, registering low 
success rates in general. The fiscal constraints of village committee and 
farmers aside, such projects would have to overcome a multitude of obstacles 
such as free-rider problem, misconception of government’s responsibilities, 
poor leadership, and lack of sound policy. The success of such projects was 
rare and attributed largely to huge donations and good leadership.  
The government policy of yishi yiyi had yet to fulfil its objectives. It 
attempted to regulate farmers’ contribution of fund and organise efforts 
towards rural public goods provision to reduce farmers’ financial burden. But 
the limit set at RMB15 for each farmer’s contribution only proved too 
impractical for actual implementation. At the same time, the government 
subsidy for yishi yiyi was also insufficient to be effective. Farmers were still 
required to contribute beyond the ceiling of yishi yiyi. If farmers were 
unwilling, yishi yiyi was ineffective in encouraging farmers to raise funds for 
rural public projects. 
A village’s collective income was vital to rural public goods provision. 
However, for villages that were dominated by agriculture, they had little or 
almost no collective economy like many villages in T Town. The dependence 
on logging for collective income was not guaranteed due to natural factors. 
The decreasing collective incomes of S and N Villages were good examples. 
Data also showed that the majority of villages in China had limited collective 
economy. 
Entrepreneurs’ donation acted as an important supplementary funding for 
rural public goods provision. As in T Town, villages B and N were lucky to 
receive huge donations from a respective Mr Deng and Mr Li, two home-
grown entrepreneurs from the villages. However, public goods provision could 





not rely on entrepreneurs’ donations, as they were rare and infrequent and 
could not be relied upon as a common way of fundraising. 
Despite the difficulties in organising rural public goods provision for 
agriculture-dominated villages, some villages managed to overcome financial 
constraints and traditional government-reliant mind-set through good 
leadership to push through public projects. Agricultural-based farmers, the 
lowest earners in the farming industry, could only rely on the government for 
funds. The government’s funds allocation to some public projects had greatly 
motivated farmers’ enthusiasm in playing a part, albeit minor, in raising funds. 
The mobilisation, fundraising and organisation of rural public goods provision 
would not be possible without good leadership. S Village had good village 
committee members who worked closely together to organise rural public 
goods provision, while the overconcentration of power in the hands of the 
village branch secretary of N Village was a hindrance to public goods 
provision. 
The free rider mentality was common in collective actions. Whether it 
hindered cooperation among farmers in the provision of rural public goods 
depended on contextual factors such as group size and cultural factors. The 
free rider problem was overcome in the case of the drinking water diversion 
project conducted by the village group as a small unit in a village. Households 
that did not contribute to the project would not have the water pipe running 
through their household. Village culture also played an important part in 
eliminating the free rider problem. Villages like the clan-dominated S Village 
had overcome the problem better than N Village, an atomised village. The 
strong village identity at S Village would act to shame and isolate those who 
attempted to free ride on public projects. However, villages like S Village 
were disappearing in China attributable to the high mobility of farmers 
between cities and villages and the gradual fading of traditional village culture. 
The atomisation of villages thus had negative effects on collective action and 
cooperation in public goods provision.  
Promoting self-development among farmers thus still had a long way to 
go. The few successful cases mentioned earlier were very special and isolated 





cases. Most of these successful cases were related to drinking water facility 
construction that was small projects that could be handled by villages. These 
projects satisfied certain criteria: the project should be within the affordability 
of farmers or the collective income; farmers must be prepared to contribute 
funds or labour; free rider problem could be overcome by strong village 
culture; large donations, and the existence of good leadership. Most villages 
could not meet these criteria. As villages became more atomised and farmers 
moved to the cities to work, the difficulties of promoting self-development of 
villages would be further compounded. 





Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
Village officials in agricultural villages struggled to finance rural public 
goods provision after the TFR and AAT. The central government has 
increased the fiscal transfers to villages, but why is the provision of some 
public goods more successful than that of others given that these villages are 
in a same town and are subject to similar financial situation? By examining 
funds allocation as a process, this dissertation argues that the success of rural 
public goods provision in agricultural villages depends on not only the strong 
support of the government, but also more importantly the enforcement of 
clearly defined policies on funds allocation of local governments. When these 
policies are unclear, guanxi plays an important role in the successful provision 
of public goods. It is difficult for farmers to organise public goods provision in 
agricultural villages as villages have little collective income and farmers are 
reluctant to contribute funds. 
Public projects undertaken in the rural areas that were examined in this 
study had been classified into three categories to depict the different degrees 
of success of their provision. For public goods that were funded mainly by the 
government, there were two categories—one with clearly defined policies and 
the other without. The first category of public goods had a higher success rate, 
while the second category had to rely on guanxi or local government officials’ 
preferences. The third category of public projects funded mainly by villages 
faced immense hurdles in its implementation, constrained largely by the 
limited financial capacities of village committees and farmers, the free-rider 
problem, and misconception of government’s role. 
This dissertation had examined formal institutions, especially the 
fundraising and fund application and allocation system of T Town, H District, 
Chenzhou City in Hunan province at a micro level. Formal institutions, such 
as a specialised government department, a specific fund application and 
allocation system, strong government policy support and an effective 





evaluation system, had played essential roles in the success of public projects 
in villages dominated by agriculture. 
This chapter reviews some of the main findings. Firstly, it restates the 
significance of formal institutions and policies in rural public goods provision. 
Secondly, it examines the role played by guanxi in raising fund for rural 
public expenditure in agricultural villages and lays out its negative effects. 
Moreover, it also uncovers the role of local officials’ preferences on public 
project funds allocation. Thirdly, it reviews the factors constraining rural 
public goods provision by villages and farmers. The chapter will end with 
suggestions on further areas of studies such as an analysis of the fund 
allocation and project application systems. 
8.1	  Government-­‐Oriented	  Provision	  
This section discusses public goods funded mainly by government with 
specific procedures, clearly defined fund application and allocation policies, 
and other relevant guidelines or regulations. Inter-village road constructions 
came under the care of the Highway Administration Bureau and pond desilting 
constructions were the responsibility of the Water Resource Bureau. With the 
backing of these government departments, the workflow of this category of 
projects was normally smooth and efficient. The existence of specialised 
government departments had greatly reduced bureaucracy and simplified 
official procedures. 
Fund allocations for inter-village road construction and ponds desilting 
works were clearly and scientifically defined and effectively implemented, 
fuelling farmers’ enthusiasm in the projects. Almost all villages had been 
granted a certain amount of government subsidy for the works. Each level of 
government would provide subsidies based on the inter-village road length 
and pond size. For inter-village road construction, a respective 49% and 72% 
of total road construction costs of S and N Villages came from government 
subsidy. N and S Villages had obtained government subsidy for around 70% 
of the total costs of ponds desilting work.  
The clearly and scientifically defined fund allocation systems and the 
huge funds provided by the government had strengthened farmers’ confidence 





in raising the remaining funds for public projects, which was not substantial. 
Farmers’ contribution accounted for around 10% of total inter-village road 
construction costs and approximately 29% of total ponds desilting costs at S 
and N Villages. 
The inclusion of public project construction in the performance evaluation 
of officials acted as an effective gauge of the provision process. Performance 
was based on the completion of a certain length of road as well as in the 
success of raising and managing funds.  
8.2	  Provision	  with	  Flawed	  Policy	  Design	  
The second category of public projects was funded mainly by the 
government but with unclear or unscientific policies. The success of such 
projects was low due to low accessibility of government funds as a result of 
unclear policies. Villages that had good guanxi with government officials had 
better chances of soliciting government funds for public goods provision. So 
would projects that reflected achievements of local governments. A 
comparison of two cases of similar drinking water facility construction 
projects had revealed the effect of guanxi in the fund application process. For 
drinking water projects, which came under the central policy of minban 
gongzhu, the government would only provide supporting funds. Unlike inter-
village road and ponds desilting projects, the Water Resources Bureau of H 
District had not formulated specific guidelines for fund application and 
allocation. A comparative study of the drinking water projects in dawanli and 
village group 4 of S Village had shown the importance of guanxi in the fund 
application process. The guanxi between the village secretary and the official 
at H District Government had enabled dawanli to obtain funds, while village 
group 4 failed for the lack of guanxi. 
The massive implementation of guanxi had negative impacts on villages. 
Not only did it give rise to corruption and lead to poor utilisation of funds, it 
had harmed farmer-official relationship in the long run. Villages had to 
splurge huge collective income to entertain officials at meals or to buy gifts 
for central officials to cultivate guanxi. Such expenses alone could easily 
surpass the annual salaries of four village officials. In addition, most farmers 





had low trust of local officials, as corruption cases of officials were rampant 
and widely reported on television news. Farmers were afraid that the hard 
earned money raised by them would be unwisely channelled to entertain 
officials, or embezzled. The low trust largely explained farmers’ reluctance in 
raising funds for rural public goods provision. 
This finding was important to uncovering many hidden problems 
associated with the current rural public goods system. The recommendation 
was to improve formal institutions such as regulating project application and 
fund allocation systems. Further work in this area could look at proposing 
specific measures for improving these formal institutions to reduce guanxi 
manoeuvrings. 
The NSCC projects under the second category of projects came under 
formal institutions and policies that were flawed. First, the application 
eligibility of NSCC projects was not comprehensive enough to cover every 
village. The local government’s emphasis on investment attraction had 
disadvantaged villages without industrial potential. As some NSCC projects 
were conducted only in certain parts of a village, the excluded would feel 
unduly ostracised and antagonistic towards local officials in the long run. 
Second, the NSCC had given rise to investment-oriented construction in 
countryside, which led to funds being diverted to projects that were of little 
utility to farmers. Farmers at S Village could not appreciate the ancient bridge, 
ancient stage, and recreation ground at dawanli. The money spent on these 
fancy projects took up as much as 42% of total costs of NSCC construction.  
Third, the requirement of enthusiasm and readiness in contributing funds 
or labour might not be a fair measure for some villages. It would only further 
widen the gap between villages with good agricultural infrastructure and those 
without. The alacrity of villages with good infrastructure was understandable. 
It was a vicious circle of improved infrastructure inevitably leading to better 
production efficiency and more income, while poor infrastructure limiting 
production capacity and income. The giving of priority to villages with better 
infrastructure would only aggravate the situation. The cases of S and V 
Villages in T Town were salient cases. S Village, which had better 





infrastructure than N Village had been successively selected as a 
demonstration site for three years, while N Village was only chosen for a year 
due to the perceived lack of farmers’ enthusiasm and cooperation.  
 
8.3	  Village-­‐Oriented	  Provision	  
This dissertation also examined the possibility of self-organizing 
provision of the third category of public projects funded mainly by villages. 
Given the limited resources available in villages, self-organizing might seem a 
far-fetched reality. 
First, the policy of yishi yiyi to promote public goods provision within the 
village had not been widely implemented due to some flaws in the policy 
design. The stipulated contribution of an unpractical ceiling of RMB15 per 
farmer reflected badly on the decision-making capacity of upper-level 
governments. Moreover, the flexibility of labelling excess contributions from 
farmers as donations only burdened farmers further by requiring them to 
contribute more to the funds.  
Second, fundraising was constrained by a village’s collective income. The 
collective income of some villages was so limited that it could hardly provide 
for public projects except for extremely small projects such as the 
maintenance of a ditch. Government fund allocation was often a push factor 
for farmers to raise funds. Inter-village road construction depended mainly on 
government funds. The collective incomes of both N and S Villages were on 
the decline as they are derived mainly from logging, which is contingent on 
natural conditions. Villages with decreasing collective income had no other 
alternatives but to rely on government funds for public goods provision. 
Third, to raise funds, villages needed to overcome their fiscal constraints, 
possess a changed mind-set and have good leaders. However, these conditions 
were rather difficult at agricultural villages. Agricultural-based farmers who 
were low-income earners were usually reluctant to contribute to public goods 
provision. They could only contribute to extremely small public projects.  
The heavy reliance on government was common especially after the TFR 
and AAT. The AAT had endeared the central government to farmers. Local 





government officials on the other hand had fallen out of favour with farmers 
after the media widely reported on their corrupt practices and scandals. 
Farmers were fearful of being cheated of their money. Interviews had shown 
that the recent pro-farmer and pro-agriculture policies had given farmers the 
misperception that the government would eventually solve all their problems 
including public goods provision.  
Farmers were also reluctant to contribute funds if a free rider problem was 
prevalent. A closely-knit village with strong identity was a deterrent to free 
riding behaviours. Farmers who were afraid of being isolated by peers would 
be pressured to contribute to public expenditure. However, with more farmers 
migrating to cities to work, these constraints had been gradually weakened. 
Only small public projects such as drinking water projects that could divert 
pipelines away from free riding households would farmers’ participation be 
evident.  
Even small public projects could be stalled if good leadership was lacking. 
The leader undertook the main responsibility of raising funds among farmers 
and acted as their spokesman when communicating with upper-level 
government. The author’s fieldtrip revealed that village committee members 
and group leader were usually the organisers. It was easier for the committee 
to function when members were cooperative as in the case of S Village.  
The few successful farmer-initiated public project constructions were 
restricted to extremely small projects, or projects with large donations from 
entrepreneurs. Good examples were the donation of RMB30 million by Mr 
Deng to B Village and the donation of RMB125,000 by Mr Li to N Village 
which had greatly supplemented funds. Villages could only contribute to rural 
public goods when their collective income was abundant, when there were 
donations by entrepreneurs, and when farmers had organisational capabilities. 
Successful cases like those of villages in T Town were few as these 
preconditions were difficult to satisfy. 
 
 





8.4	  Contribution	  	  	  
This dissertation looks at government policy such as fund allocation and 
examines how fund allocation as a process affected rural public goods 
provision in agricultural villages. The different roles played by governments at 
different levels, village committees and farmers are likewise analyzed. The 
relationships between county, town and village committees after the TFR and 
AAT have also been explored.   
The detailed investigation of the fund allocation for three classified public 
projects has unveiled the reasons for the success of some public projects after 
the TFR and AAT when the lack of funds is the general situation for 
agricultural villages. Huge differences existed in fund allocation among 
different types of public goods provision. The classification of public projects 
based on the indicator of clearly defined fund allocation policy has enriched 
the literature of the effects of TFR and AAT on rural public goods provision.  
This dissertation supplemented Tsai’s study on the role played by formal 
institutions. Unlike Tsai’s emphasis on informal institutions as an explanation 
to the differences on public goods provision in different villages, this 
dissertation ascertains that clearly defined fund allocation policies are a factor 
in the success of rural public goods provision. By viewing funds allocation as 
a process, the relationship between local government officials and farmers, as 
well as relationship among different levels of local governments such as 
district and town governments were also presented. 
Finally, the importance of informal institutions such as guanxi has been 
explored in this research to examine the public goods provision in agricultural 
villages. The dissertation extends Tsai’s study of villages with strong solidary 
groups to agricultural villages in the central part of China where solidary 
groups are uncommon, and cooperation among peasants is weak. Tsai focused 
on solidary groups such as temples, churches, and lineage groups which 
provide informal rules to make local officials accountable for providing public 
goods for peasants.  
In this study, the solidary groups such as temples and churches in 
agricultural villages like S and N Villages in Chenzhou City, Hunan Province 





in the central part of China, are uncommon. Agricultural villages thus require 
different solutions from villages in Tsai’s study. The lack of funds and the 
unclear policies on funds allocation have left villages with no choice but to 
attempt all means to obtain funds. Guanxi played an important role in fund 
allocation when formal institutions regarding funds allocation are not strong. 
8.5	  Future	  Work	  
The comparative case study of both successful and unsuccessful projects 
had highlighted the importance of formal institutions and policies. The 
investigation had unveiled deep-seated problems in the process of rural public 
goods provision pertaining to fund allocation, fundraising, and project 
application systems at the district level. The fund allocation system at 
provincial and municipal levels could not be examined due to the difficulty in 
obtaining relevant data that had been labelled confidential and restricted.  
A supplementary study of the ways to regulate funds allocation at 
different levels of government would go hand in hand with the theme of this 
dissertation. Policies needed to be tightened to ensure effective use of 
financial resources, avoid duplicated constructions, prevent the construction of 
vanity projects and arrest the cultivation of guanxi. 
The focus of this dissertation was limited to rural infrastructure related 
public projects. Other public goods projects could be examined in future 
studies. The exploration of factors hindering self-development of villages in 
rural public goods provision through case studies had given solid ground to 
why rural public goods provision should not overstate the capability of 
villages and farmers. Strengthening the role of the government would be a 
better alternative. 
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